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# \*\*\*1NC\*\*\*

**The aff grounds their justifications for the plan in an ideology that has brought the planet to the brink of catastrophe: anthropocentrism**

Sivil 2k

Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. “WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT”, 2000, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>

Three most significant and pressing factors contributing to the environmental crisis are the ever increasing human population, the energy crisis, and the abuse and pollution of the earth’s natural systems. These and other factors contributing to the environmental crisis can be directly linked to anthropocentric views of the world. The perception that value is located in, and emanates from, humanity has resulted in understanding human life as an ultimate value, superior to all other beings. This has driven innovators in medicine and technology to ever improve our medical and material conditions, in an attempt to preserve human life, resulting in more people being born and living longer. **In achieving this aim, they have indirectly contributed to increasing the human population.** Perceptions of superiority, coupled with developing technologies have resulted in a social outlook that generally does not rest content with the basic necessities of life. Demands for more medical and social aid, more entertainment and more comfort translate into demands for improved standards of living. Increasing population numbers, together with the material demands of modern society, place ever increasing demands on energy supplies. While wanting a better life is not a bad thing, given the population explosion the current energy crisis is inevitable, which brings a whole host of environmental implications in tow. This is not to say that every improvement in the standard of living is necessarily wasteful of energy or polluting to the planet, but rather it is the cumulative effect of these improvements that is damaging to the environment. The abuses facing the natural environment as a result of the energy crisis and the food demand are clearly manifestations of anthropocentric views that treat the environment as a resource and instrument for human ends. The pollution and destruction of the non-human natural world is deemed acceptable, provided that it does not interfere with other human beings. It could be argued that there is nothing essentially wrong with anthropocentric assumptions, since it is natural, even instinctual, to favour one’s self and species over and above all other forms of life. However, it is problematic in that such perceptions influence our actions and dealings with the world to the extent that the well-being of life on this planet is threatened, making the continuance of a huge proportion of existing life forms "tenuous if not improbable" (Elliot 1995: 1). Denying the non-human world ethical consideration, it is evident that anthropocentric assumptions provide a rationale for the exploitation of the natural world and, therefore, have been largely responsible for the present environmental crisis (Des Jardins 1997: 93). Fox identifies three broad approaches to the environment informed by anthropocentric assumptions, which in reality are not distinct and separate, but occur in a variety of combinations. The "expansionist" approach is characterised by the recognition that nature has a purely instrumental value to humans. This value is accessed through the physical transformation of the non-human natural world, by farming, mining, damming etc. Such practices create an economic value, which tends to "equate the physical transformation of ‘resources’ with economic growth" (Fox 1990: 152). Legitimising continuous expansion and exploitation, this approach relies on the idea that there is an unending supply of resources. The "conservationist" approach, like the first, recognises the economic value of natural resources through their physical transformation, while at the same time accepting the fact that there are limits to these resources. It therefore emphasises the importance of conserving natural resources, while prioritising the importance of developing the non-human natural world in the quest for financial gain. The "preservationist" approach differs from the first two in that it recognises the enjoyment and aesthetic enrichment human beings receive from an undisturbed natural world. Focusing on the psychical nourishment value of the non-human natural world for humans, this approach stresses the importance of preserving resources in their natural states. All three approaches are informed by anthropocentric assumptions. This results in a one-sided understanding of the human-nature relationship. Nature is understood to have a singular role of serving humanity, while humanity is understood to have no obligations toward nature. Such a perception represents "not only a deluded but also a very dangerous orientation to the world" (Fox 1990: 13), as only the lives of human beings are recognised to have direct moral worth, while the moral consideration of non-human entities is entirely contingent upon the interests of human beings (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 9). Humanity is favoured as inherently valuable, while the non-human natural world counts only in terms of its use value to human beings. The "expansionist" and "conservationist" approaches recognise an economic value, while the "preservationist" approach recognises a hedonistic, aesthetic or spiritual value. They accept, without challenge, the assumption that the value of the non-human natural world is entirely dependent on human needs and interests. None attempt to move beyond the assumption that nature has any worth other than the value humans can derive from it, let alone search for a deeper value in nature. This ensures that human duties retain a purely human focus, thereby avoiding the possibility that humans may have duties that extend to non-humans. This can lead to viewing the non-human world, devoid of direct moral consideration, as a mere resource with a purely instrumental value of servitude. This gives rise to a principle of ‘total use’, whereby every natural area is seen for its potential cultivation value, to be used for human ends (Zimmerman 1998: 19). This provides limited means to criticise the behaviour of those who use nature purely as a warehouse of resources (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 184). It is clear that humanity has the capacity to transform and degrade the environment. Given the consequences inherent in having such capacities, "the need for a coherent, comprehensive, rationally persuasive environmental ethic is imperative" (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 2). The purpose of an environmental ethic would be to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the environment, and to provide a rational basis from which to decide how we ought and ought not to treat the environment. The environment was defined as the world in which we are enveloped and immersed, constituted by both animate and inanimate objects. This includes both individual living creatures, such as plants and animals, as well as non-living, non-individual entities, such as rivers and oceans, forests and velds, essentially, the whole planet Earth. This constitutes a vast and all-inclusive sphere, and, for purposes of clarity, shall be referred to as the "greater environment". In order to account for the moral relations that exist between humans and the greater environment, an environmental ethic should have a significantly wide range of focus. I argue that anthropocentric value systems are not suitable to the task of developing a comprehensive environmental ethic. Firstly, anthropocentric assumptions have been shown to be largely responsible for the current environmental crisis. While this in itself does not provide strong support for the claim, it does cast a dim light on any theory that is informed by such assumptions. Secondly, an environmental ethic requires a significantly wide range of focus. As such, it should consider the interests of a wide range of beings. It has been shown that anthropocentric approaches do not entertain the notion that non-human entities can have interests independent of human interests. "Expansionist", "conservationist" and "preservationist" approaches only acknowledge a value in nature that is determined by the needs and interests of humans. Thirdly, because anthropocentric approaches provide a moral account for the interests of humans alone, while excluding non-humans from direct moral consideration, they are not sufficiently encompassing. An environmental ethic needs to be suitably encompassing to ensure that a moral account is provided for all entities that constitute the environment. It could be argued that the indirect moral concern for the environment arising out of an anthropocentric approach is sufficient to ensure the protection of the greater environment. In response, only those entities that are in the interest of humans will be morally considered, albeit indirectly, while those entities which fall outside of this realm will be seen to be morally irrelevant. Assuming that there are more entities on this planet that are not in the interest of humans than entities that are, it is safe to say that anthropocentric approaches are not adequately encompassing. Fourthly, the goals of an environmental ethic should protect and maintain the greater environment. It is clear that the expansionist approach, which is primarily concerned with the transformation of nature for economic return, does not meet these goals. Similarly, neither does the conservationist approach, which is arguably the same as the expansionist approach. The preservationist approach does, in principle satisfy this requirement. However, this is problematic for such preservation is based upon the needs and interests of humans, and "as human interests and needs change, so too would human uses for the environment" (Des Jardins 1997: 129). Non-human entities, held captive by the needs and interests of humans, are open to whatever fancies the interests of humans. In light of the above, it is my contention that anthropocentric value systems fail to provide a stable ground for the development of an environmental ethic

**Unquestioned anthropocentrism is the root cause of violence and exploitation**

Johns 98

David M. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science Portland State Univ. B.S. Political Science and Anthropology 1976, Portland State University; M.A. Political Science 1978, J.D. Law, 1980, Columbia University.The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World (1990) Some Preliminary Comments in The great new wilderness debate By J. Baird Callicott, Michael P. Nelson

All human centered value systems necessarily fall prey to the easy rationalization of militarism. If one is concerned only with humans, with the perpetuation and protection of particular social systems against internal or external threats, the constraints placed upon the consumption of nature are weakened. Even when limits on resources may temper overconsumption generally, there is a real tendency in this sphere of "national security" to literally let the future take care of itself and commit all to the current struggle. Certainly aesthetic regard for nature falls by the wayside. If the machine needs oil, then drill. The Soviet Union, as an example, has some of the strictest environmental legislation in the These laws also provide a giant loophole for any endeavor related to the security of the state, virtually negating restrictions!' Most countries start with weaker laws to begin with before embracing the exceptions. There are many human-centered value systems, religious and secular, critical of militarization—and all are largely ineffective. The failure comes in part from the wedding of values to structures of power—be they church or state—that depend upon force for their survival. Insofar as these pacifistic values arc taken up by those "outside" these structures they provide some check. But because they are human-centered—the point of opposing militarization is to end human waste and suffering—it is easy to neutralize them by appeal to other human values and other forms of suffering even worse than war or the costs of deterrence. The other great weakness is that much pacifistic thinking does not address adequately the roots of militarism, something I attempt to do below. If one values nature in and for itself, then human goals and needs are placed within the context of a larger community. The value placed on the integrity of that community militates heavily against any human-centered rationalization for exploitation. A biocentrism view quite simply limits the conversion of ecosystems and biomass to human use to any extensive degree. Although such a view may seem utopian, because it poses a threat to the survival of particular social systems or the system of historical social systems, it does not pose a threat to tic survival of the species as some would argue. Quite the opposite, the threat to both us and the planet comes from this system of systems. It is here that biocentrism provides understanding which human-centered approaches cannot, for the latter accept fundamental values which justify the very structures that give rise to the outcomes they criticize. Consider the roots of militarism. Because modern militarism is panicularly virulent, attempts to understand and criticize this blight are often limited to the modern period. Certainly the combination of enlightenment arrogance, science, and technology, embedded in the international political economy resulting from the European expansion, has produced a very dangerous world."' It is, however, necessary to look more deeply into human history to grasp the underlying dynamic of militarism. While it may have reached new proportions, it is not new, but rather an essential feature of something very old: civilization.'It is inseparable from social systems based upon hierarchy (class, gender, and ethnic), control of nature, the denial of self, and the emotions and bonds which constitute the self. It is an essential feature of those societies in which the state exists, the process by which the state attempts to substitute itself for authentic human community is well underway, and conflict between communities has been replaced by the institutionalized conflict of center and periphery and between competing centers." Civilization, and the process of its formation and emergence in the neolithichic, is the story of the human attempt to adapt through various strategies of control—control of nature and of people through technology and social organization. It is this attempt to control nature that separates us from it, that constitutes the core of our alienation from it, and that becomes the foundation for social development that includes patriarchy, class domination, statism, and militarism. While most, but by no means all human centered value systems eschew militarism, civilization is held as a crowning achievement. Some value systems praise the military spirit, while the majority that condemn it usually do so as a necessary evil, i.e.. they simultaneously justify it to one degree or another. The point to be made here is that civilization is based upon and is constituted by relationships of domination that invariably and necessarily produce the conflict and inequality which make militarism inevitable. Certainly some human-centered theory recognizes aspects of the roots of militarism. and it recognizes the terrible price humans have paid, even if ignoring the price nature has paid. Nevertheless, critics maintain a fervent faith in the human mission to manage, in the human ability to disentangle what is inextricably linked. They speak from within the perspective of civilization and cannot see that they must transcend the precarious ground on which they (we) teeter." Critical theory shares much in common with liberal theory in this area. Some Marxist analysis of the genesis of modern Militarism is sound. The notion that many human ills would be solved with due end of class society is also appealing. But the end of class is not the end of the state or of domination, and hence not the end of social systems which produce militarism. (Nor is the end of capitalism the end of class.) The control of nature and the human control of social and cultural evolution are values deeply embedded in most Marxism. Although it has developed useful models for understanding social transformation, the assumptions, perspective, and the content of the transformative vision arc very much within the human-centered tradition that is part of the problem.'" Some feminism gets much closer to the source of the problem in its cri- tique of hierarchy generally and in particular in its understanding of the central role of patriarchy to militarism and to producing humans amenable to domination. At times. however, feminist theory falls into a kind of intraspecific dualism, i.e., human males are the problem (while at the same time claiming credit for the fact that females created agriculture, which became the economic foundation for the emergence of hierarchy), ignoring that systems adapt to and alter the environment, and individuals adapt to (even while they resist) the roles created by the system's division of labor.' Even where this dualism is not at issue, most feminism, like Marxism, remains human-centered. Values such as community, spontaneity, and integration of emotion and intellect militate against the worst features of mainstream human-centered values, but still fail to take account a the re-lationship with nature as fundamental to all hierarchical systems. Or they remain anthropocentric and fail to address the separation front nature which not only makes possible the superexploitation of the biosphere for the maintenance of the military apparatus. but also underlies the social structures which produce militarism. While Marxism, feminism, and other critical social theory have contributed much to understanding the dynamic of our civilization, they tend to miss the point that if nonhuman life is not valued for itself, then life is not valued for itself. Any system of values that does not transcend nature-as-other cannot limit destruction of the biosphere as effectively as one that embraces nonhuman life as intrinsically valuable. Nor can such a value system help to heal the fundamental split in the human psyche which makes possible civilization and militarism. Biocentrism is not alone in grasping that the dynamic of human evolution over the last six or seven thousand years may be at a dead end. Certainly the huge growth in human numbers. the displacement of "simpler" societies by more "complex" ones, ones with greater capacity to exploit nature, capture and use energy, and so on suggests that the underlying dynamic is highly adaptive, at least at first glance. What is increasingly clear. however, is that if this dynamic continues we stand a very good chance of killing ourselves along with a good portion of the rest of the planet. The latter is well under way—it's business as usual. Biocentrism offers a direction for human society based upon a thoroughly fundamental transformation which stresses the centrality of finding our place in nature. Such a transformation is as fundamental as the neolithic or industrial revolutions. A life-centered or planet-centered value system requires that we move toward transcending the split with nature both within our own psyches and in our material relationships: how we consume and alter the biosphere. Far fewer humans, far lower levels of consumption for many. much improved levels for others, the recreation of authentic communitics that reintegrate the human into the natural, and the abandonment of the instrummentalities of control—these are a few of the implications of such an ethic. In contrast, a human-centered approach focuses on wiser if not greater human control. In its more progressive forms we hear words like stewardship rather than ownership; nevertheless, underlying both is the notion that we can replace nature with our intellect. that we can manage our way out of any problems, that We as a species are not only unique (as every species and ecosystem is), but that our uniqueness means we are godlike, better than the others. In short, it is the same arrogance. the same split that has brought us to the current crisis

The alternative is to question anthropocentric logic as a prior consideration to policy action

DeLuca 05

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and adjunct in the Institute of Ecology at the University of Utah, author of Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

The question moves, then, from asking whether a strategy is effective or moral, to asking, "Does a strategy contribute to machination?" As our discussion should have made clear, machination is about a logic, not a particular machine. (This same point is true of Heidegger's later critique of technology.) Heidegger's critique of the logic of machination has the advantage of being able to be clearly distinguished from any particular machine or technology. Machination, to reiterate, is a logic characterized by calculation, giganticism, acceleration, and technicity wherein animals, plants, and the earth become objects, mere resources, and humans, also, are reduced to the service of a ravenous progress. To ask if a strategy contributes to machination, then, is to ask [End Page 76] whether it contributes to the degradation of the earth and the hollowing-out of the world, a particularly pressing question for environmentalists. Obviously, then, the mainstream strategy of setting up headquarters in the political center (Washington, D.C.) of global capitalism—arguably the finest manifestation of the logic of machination; and adopting such practices as lobbying, trading favors, making cash donations, doing fund-raising, hiring MBAs and lawyers to run operations, exchanging board memberships with major corporations, producing glossy magazines funded by advertising from car companies and other suspect sources, practicing media spin and public relations as if environmental groups are no different (except poorer) than GE, Exxon, Monsanto, and Union Carbide, is suspect. Mainstream groups have consciously adopted the politics, organizational structure, and discourse of machination. Yet even the practices of radical grassroots groups that eschew central organization and its attendant dangers deserve scrutiny. Beginning with Greenpeace in the 1970s and intensifying in the 1980s with the emergence of wilderness and environmental justice groups, the radical environmental movement has increasingly relied on managing images and manipulating media, in fact practicing what could be considered an oppositional grassroots public relations. If public relations, along with advertising, is the discourse of machination, a discourse of empty words in service of giganticism (bigger is better) and progress (newer is better), what are the consequences when radical environmental groups deploy that very discourse in efforts to reach the public through mass media? What are the consequences when Greenpeace champions the cause of furry baby harp seals at the neglect of less photogenic indicator species? Are the effects of this any different from when the much more compromised World Wildlife Fund (WWF) adopts the panda as its symbol and cause celebre? What are the consequences when Earth First!, the environmental justice group Kentuckians For The Commonwealth, and other grassroots groups conform to the constraints of the mass media (stunning images, sound bites, conflict focus, emotional appeals, and so on) and deploy the practices of public relations in order to stage image events? Is it possible to fundamentally challenge machination while using the techniques of machination? These are not rhetorical questions. I do not have the answers and I do not think there are easy answers. Instead, Heidegger offers the environmental movement the admonishment to question what [End Page 77] it takes for granted, to think about the presuppositions and practices that are reflexively deployed as a matter of course

# \*\*\*Links\*\*\*

## Economy

Suzuki and Moola 09

David Suzuki, PhD in zoology from UChicago, and Faisal Moola, 8.20.09, David Suzuki Foundation blog, “It's time for a new economic paradigm,” http://www.davidsuzuki.org/blogs/science-matters/2009/08/its-time-for-a-new-economic-paradigm/

I list ecosystem \_and \_other species deliberately because we have become a narcissistic, self-indulgent species. We believe we are at the centre of the world, and everything around us is an "opportunity" or "resource" to exploit. Our needs or demands trump all other possibilities. This is an anthropocentric view of life. Thus, when faced with a choice of logging or conserving a forest, we focus on the potential economic benefits of logging or not logging. When the economy experiences a downturn, we demand that nature pay for it. We relax pollution standards, increase logging or fishing above sustainable levels, or (as the federal government has decreed) lift the requirement of environmental assessments for new projects. A fundamentally different perspective on our place in the world is called "biocentrism". In this view, life's diversity encompasses all and we humans are a part of it, ultimately deriving everything we need from it. Viewed this way, our well-being, indeed our survival, depends on the health and well-being of the natural world. I believe this view better reflects reality. The most pernicious aspect of our anthropocentrism has been to elevate economics to the highest priority. We act as if the economy is some kind of natural force that we must all placate or serve in every way possible. But wait! Some things, like gravity, the speed of light, entropy, and the first and second laws of thermodynamics, are forces of nature. There's nothing we can do about them except live within the boundaries they delimit. But the economy, the market, currency — we created these entities, and if they don't work, we should look beyond trying to get them back up and running the way they were. We should fix them or toss them out and replace them.

## “Sustainability”

Drew et al 02

Lawrence J. Drew, William H. Langer, and Janet S. Sachs, March 2002, Natural Resources Research, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2002, “Environmentalism and Natural Aggregate Mining,”

Sustaining a developed economy and expanding a developing one require the use of large vol- umes of natural aggregate. Almost all human activity (commercial, recreational, or leisure) is transacted in or on facilities constructed from natural aggregate. In our urban and sub- urban worlds, we are almost totally dependent on supplies of water collected behind dams and transported through aqueducts made from concrete. Natural aggregate is essential to the facilities that produce energy—hydroelectric dams and coal-fired powerplants. Ironically, the utility created for mankind by the use of natural aggregate is rarely compared favorably with the environmental impacts of mining it. Instead, the empty quarries and pits are seen as large negative environmental consequences. At the root of this disassociation is the philosophy of environmentalism, which flavors our perceptions of the excavation, processing, and distribu- tion of natural aggregate. The two end-member ideas in this philosophy are ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. Ecocentrism takes the position that the natural world is a organism whose arteries are the rivers—their flow must not be altered. The soil is another vital organ and must not be covered with concrete and asphalt. The motto of the ecocentrist is “man must live more lightly on the land.” The anthropocentrist wants clean water and air and an uncluttered landscape for human use. Mining is allowed and even encouraged, but dust and noise from quarry and pit operations must be minimized. The large volume of truck traffic is viewed as a real menace to human life and should be regulated and isolated. The environmental problems that the producers of natural aggregate (crushed stone and sand and gravel) face today are mostly difficult social and political concerns associated with the large holes dug in the ground and the large volume of heavy truck traffic associated with quarry and pit operations. These concerns have increased in recent years as society’s demand for living space has encroached on the sites of production; in other words, the act of production has engendered condemna- tion. Many other environmental problems that are associated with dust and noise and blasting from quarry and pit operations have been reduced through the efficient use of technology. Recycling concrete in buildings, bridges, and roads and asphaltic pavements will ultimately reduce the demand for virgin natural aggregate. The impact created by the large holes in the ground required for the mining of natural aggregate can be greatly reduced by planning their reclamation before mining begins.

## Sustainability (policy specific)

Katz 03

Eric Katz, currently Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, author of “Organism, Community, and the ‘Substitution Problem’, and Lauren Oechsli, an undergraduate biology major at Columbia University, New York, 2003, “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”, http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=392

It is not surprising that anthropocentric arguments dominate discussions of policy: arguments for environmental preservation based directly on human interests are often compelling. Dumping toxic wastes into a community’s reservoir of drinking water is clearly an irrational act; in such a case, a discussion of ethics or value theory is not necessary. The direct harm to humans engendered by this action is enough to disqualify it from serious ethical consideration. Nevertheless, other actions in the field of environmental policy are not so clear: there may be, for example, cases in which there are competing harms and goods to various segments of the human population that have to be balanced. The method for balancing these competing interests gives rise to issues of equity and justice. In addition, and more pertinent to our argument, are cases in which human actions threaten the existence of natural entities not usable as resources for human life. What reason do we humans have for expending vast sums of money (in positive expenditures and lost opportunities) to preserve endangered species of plants and animals that are literally nonresources? 2 In these cases, policies of environmental preservation seem to work against human interests and human good. Anthropocentric and instrumental arguments in favor of preservationist policies can be developed in a series and arranged in order of increasing plausibility. First, it is argued that any particular species of plant or animal might prove useful in the future. Alastair Gunn calls this position the “rare herb” theory. According to this theory, the elimination of any natural entity is morally wrong because it closes down the options for any possible positive use. 3 A point frequently raised in discussions of this problem is that the endangered species we are about to eliminate might be the cure for cancer. Of course, it is also possible that it will cause cancer; the specific effects of any plant or animal species might be harmful as well as beneficial. Because we are arguing from a position of ignorance, it is ludicrous to assert either possibility as certain, or to use either alternative as a basis for policy. A better argument is used by Paul and Anne Ehrlich: the metaphor of the airplane rivets. 4 The Ehrlichs tell a parable of an airplane passenger watching as a mechanic removes some of the rivets from the wing assembly of the plane he is boarding. When asked what he is doing, the mechanic replies that for reasons of economy, the airline is cutting down on the number of rivets used on each plane; some of the rivets are being removed and used on other planes. The procedure is not dangerous, continues the mechanic, since up to this point, no planes have been lost. The point of the parable is that although the elimination of individual species might not be directly harmful to human welfare, the aggregate elimination of many species probably will be. It is thus in the interests of humanity to remove as few “rivets” as possible, to preserve natural species even when they are “nonresources.” Without the use of a parable, Bryan Norton makes a similar point. In his discussion of the diversity-stability hypothesis in ecological theory, Norton argues that dynamically stable and mature ecosystems are important elements ofthat total diversity which stabilizes all ecosystems. 5 There is a danger in continually disrupting these diverse and stable ecosystems: Since the biological diversity of the planet has already entered an accelerating downward spiral, losses of species represent further accelerations toward local and global ecosystem breakdowns. The risks of breakdowns are so great and the contribution of species losses to them are so little understood that any rational society would exercise extreme caution in contributing to that acceleration. 6 Diverse species populations thus contribute to stable ecosystems, which have positive impacts on human life. Finally, this argument is broadened into a general concern for ecological function. The preservation of the natural environment insures a biosphere that supports human civilization. Degradation of the natural environment threatens human survival. Nevertheless, knowledge of ecological processes can help humans avoid damage to essential biological and physical links in the natural world. As Norton indicates, the loss of species and ecosystems is a sign that these natural connections are being “cut,” lost, or damaged. The mere preservation of the natural environment halts this process of degradation. Nature thus has to be preserved because it has a value for human beings and human society: it insures the physical basis of human life. In sum, these preservationist arguments based on “human interests” move from a narrow concern for the specific direct use of a natural entity or species, to the indirect importance of species as stabilizers of ecosystems, and finally to a general concern for the maintenance of ecosystems as the basis of human existence. These anthropocentric instrumental arguments for environmental preservation are easily transferred to issues of environmental policy. Recent concern about the destruction of the ozone layer and the increased probability of the “greenhouse effect” reflect the fear that current environmental and economic polices are damaging the environment and threatening human life. Indeed, it is a mark of the success of the environmental movement that the public is now aware of the connections between environmental health and human survival.

## Warming

Crist 07

Eileen Crist, PhD in sociology from Boston University, 2007, Telos 141 (Winter 2007): 29–55. “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” http://www.sts.vt.edu/faculty/crist/

And yet, the current framing of climate change as the urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical mat- ter than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming. Attention to the long-standing ruination of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. Climate change is undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life’s interconnectedness and variety. But if global warming has such potential to afflict the natural world, it is because the latter’s “immunity” has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from view the prior, ongo- ing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth.

## Ships

Rodrigue 09

J-P, “The Geography of Transport Systems,” Hofstra University, Department of Global Studies & Geography, <http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans>.

Water quality. Transport activities have an impact on hydrological conditions. Fuel, chemical and other hazardous particulates discarded from aircraft, cars, trucks and trains or from port and airport terminal operations, such as de-icing, can contaminate rivers, lakes, wetlands and oceans. Because demand for shipping services is increasing, marine transport emissions represent the most important segment of water quality inventory of the transportation sector. The main effects of marine transport operations on water quality predominantly arise from dredging, waste, ballast waters and oil spills. Dredging is the process of deepening harbor channels by removing sediments from the bed of a body of water. Dredging is essential to create and maintain sufficient water depth for shipping operations and port accessibility. Dredging activities have a two-fold negative impact on the marine environment. They modify the hydrology by creating turbidity that can affect the marine biological diversity. The contaminated sediments and water raised by dredging require spoil disposal sites and decontamination techniques. Waste generated by the operations of vessels at sea or at ports cause serious environmental problems, since they can contain a very high level of bacteria that can be hazardous for public health as well as marine ecosystems when discharged in waters. Besides, various types of garbage containing metals and plastic are not easily biodegradable. They can persist on the sea surface for long periods of time and can be a serious impediment for maritime navigation in inland waterways and at sea and affecting as well berthing operations. Ballast waters are required to control ship’s stability and draught and to modify their center of gravity in relation to cargo carried and the variance in weight distribution. Ballast waters acquired in a region may contain invasive aquatic species that, when discharged in another region may thrive in a new marine environment and disrupt the natural marine ecosystem. There are about 100 non-indigenous species recorded in the Baltic Sea. Invasive species have resulted in major changes in nearshore ecosystems, especially in coastal lagoons and inlets. Major oil spills from oil cargo vessel accidents are one of the most serious problems of pollution from maritime transport activities.

## **Science**

Sivil 2000

Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. “WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT”, 2000, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>

Understanding the magnitude of the environmental crisis and the potential threat it poses to life on this planet, it is clearly not an option to adopt a "wait and see" attitude. A popular option is to turn to science, which helps provide adequate material needs for everyone and also extends the richness of our non-material lives. Playing such a socially prominent and important role, science constitutes a major element of the "cultural filter" through which Western society views the environment (Pepper 1996: 240). Classical science, which is still very dominant, has developed into a dualist paradigm in which the scientific observer is separate and distinct from his or her observations. This has contributed to a conception of the world consisting of independent material objects, each having independent properties, with the behaviour of the whole explainable by the behaviour of its constituent parts. Nature is viewed as separate from humanity, machine-like and reducible to basic components, which can be known objectively and predicted. This science represents the source of absolute truths on which to base decisions and is often regarded as the most respectable way to know nature. The dimensions of environmental issues are seldom, if ever, restricted to the specific parameters of any one scientific discipline (Des Jardins 1997:5). Moreover, most major issues facing humanity stretch beyond being mere scientific problems, involving as they do, society, politics, law, economics, etc. Covering such a broad spectrum, it is evident that science, widely distinguished by the compartmentalisation of knowledge, cannot deliver comprehensive solutions to global issues (McMichael 1993: 326). The task of assessing the impacts of ecological imbalances and disruptions on human and other life forms entails significantly more than the classical scientific paradigm of hypothesis formation, data collection and data analysis. Leaving environmental problems in the hands of science would, therefore, effectively result in a narrow understanding of the problem at hand, and by correlation a limited and short-sighted solution. Furthermore, classical science asserts that "scientific knowledge equals power over nature" (Pepper 1996: 240), and that the manipulation of nature can be used for social progress. This has resulted in science being used in many modern developments, of which some exert a negative impact on the environment (e.g. inorganic fertilisers, pesticides, industrial processes, nuclear energy, and nuclear threat, to name but a few). In this light, science should not be viewed as the ultimate source of hope for the future, and clearly should not be given full responsibility for addressing the environmental crisis.

## Policy

Katz and Oechsli 93

Eric Katz and Lauren Oechsli, 1993 Members of the Science, Technology, and Society Program,, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark. Katz is currently Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics , “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”, <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=392>

If a policy of preservation is adopted, the benefits to be derived are those associated with the continued maintenance of the biosphere as the basis of human life: production of oxygen, consumption of atmospheric carbon, preservation of potentially useful species, etc. If a policy of development is adopted, the benefits to be derived are primarily local and economic: increased agricultural and livestock production, industry, and exports. The costs and harms within each policy are determined by the failure to achieve the alternative benefits. A policy of preservation limits economic gain; a policy of development limits the goods of a functioning natural ecosystem. Although the choices appear clear, we lack the kind of data that would make the utility calculations possible. Is there a quantifiable good in the preservation of x amount of rain forest acreage that can be expressed in terms of biospherical maintenance and then compared to the loss of economic gains by indigenous local populations? Can we determine a quantifiable good in various methods of rain forest development, which then can be compared to losses in ecological function? It seems unlikely that these kinds of comparisons could ever be made; they are not being made now. In a recent survey of land use and management by indigenous peoples, Jason W. Clay warns: “Until now, few researchers have examined the ways indigenous inhabitants of tropical rain forests use and sustain their region’s resources.”9 Clay is saying that we do not know what the economic benefits and costs are in alternative policies of preservation and development. If viewed in this way, utility calculations become impossible as a basis of policy. Our complaint is not merely with the traditional difficulties of performing real- life utility calculations. The deeper issue is the anthropocentric framework that limits ethical and policy discussions. The primary concern for human interests or benefits—anthropocentrism—creates an irreconcilable conflict between two goods that are supposedly advocated by anthropocentric policies, i.e., the ecosystem which preserves the atmosphere, thus, preserving human life, and the economic use of the land by the indigenous population. We are faced with a classic case of a conflict between a long-term support system and short-term usable goods. This conflict cannot be resolved unless we expand the framework of discussion beyond the limits of anthropocentric instrumental reasoning.

## Link of Omission

Bell and Russell 2k

Bell and Russell 2K (Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)//RSW

For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms. Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy, and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and “nature”? This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy manifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112). Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them, and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically bound.” To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation, wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale. This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy. The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply not questioned. Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn, remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell, & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.

## Resources/Oil

Mulligan 10

Shane Mulligan. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. November 2010. “Energy, Environment, and Security: Critical Links in a Post-Peak World”. Global Environmental Politics 10:4. Pages 86-88.

The environment/energy relation rests in large part upon the ideological separation of “man” and “nature.” Historically, at least in Western thought, the “natural world” has been seen either in opposition to, or as the antithesis of, manmade and industrialized landscapes. This image is represented in a wide range of cultural narratives (from Bible stories of Genesis to our political emergence from a “state of nature”) that reinforce a profound separation between an abstract “nature” and an (equally) abstract “man.” The conception of humans as somehow distinct from nature has helped encourage a general disregard for the natural world in political and economic thought, and natural resources are given limited consideration in either discipline. Fossil fuels, perhaps because of their close association with the rise of industrial society, are thus seen as part of the human (rather than the “natural”) world. Our ideas of nature are also tied to our political beliefs, and it may be that popular rule helps instill a notion of nature as a provider, or a victim of human negligence—but nature is no longer in control; it is humanity that is “sovereign,” and that holds the power to destroy nature or save the Earth.48We seem to believe that “we are now at the planetary controls, whether we like it or not.”49 Although the extent of our control is debatable, such ideas support a view of energy security as a matter of technological cleverness and political astuteness, the ultimate success of which is generally assumed: “the standard politico-economic world view denies the possibility that humankind will not be able to achieve any technological feat that may be needed, and in the meantime, resources are being used without any thought for the future.”50 Yet in the absence of a major technological breakthrough (and likely even then), the impending peak in oil production dictates that we will reduce our consumption—of oil, anyway—because we really have no choice. This lack of choice, which equates to a lack of control or power, may be the most unwelcome aspect of the peak oil message: it competes directly with our political self-image, and runs into entrenched psychological barriers to bad news.51 While our ideas of nature are deeply political, we can nevertheless identify more explicitly political considerations as a second constraint on integrating energy resources and the environment. Indeed, the message of the Limits view was in part rejected due to political incorrectness: its calls for reduced economic activity and consumption directly challenged “business as usual.” Some feel this thesis was “delegitimized almost from the start through corporate veto,” while the corporate world was able to embrace the rubric of “global change” and the growth opportunities it afforded.52 The self-identiªed “Cassandras” on the environment were thus isolated from policy circles.53 Jimmy Carter was an exception in this sense: yet his efforts to run a Presidency while highlighting an energy crisis, and his repeated calls for energy conservation, were far less marketable than Ronald Reagan’s assurances of prosperity.54 Even the environmental movement abandoned the Limits approach, redeªning its mandate in order to improve its reception within the mainstream of industrial society.55 International political factors also favored the exclusion of energy from the environmental agenda. For one, the oil crises of the 1970s could readily be blamed on political decisions, especially the actions of OPEC, and “aboveground factors” including the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. Oil scarcity in these instances was quite clearly induced or even “contrived” by human agency (and hence, was not an ecological scarcity).56 In addition, we must consider the suspicion with which the South looked upon environmentalism generally: as a threat to economic development, thrust upon these states by both well-meaning and opportunistic parties of the North. While these concerns did not prevent an explosion of environmental diplomacy in subsequent decades, energy supplies have been largely absent from the sustainable development agenda.57 Thus in an international setting, the notion of limits to growth faced serious obstructions from those states that still felt the need to prioritize growth—which effectively meant all the world’s nations. A third important factor can be found in economic arguments, which from the beginning challenged the Limits thesis by invoking the expectation that any problems of resource decline would be solved through technological advances and market-driven substitution. Declining commodity prices in the 1980s were held by many as evidence of an enduring abundance in resources: Ehrlich’s “stupid bet”58 with Julian Simon over future trends in commodity prices left Ehrlich not only hundreds of dollars poorer, but also facing a raft of critics who now held (what they took to be) conclusive evidence that natural scarcity was not a serious concern for industrial societies. Indeed, during the long period of global economic growth that ground to a halt in 2008, it was not uncommon to hear suggestions that the vision of The Limits to Growth—“that shortages of energy and other natural resources would soon become widespread in the face of growing demand”—was simply “an error.”59 Such ideas were deeply embedded in the early literature on environmental security. Mathews argued that “human society has not arrived at the brink of some absolute limit to its growth,” but that nonrenewable resources were, paradoxically, “inexhaustible:” “As a nonrenewable resource becomes scarce and more expensive, demand falls, and substitutes and alternative technologies appear. For that reason we will never pump the last barrel of oil or anything close to it.”60 Homer-Dixon also took the apparent abundance of resources as reason to discount their ultimate scarcity: Many energy-supply predictions made in the 1970s are now truly embarrassing. For example, in 1973 the Cornell ecologist David Pimental and his colleagues asserted that “if current use patterns continue, fuel costs are expected to double or triple in a decade and to increase nearly ªvefold by the turn of the century.” In 1998, real petroleum costs were little higher than in 1973.61 More recently, Dennis Pirages made the rather questionable assertion that the trends of the 1980s and 1990s constituted “empirical observations that for the foreseeable future, resource scarcity is likely to be a relatively minor source of human suffering.”62 A final consideration in the separation of environment and energy is the role of security discourses. Corresponding with the emergence of a “new” discourse on environmental security was an “old” security establishment that jealously guarded its domain. This was reºected in the academic community’s aversion to broader and deeper notions of security, which in many ways seemed “utterly alien to the security studies community.”63 The environment did not invoke the specter of organized violence, nor were national security (i.e. military) technologies and methods likely to be helpful for most environmental problems—rather, military research and actions were recognized as a major cause of degradation.64 And despite the wide range of issues discussed under critical security studies (CSS), the notion of “threats without enemies”65 rubs gratingly against more established views of security analysts. On the other hand, analysts have long viewed energy (and especially oil) as a national security concern, and the military role in ensuring (or preventing) access to energy resources is well established. By the time environmental security came on stage, then, energy supply was already understood as a matter of national security.66 Moreover, many key analytical characteristics of environmental security did not seem to apply to energy resources. In the latter, sovereign claims over the resource enabled the identification of an enemy that could be confronted, a “will” that might be broken (OPEC, Saddam Hussein). Thus, energy security could be provided for by military means, while also being essential for military superiority. Perhaps most importantly, the structure of sovereign rights and the physical and institutional excludability of energy resources has sidelined efforts to consider these as global or commons resources.67 Surely fossil fuels could be seen as a commons problem, similar to freshwater sources, with distinct rights for “upstream” and “downstream” users—a point that suggests prospects for international governance arrangements. Yet fossil fuels have historically been seen in terms of “property,” and as subject to states’ sovereign right to exploit their natural resources

## Environmental Protection

Lintott 11

Sheila Lintott, philosopher. Fall 2011. “Preservation, Passivity, and Pessimism”. Ethics & the Environment. 16:2. Pages 104-106.

Striking parallels exist between the old domination program and restoration. The most basic is that in both systems humans hold the place of highest authority and power within the world. Also, neither view recognizes any limits to the scope or range of legitimate human manipulation in the world. This does not mean that there are no constraints— only beneficial manipulations should be undertaken—but it does mean that nothing is intrinsically off-limits. A further parallel is that because the fate of the world rests on humans, they must have a clear idea of what needs to be done. They must know what conditions are good (or at least what conditions are better) and then work to bring them about. Their activity, then, requires them to shape the world after ideas in their own mind. (Kane, 227; see also Katz 1997b) In other words, despite claims to the contrary, despite good intentions, and despite some manner of improvements, the logic of restoration implements the allegedly jettisoned domination model according to which humans are superior to and thus justified in shaping nature as they see fit, whether they act on behalf of what they deem to be in their own or in nature’s interest. This logic of domination is coupled with the hierarchical dualism of the active and the passive in restorationist criticisms of preservation. An appreciation of the activity, the effort, and the work required in preservation is often lacking in restorationist critiques of preservationism. The debate has absorbed the active/passive dualism in its full normative force. Preservation is not a merely negative policy; it mandates and requires a great deal of activity. However, it is the sort of activity that too frequently goes unnoticed and almost entirely unappreciated. It is the sort of activity usually associated with the female side of the male/female dualism. It is activity that, although its interaction isn’t always obvious, does positively or negatively affect others, through the agent’s self-control, restraint, respect, and patience, all of which demand great strength and effort. It is not the case that these seemingly passive acts happen without effort, without agency, without activity, as it is often supposed. (Think, for example, about the lack of credit given to mothers because they are allegedly naturally nurturing, doing, it seems, what comes naturally to them; their care work is often construed passively, as if it happens through them, rather than being work that requires serious effort, intellect, and conscious sacrifice.) Jordan maintains that a successful environmentalism will be one that satisfies individuals at a personal level, and he does not believe preservationism can. At a personal level, [preservationism] survives in a culture that provides only an extremely limited repertory of ways for contacting nature—ways, I mean, that engage only a limited range of human interests, talents, and abilities. The result—unintended of course—is a kind of psychological elitism that accommodates those inclined by nature to the experience of observation and appreciation, but has less to offer the mechanics, nurturers, healers, hunters, gatherers, artists, craftsmen, pilots, planners, leaders, and ditch diggers among us. (And at a personal level, of course, it leaves those parts of each of us unsatisfied.) (Jordan 2000a, 31) The conclusion is that restoration is the more promising policy when it comes to forging a culture of nature. Preservationism is inept; it offers an “extremely limited” list of ways to engage with nature and appeals only to a select few of us, and only to a small part of each of us psychologically— the part that is interested in the relatively passive habits of “observation and appreciation.” Yet Jordan’s charges of elitism should be turned on his own view. He suggests that “mechanics, nurturers, healers, hunters, gatherers, artsheila lintott preservation, passivity, and pessimism 105 ists, craftsmen, pilots, planners, leaders, and ditch diggers among us” are not “inclined by nature to the experience of observation and appreciation.” This divides people into those who ‘do’ and those who ‘think,’ with the doers digging ditches and the thinkers satisfied with observation and appreciation. This is a double insult. For one, the suggested division of labor is faulty, for ditch diggers, hunters, and mechanics certainly better observe and appreciate, i.e., think before they act, lest they dig into a gas line, hunt a pet, or damage an engine in their rush to act. Second, while preservationists, whether they spend their time writing books or walking in the woods (or, most likely, both), certainly do observe and appreciate nature, in doing so, they engage in a great many additional activities. In selecting subjects for study, they discriminate between subjects according to their capacities, behaviors, and an array of other aspects, exerting effort to avoid influencing the objects of their study, and they work to make what they study meaningful in a broader context and to a broad audience. These are some of the many things that preservationists do when they “observe and appreciate.” Also, the talents that a preservationist has are shared with those engaged in a variety of other activities Jordan mentions; for example, the ability to detect subtle signs of flourishing would also be beneficial for a healer. Moreover, to cultivate environmental virtues, profound cultural and individual changes are in order. Given this, we should be concerned about restorationists’ willingness to cater to existing attitudes, perceived needs, and desires in the environmental policy they endorse. Those attitudes, perceived needs, and desires are at the very heart of the problem of environmental degradation; many of them underwrite the environmental crisis in which we find ourselves today. The fact that preservation doesn’t satisfy such preexisting desires is not necessarily to be counted against it; indeed it may be part of its strength.

## Deep Ecology

Grey 93

William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol 71, No 4 (1993), pp. 463-475

Finally, I consider the "ecocentric" approach advocated, for example, by J. Baird Callicott (1989), which is another attempt to develop a non-anthropocentric basis for value. This "deep" approach, inspired by Aldo Leopold (1949), on examination also reveals covert anthropocentrism. For example, in "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species" Callicott explores various grounds on which we might extend moral consideration to nonhuman individuals. One particular line which he explores, and revealingly rejects is "holistic rationalism". Goodness, on this view, is identified above all with the objective harmony of the biosphere as a whole, which "exemplifies or embodies the Good" (Callicott 1989, p. 142). Since species serve the good of the biotic whole (which is quite independent of human interest) we have a non-anthropocentric justification for species preservation. But individual species, from this perspective, are transitional components of developmental stages of the planet's evolutionary odyssey: The Age of Reptiles came to a close (for whatever reason) to be followed by the Age of Mammals. A holistic rationalist would not regret the massive die-off of the late Cretaceous because it made possible our yet richer mammal-populated world. The Age of Mammals may likewise end. But the "laws" of organic evolution and of ecology (if any there be) will remain operative. In time speciation would occur and species would radiate anew. Future "intelligent" forms of life may even feel grateful, if not to us then to their God (or the Good), for making their world possible. The new Age (of Insects, perhaps) would eventually be just as diverse, orderly, harmonious and stable and thus no less good than our current ecosystem with its present complement of species. With friends like the holistic rationalists, species preservation needs no enemies. (Callicott 1989, p. 142) This passage is revealing. Note the characterization of the Age of Mammals as "richer" than the Age of Reptiles. As mammal chauvinists we might agree, but it is not clear on what grounds Callicott can justify the claim. It is also easy to agree that our demise, and the demise of the ecosystem which currently supports us, would be a matter of regret. But clearly it would be regrettable because of a decidedly anthropocentric set of values, interests and perceptions—if Callicott really eschews such concerns entirely, the grounds on which his regret is based are deprived of any foundation.

## Shipping/Trade

Denton 08

Luther Denton. Professor at Georgia South University. 2008. “The Introduction of Non-Native Species” Journal of Transportation Management. Pages 57-58.

The introduction of non-native species (NNS) to coastal habitats is generally accepted as harmful to the health of the local ecosystem and the commerce derived from that resource. In the case of pathogens, they can be harmful to human health, as well. Even those who think these introductions to be natural and inevitable agree that, at least from a short-term perspective, they are disruptive and can have devastating financial consequences for commerce. The introduction of NNS is different from other problems, like pollution or overharvest of resources. Simberloff (2005A, p. 216) points out that the introduction of NNS should be viewed as an “irrevocable act” as living organisms, once established in a new environment, have the capacity to independently reproduce, expand, and even evolve (Cox, 2004 as cited in Simberloff 2005A). In addition, eradication of such an invasive species is generally unsuccessful and prohibitively expensive (Veitch 2002 as cited in Simberloff 2005A). In many cases, invading NNS occupy an environmental niche that is vacant, with few or no predators and untapped sources of nourishment. The damage inflicted by NNS comes in many forms. Nunes and van den Bergh (2004), in their examination of the effects of harmful introduced algal bloom species, categorized the damages inflicted by NNS into Use Value and Non-Use Value. Use Value includes the effect on marine resources with commercial value, the effect on the health of the marine ecological system, the effect on human health, and the impact on tourism and recreational benefits. Non-Use Value includes the risk of the loss of “legacy benefits” (the risk that future generations would not have access to certain marine resources) and the risk of “existence benefits” (the risk that certain marine species would go locally extinct). Ocean ships are the primary vector for the spread of marine non-native species (NNS) to new coastal environs. Ocean ships typically carry living organisms either attached in some manner to the exterior hull of the ship or as passengers in the water used as ballast in interior tanks. As the use of ships to transport cargo continues to increase, there is a corresponding increase in the number of introduced NNS (Levine and D’Antonio, 2003, reported that as international trade increased, so did the introduction of NNS). Organisms that have been introduced using these vectors include but are certainly not limited to fish, plants, mollusks, crustaceans, algae, plankton, bacteria, and viruses.

## Water

Krimsky 05

Sheldon Krimsky, February 18th, 2005, Department of Urban and Environmental Policy and Planning, Tufts University, “Water Ethics: Beyond Riparian Rights,” <http://www.tufts.edu/water/pdf/KrimskyWaterEthics.pdf>

Anthropocentrism vs. Non-Anthropocentrism The issue here is whether all values we attribute to natural entities are derivative of human values; whether there are intrinsic values to certain natural systems. Do lakes, rivers or the oceans have a value in-and-of-themselves outside of human use? The system of Riparian rights pertain to the community of Homosapiens. Responsibility to Natural Systems Does it make sense to speak of a responsibility to a natural system; to protect it in some way for its uniqueness, its integrity, or its value to species other than humans? How would such responsibility be defined? Is there comparable to the “endangered species act” a need for an “endangered ecosystems act”? What ethical considerations are at stake when water crosses national boundaries? What international treaties or agreements give consideration to cross-cultural needs and responsibilities of water systems? How do we protect water contamination across national boundaries? Cross Cultural Environmental Equity Intergenerational Equity What responsibility do we have to future generations for water source and quality protection? A.Make them better off (Family Values) B.Parity: Give them at least what we have (Sustainability) C.Build a scientific base so they can solve their own problems (Scientific Legacy). D.Consume at any rate we want (Generational Cornecopianism). E.How far into the future is our responsibility? “Those who claim responsibility for the well being of future generations often do so out of a sense of “intergenerational equity.” They hold that for us to use the environment in a way that harms our descendants is unfair because it does not accord future humans the same rights and advantages we hold today.” Eric Rosenbaum, Water Engineer, South Bay Water Recycling Social Risk Management The ethical issues pertain to what is acceptable risk of water contamination; what evidence is sufficient to restrict contaminants in the water supply. The amount of health and ecological risk of water contamination is a scientific questions; what constitutes acceptable risk is a value question. “You can never step into the same river twice”Heraclitus There are certain givens about water that set the context for any ethical analysis The amount of water on the earth is more or less conserved. It is a renewable resource. Water is fungible—as aggregates of molecules it doesn’t stay in one place. Water geography is defined by its ecosystems—the sources and sinks of water molecules; wetlands, lakes, falls, rivers, oceans. Humans can reduce the quality and availability of water by their transformation of land. Entropy and Water Energy is neither created nor destroyed; the total energy is conserved. It is changed from usable to unusable forms. This is the principle of entropy in thermodynamics. Water, too, is not created nor destroyed; it is just put into a form which makes it unavailable, contaminated, salinated, and removed from aquifers. Water Scarcity The lack of availability of portable water is a growing problem and one that accelerates as the global population reaches 10 billion. The ethical dilemma is: how should we manage the scarcity? The autonomy of each individual and their family is based on the availability of potable water. Water availability and human rights Should the availability of water be considered a human right? If so, then should the earth’s water resources be managed in such a way that each person is allotted a basic entitlement of drinking water? Who insures that the rights are protected? Water as an Ethical Issue “The art and practice of equitable distribution of and access to fresh water for all people in the 21stcentury, as a fundamental human right and international obligation, is the mother of all ethical questions of all transboundary natural resources of a finite nature.” Thomas R. Odhiambo, Past President of the African Academy of Sciences “All peoples…have the right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs.”Proclamation of the 1977 UN Water Conference Water and Consumption The more we consume material products, the more water is used. Conservation of water doesn’t only mean using low flow showers, it means reducing material consumption (material throughput). The production of a car uses 50 times as much water as its weight. Contamination What principle should guide the permissable contamination of our water supplies? Protected from crossing a threshold of contamination for a selected group of primary pollutants—say a few dozen. There are about 86,000 chemicals in industrial and commercial use. What does the Precautionary Principle tell us? “There is yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it…..The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations.”Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic” in A Sand County Almanac The Eco-ethics of Water Conservation ethics would include whatever water systems exist in the bioregion The protection of land includes the water systems: “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively the land.” A, Leopold. “The Land Ethic.” Protected Regions What does the concept of protecting rivers, lakes and oceans mean in terms of human use? Humans create artificial lakes. Dam rivers redirect the flows of streams and rivers [and] F[f]lood enormous land areas What ethical restrictions, if any, should be imposed on natural waterways. Are there [are] water systems of such unique value that they should be protected beyond all human economic value. The law has made that choice for certain endangered species, but not for water systems—unless the species require it. DAMS “Rivers, watersheds and aquatic ecosystems are the biological engines of the planet. They are the basis for life and the livelihoods of local communities. Dams transform landscapes and create risks of irreversible impacts. Understanding, protecting and restoring ecosystems at river basin level is essential to foster equitable human development and the welfare of all species.” World Commission on Dams Ethics of DAMS There has been a change in how we view dams and their impact on the ecosystem. The Trouble With Dams Some 100,000 dams regulate America's rivers and creeks, often at the expense of ecosystems--and of taxpayers, who are subsidizing handouts to a large number of farmers, floodplain occupants, hydro-electricity users, and river-transportation interestsby Robert S. DevineAugust 1995 Dam burst in Pakistan leaves 400 missingDeclan Walsh in Karachi Saturday February 12, 2005 The Guardian At least 54 people were killed and hundreds remained missing last night after a dam burst following a week of torrential rain across Pakistan. The collapse of the 150-metre-long Shadikor dam swept away five villages along the Arabian Sea coast of the south-western province of Baluchistan. Water Contamination What ethical responsibility do we have for what goes into the water systems? Transgenic fish Industrial Contaminants What standards are used to determine whether water is an appropriate sink for industrial chemicals. Region's drinking water at risk from petroleum spillsby The Associated Press. Feb. 15, 2005 SPOKANE, Wash. (AP) --An aquifer that supplies drinking water to 400,000 people in two states is threatened by millions of gallons of stored petroleum products and leaks from car motors, experts say.A leak in December at a Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. refueling depot near Hauser, Idaho, raised awareness of the Rathdrum Prairie-Spokane Valley Aquifer.What is more troubling is the amount of petroleum stored in aging tanks and dripping motor oil and gasoline that runs off parking lots and streets into the aquifer. Lord Selborne on the ethics of freshwater In his report to the UNESCO sub-commission on the ethics of freshwater, Lord Selborne begins his 50 page report with a compelling analysis of water as an ethical issue laying out the justification and principles behind the centrality of ethics. “While we all have a need for water, this does not give us the right to have access to as much water as we choose. Society must first insure that appropriate prioritization of water access to be put in place which allows humanity’s essential needs to be met as well as those of our eco-systems.”Lord Selborne, (2000) The Ethics of Freshwater Use: A SurveyUNESCO Ethical Principles behind the Rights to Freshwater Principle of human dignity: no life without water; those to whom it is denied are denied life. Principle of Participation: the poor must be involved in water planning and management. Principle of Solidarity: upstream-downstream inter-dependency calls for integrated water management. Principle of Human Equality: rendering to all persons their due Principle of the Common Good: water is a common good. Principle of Stewardship: finding an ethical balance among using, changing, and preserving water resources and land. Water has been incorporated into the human rights agenda through the United Nations. The challenge is to insure that rights are protected: rights to access; rights to quality drinking water. No one disputes the fundamental right of every person to have water to live and survive. There is less consensus on the rights of water eco-systems and their protection against re-configuring the landscape of the planet. Here, utilitarian ethics dominates—balancing protection with human needs. Water contamination is framed almost entirely in human terms. We don’t ask: “Is it good for the river,” to use it as a septic system. The protection of sensitive and ecologically unique areas is emerging as an area of environmental ethics.

# \*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

## Extinction (pollution)

Destefano 90

Linda Destefano, eco-thinker 1990 <http://www.peacecouncil.net/history/PNLs1981-90/PNL570-1990.pdf>

It is the human species which has brought the entire ecosystem to the brink of disaster- whether by poisoning the biosphere with out deadly chemicals and radioactive garbage or by using up all earth's resources through overpopulation and extravagant, wasteful lifestyles, or by nuclear holocaust because of the ultimate ego-trip (that is, being will- ing to destroy everything rather tha n give up the childish fascination with human cleverness as manifested i n the latest "advance" in weapons tech- nology) Human oppression of other species is a flaw which turns back on u s because everything in the environment is related; the attitude and behavior of one species influences th e others, and eventually the result returns to initiator. For instance, there is the willingness of many persons to drive other species to extinction. Example: many plants are endangered. Research is being con - ducted on the potential treatment of cancer by plant extracts. Will we extinguish a plant species which could have treated cancer? Example: whales, dolphins, gorillas an d elephants are among the many endangered animals . If they are decimated, we may lose more than the beauty and wonder of these earth companions. We may lose the pos- sibility to learn from them a wiser way to treat the earth and each other. Dr. John Lilly (a medical doctor and scientist) has worked thought his Human-Dolphin Institute to develop a better means of communication between humans and dolphins, who he regards as probably more intelligent and ethical than humans.(l) If we drive them to extinction, we will never learn whether Lilly is right or wrong . In many ways, people are very intelligent, adaptable, empathetic and loving. If we love ourselves and Mother Earth, let's use those traits to eradicate lethal ways of looking at the world, such as a speciesist view, and acquire an earth nurturing outlook . The survival of all of us depends on it

## Value to life

Gottlieb 94

Roger S. Gottlieb, professor of humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 1994, “ETHICS AND TRAUMA: LEVINAS, FEMINISM, AND DEEP ECOLOGY”, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm

Perhaps there is in progress another, even more encompassing Death Event, which can be the historical condition for an ethic of compassion and care. I speak of the specter of ecocide, the continuing destruction of species and ecosystems, and the growing threat to the basic conditions essential to human life. What kind of ethic is adequate to this brutally new and potentially most unforgiving of crises? How can we respond to this trauma with an ethic which demands a response, and does not remain marginalized? Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other -- as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother.

## O/W Case

Berry 95

Thomas, Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America in European intellectual history  “The viable human” in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, ed. George Sessions

A deep cultural pathology has developed in Western society and has now spread throughout the planet. A savage plundering of the entire earth is taking place through industrial exploitation. Thousands of poisons unknown in former times are saturating the air, the water, and the soil. The habitat of a vast number of living species is being irreversibly damaged. In this universal disturbance of the biosphere by human agents, the human being now finds that the harm done to the natural world is returning to threaten the human species itself. The question of the viability of the human species is intimately connected with the question of the viability of the earth. These questions ultimately arise because at the present time the human community has such an exaggerated, even pathological, fixation on its own comfort and convenience that it is willing to exhaust any and all of the earth's resources to satisfy its own cravings. The sense of reality and of value is strictly directed toward the indulgences of a consumer economy. This nonsustainable situation can be clearly seen in the damage done to major elements necessary for the continued well-being of the planet. When the soil, the air, and the water have been extensively poisoned, human needs cannot be fulfilled. Strangely, this situation is the consequence of a human centered norm of reality and value. Once we grant that a change from an anthropocentric to a biocentric sense of reality and value is needed, we must ask how this can be achieved and how it would work it. we must begin by accepting the fact that the life community, the community of all living species, is the greater reality and the greater value , and that the primary concern of the human must be the preservation and enhancement of this larger community. The human does have its own distinctive reality and its own distinctive value, but this distinctiveness must be articulated within the more comprehensive context. The human ultimately must discover the larger dimensions of its own being within this community context. That the value of the human being is enhanced by diminishing the value of the larger community is an illusion, the great illusion of the present industrial age, seeks to advance the human by plundering the planet's geological structure and all its biological species' This plundering is being perpetrated mainly by the great industrial establishments that have dominated the entire planetary process for the past one hundred years, during the period when modern science and technology took control not only of natural resources but also of human affairs. If the viability of the human species is now in question, it is a direct consequence of these massive ventures, which have gained extensive control not only of our economies but also of our whole cultural development, whether it be economics, politics, law, education, medicine' or moral values' Even our language is heavily nuanced in favor of the consumer values fostered by our commercial industrial establishment'.

## Ontological Damnation

Lee 99

Keekok, Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Lancaster University, The Natural and the Artefactual, 1999

We should not delude ourselves that the humanization of nature will stop at biotic nature or indeed be confined only to planet Earth. Other planets in our solar system, too, may eventually be humanized; given the technological possibility of doing so, the temptation to do so appears difficult to resist on the part of those always on the lookout for new challenges and new excitement. To resist the ontological elimination of nature as 'the Other,' environmental philosophy must not merely be earthbound but, also, astronomically bounded (at least to the extent of our own solar system). We should bear in mind that while there may be little pristine nature left on Earth, this does not mean that nature is not pristine elsewhere in other planets. We should also be mindful that while other planets may not have life on them, this does not necessarily render them only of instrumental value to us. Above all, we should, therefore, bear in mind that nature, whether pristine or less than fully pristine, biotic or abiotic, is ontologically independent and autonomous of humankind--natural forms and natural processes are capable of undertaking their own .trajectories of existence. We should also remind ourselves that we are the controllers of our science and our technology, and not allow the products of our intellectual labor to dictate to us what we do to nature itself without pause or reflection. However, it is not the plea of this book that humankind should never transform the natural to become the artefactual, or to deny that artefacticity is not a matter of differing degrees or levels, as such claims would be silly and indefensible. Rather its remit is to argue that in systematically transforming the natural to become the artefactual through our science and our technology, we are at the same time systematically engaged in ontological simplification. Ontological impoverishment in this context is wrong primarily because we have so far failed to recognize that nature embodies its own funda­mental ontological value. In other words, it is not true, as modernity alleges, that nature is devoid of all value and that values are simply humanly conferred or are the projections of human emotions or attitudes upon nature. Admittedly, it takes our unique type of human consciousness to recognize that nature possesses ontological value; however, from this it would be fallacious to conclude that human consciousness is at once the source of all values, or even the sole locus of axiologically-grounded intrinsic values. But most important of all, human con­sciousness does not generate the primary ontological value of independence in nature; nature's forms and processes embodying this value exist whether human­kind is around or not.

## Turns Case

Ingwe 10

Richard, Centre for Research and Action on Developing Locales “Ecocentric and anthropocentric policies and crises in climate/environment, finance and economy: Implications of the emerging green policy of the Obama administration for Africa’s sustainable development,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4(1), pp. 001-012, January 2010, http://www.academicjournals.org/ajpsir ISSN 1996-0832

The crisis in climate, finance, and economy, among other sectors at the global and national levels reflect the way policy has ignored ecocentric principles and limitation in the concept and operation of anthropocentrism. Specifically, pursuing the objectives, goals and interests of human beings without considering ecological principles or the inter-relatedness of human and non-human natural systems is responsible for the climate-environmental crisis. While the corruption of anthropocentric institutions, processes, structures and attitudes by top functionaries of global and national financial and economic systems has led to the crisis in these sub-sectors. The climate crisis is also the consequence of the way policy has ignored research-derived scientifically based information and knowledge provided by think-tanks, NGOs/CSOs and universities. This point is also applicable to the causes of the crises in finance and economy at global and national levels. The mitigation and adaptation to climate change and resuscitation of financial and economic systems will be successful if policy hearkens promptly to the research- derived information produced by think-tanks, universities and civil society in directing development plans and programmes. Unfortunately, despite the energy crisis in Africa in the form of gross inadequacy of electricity and the attendant disability of social and economic systems in Africa, the adoption of sustainable (renewable and efficient) energy has been rather negligible, slow, and by far below the level in nations that are in the front line of green power implementation.

## Total Domination

DeLuca 05

Kevin Michael DeLuca, Associate Professor of Speech Communication University of Utah, author of Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism and numerous articles exploring humanity-nature relations and technology, 2005, “Thinking with Heidegger Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice”, in Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87

Machination is unconditional controllability, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicity, and giganticism. Calculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable, a step taken decisively by Descartes (1999, 84–96). Machination is the "pattern of generally calculable explainability, by which everything draws nearer to everything else equally and becomes completely alien to itself" (1999, 92). The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totalizing worldview that enchants: "When machination finally dominates and permeates everything, then there are no longer any conditions by which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment by technicity and its constantly self-surpassing progress are only one sign of this enchantment, by [End Page 75] virtue of which everything presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageability, and regulation" (1999, 86–87). Heidegger prophetically predicts that machination will produce "a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable today" (1999, 108). Animals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more significantly, are banished from Being-in-the-world with us: "What is a plant and an animal to us anymore, when we take away use, embellishment, and entertainment" (1999, 194). "Nature" suffers a similar fate: "What happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings by the natural sciences? The growing—or better, the simple rolling unto its end—destruction of 'nature'.... And finally what was left was only 'scenery' and recreational opportunity and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses" (1999, 195). Under the unrestrained domination of machination, humans suffer a "hollowing out" (1999, 91, 348) and Being-in-the-world is replaced by "adventures." (I am here translating Erlebnis as adventure. Others translate it as lived-experience.)

## Suffering

Peter Singer 03

Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University; Professor at the Centre for Applied Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, May15, 2003,“Animal Liberation at 30” The New York Review of Books, Vol. 50, No. 8, <http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/singer04.htm>

In the text that followed, I urged that despite obvious differences between humans and nonhuman animals, we share with them a capacity to suffer, and this means that they, like us, have interests. If we ignore or discount their interests, simply on the grounds that they are not members of our species, the logic of our position is similar to that of the most blatant racists or sexists who think that those who belong to their race or sex have superior moral status, simply in virtue of their race or sex, and irrespective of other characteristics or qualities. Although most humans may be superior in reasoning or in other intellectual capacities to nonhuman animals, that is not enough to justify the line we draw between humans and animals. Some humans—infants and those with severe intellectual disabilities—have intellectual capacities inferior to some animals, but we would, rightly, be shocked by anyone who proposed that we inflict slow, painful deaths on these intellectually inferior humans in order to test the safety of household products. Nor, of course, would we tolerate confining them in small cages and then slaughtering them in order to eat them. The fact that we are prepared to do these things to nonhuman animals is therefore a sign of "speciesism"—a prejudice that survives because it is convenient for the dominant group— in this case not whites or males, but all humans.

## Extinction (ecological collapse)

Ahkin 10

Melanie Ahkin, works at Monash University, 2010, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the Critique of Rationalism in Val. Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australasian Philosophers, Issue 3, <http://www.eap.philosophy-australia.com/issue_3/EAP3_AHKIN_Human_Centrism.pdf>

Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-human natural realm of non- instrumental value, and impedes the fair and impartial treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: Within the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric framework.15 Whilst acknowledging the importance of prudential concerns for the motivation of practical change, Plumwood emphasises the weightier task of acknowledging injustices to non-humans in order to bring about adequate dispositional change. The model of enlightened self-interest implicit in prudentially motivated action is inadequate to this task insofar as it remains within the framework of human centrism. Although it acknowledges the possibility of relational interests, it rests on a fundamental equivocation between instrumental and relational forms of concern for others. Indeed it motivates action either by appeal to humans' ultimate self-interest, thus failing to truly acknowledge injustices caused to non-human others, remaining caught within the prudentially risky framework of anthropocentrism, or else it accepts that others' interests count as reasons for action- enabling recognition of injustices- but it does so in a manner which treats the intersection of others' needs with more fully-considered human interests as contingent and transient. Given this analysis, it is clear that environmental concern must be based on a deeper recognition of injustice, in addition to that of prudence, if it is to overcome illusions of human disembeddedness and self-enclosure and have a genuine and lasting effect.

## Hierarchies

Smith no date

Penelope Smith, eco-thinker “Animal Communication Specialist”, no date, http://www.anaflora.com/animalliberty/articles/penelope/pene-2.html

Many humans have an attitude that restricts their ability to understand or empathize with non-human animals and other life forms and has some serious consequences for all life on this planet. It is called anthropocentrism, or viewing man as the center or final aim of the universe. I refer to this in my book, Animal Talk, as the "human superiority complex" considering humans as superior to or the pinnacle of all forms of life. From the anthropocentric view, non-human beings that are most like human are usually considered more intelligent, for example, chimpanzees who learn to use sign language or dolphins who signal word or thought comprehension through touching electronic devices in their tanks. Animals or other life forms that don't express themselves in human ways by language or in terms easily comprehensible by common human standards are often considered less developed, inferior, more primitive or mechanistic, and usually of less importance than humans.  This viewpoint has been used to justify using animals as objects for human ends. Since humans are the superior creatures, "dumb, unfeeling" non-humans can be disregarded, mistreated, subjugated, killed or whole species eliminated without much concern for their existence in itself, only their usefulness or lack of it to humankind. Many humans, as they see other animals are more like them in patterns of behavior and expression of intelligence, begin to respect them more and treat them with more regard for their rights. However, this does not transcend the trap of anthropocentrism. To increase harmony of life on Earth, all beings need to be regarded as worthy of respect, whether seen as different or similar to the human species. The anthropocentric view toward animals echoes the way in which many humans have discriminated against other humans because they were of different cultures, races, religions, or sexes. Regarding others as less intelligent or substandard has commonly been used to justify domination, cruelty or elimination of them. Too often people label what they don't understand as inferior, dumb, or to be avoided, without attempting to understand a different way of being. More enlightened humans look upon meeting people, things or animals that are different than themselves as opportunities to expand their understanding, share new realities, and become more whole.

# \*\*\*Alt\*\*\*

## Alt -> Embrace non-anthropocentric ethics

Katz and Oechsli 93

Eric Katz and Lauren Oechsli Members of the Science, Technology, and Society Program,, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark. Katz is currently Vice President of the International Society for Environmental Ethics , “Moving beyond Anthropocentrism: Environmental Ethics, Development, and the Amazon”, <http://www.umweltethik.at/download.php?id=392>

Can an environmentalist defend a policy of preservation in the Amazon rain forest without violating a basic sense of justice? We believe that the mistake is not the policy of preservation itself, but the anthropocentric instrumental framework in which it is justified. Environmental policy decisions should not merely concern the trade-off and comparison of various human benefits. If environmentalists claim that the Third World must preserve its environment because of the overall benefits for humanity, then decision makers in the Third World can demand justice in the determination of preservation policy: preservationist policies unfairly damage the human interests of the local populations. If preservationist policies are to be justified without a loss of equity, there are only two possible alternatives: either we in the industrialized world must pay for the benefits we will gain from preservation or we must reject the anthropocentric and instrumental framework for policy decisions. The first alternative is an empirical political issue, and one about which we are not overly optimistic. The second alternative represents a shift in philosophical world view. We are not providing a direct argument for a nonanthropocentric value system as the basis of environmental policy. Rather, our strategy is indirect. Let us assume that a theory of normative ethics which includes nonhuman natural value has been justified. In such a situation, the human community, in addition to its traditional human-centered obligations, would also have moral obligations to nature or to the natural environment in itself. One of these obligations would involve the urgent necessity for environmental preservation. We would be obligated, for example, to the Amazon rain forest directly. We would preserve the rain forest, not for the human benefits resulting from this preservation, but because we have an obligation of preservation to nature and its ecosystems. Our duties would be directed to nature and its inhabitants and environments, not merely to humans and human institutions. From this perspective, questions of the trade-off and comparison of human benefits, and questions of justice for specific human populations, do not dominate the discussion. This change of emphasis can be illustrated by an exclusively human example. Consider two businessmen, Smith and Jones, who are arguing over the proper distribution of the benefits and costs resulting from a prior business agreement between them. If we just focus on Smith and Jones and the issues concerning them, we will want to look at the contract, the relevant legal precedents, and the actual results of the deal, before rendering a decision. But suppose we learn that the agreement involved the planned murder of a third party, Green, and the resulting distribution of his property. At that point the issues between Smith and Jones cease to be relevant; we no longer consider who has claims to Green’s wallet, overcoat, or BMW to be important. The competing claims become insignificant in light of the obligations owed to Green. This case is analogous to our view of the moral obligations owed to the rain forest. As soon as we realize that the rain forest itself is relevant to the conflict of competing goods, we see that there is not a simple dilemma between Third World develop- ment, on the one hand, and preservation of rain forests, on the other; there is now, in addition, the moral obligation to nature and its ecosystems. When the nonanthropocentric framework is introduced, it creates a more complex situation for deliberation and resolution. It complicates the already detailed discussions of human trade-offs, high-tech transfers, aid programs, debt- for-nature swaps, sustainable development, etc., with a consideration of the moral obligations to nonhuman nature. This complication may appear counterproduc- tive, but as in the case of Smith, Jones, and Green, it actually serves to simplify the decision. Just as a concern for Green made the contract dispute between Smith and Jones irrelevant, the obligation to the rain forest makes many of the issues about trade-offs of human goods irrelevant.12 It is, of course, unfortunate that this direct obligation to the rain forest can only be met with a cost in human satisfaction—some human interests will not be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the same can be said of all ethical decisions, or so Kant teaches us: we are only assuredly moral when we act against our inclinations. To summarize, the historical forces of economic imperialism have created a harsh dilemma for environmentalists who consider nature preservation in the Third World to be necessary. Nevertheless, environmentalists can escape the dilemma, as exemplified in the debate over the development of the Amazon rain forest, if they reject the axiological and normative framework of anthropocentric instrumental rationality. A set of obligations directed to nature in its own right makes many questions of human benefits and satisfactions irrelevant. The Amazon rain forest ought to be preserved regardless of the benefits or costs to human beings. Once we move beyond the confines of human-based instrumental goods, the environmentalist position is thereby justified, and no policy dilemma is created. This conclusion serves as an indirect justification of a nonanthropocen- tric system of normative ethics, avoiding problems in environmental policy that a human-based ethic cannot.

## Alt-> embrace deep ecology

Gottlieb 94

Roger S. Gottlieb, professor of humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 1994, “ETHICS AND TRAUMA: LEVINAS, FEMINISM, AND DEEP ECOLOGY”, http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm

What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law[(23)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.[(24)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.[(25)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."[(26)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.[(27)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.[(28)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.[(29)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?[(30)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.[(31)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.[(32)](http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm" \l "FN32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz -- is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as an other across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for our selves nor for the other, but for us all.

## Alt -> Become members of the biotic community

Seed 88

John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Introduction,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, also by John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/TLAM%20text.htm

The other root of the Council of All Beings, is a new philosophy of nature called "deep ecology.”3 In contrast to reform environmentalism which attempts only to treat some of the symptoms of the environmental crisis, deep ecology questions the fundamental premises and values of contemporary civilization. Our technological culture has co-opted and absorbed all other criticism, so that parts may be questioned but not the whole, while deep ecology as a fountain of revolutionary thought subjects the core of our social existence and our thinking to piercing scrutiny. Deep ecology recognizes that nothing short of a total revolution in consciousness will be of lasting use in preserving the life-support systems of our planet. Within the framework of deep ecology, and contrary to key assumptions of Judeo-Christian/Marxist/humanist tradition, humans are not to be viewed as the ultimate measure of value or as the crown of creation. We are but "a plain member" of the biotic community and our arrogance with respect to this community threatens not only ourselves but all of life. We must learn to "let beings be," to allow other species to follow their separate evolutionary destinies without dominating them. We must come to understand that life-forms do not constitute a pyramid with our species at the apex, but rather a circle where everything is connected to everything else. We must realize that the environment is not "out there," and that when we poison the air or the water or the soil, we poison ourselves because of the vast biological cycles within which we too are inextricably embedded. The themes of deep ecology echo the ancient earth wisdom of native peoples such as Chief Seattle (see page 67). They are further elaborated in this volume in "Beyond Anthropocentrism." (See page 35.) The intellectual acceptance of these concepts is difficult, as our entire socialization in western societies goes against them. An analysis of the political, economic, social and cultural block to a full appreciation of deep ecology would require a book in itself! Furthermore, intellectual acceptance of these concepts is not enough; enormous energies are needed for change to take place on a fundamental level. As Arne Naess points out in his chapter on "Self Realization," this knowledge must permeate us and become part of our very identity. This is not to deny our identity as humans but rather, as Naess argues, to place this identity within its proper perspective, within the larger perspective of our "ecological Self." But while full intellectual acceptance of the truths offered by deep ecology might be extremely difficult to attain, through the power of ritual we may be able to capture a glimpse of the possibilities of Self which are open to us.

## Alt -> Social Ecology

Cochrane 6

Alasdair Cochrane, PhD, Centre for the Study of Human Rights, 2006, originally from Internet Encyplopaedia of Philosophy, edited by James Fieser, Ph.D., founder and general editor and Bradley Dowden, Ph.D., general editor, “Environmental ethics,” http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21190/1/Environmental\_ethics\_%28LSERO%29.pdf

Social ecology shares with deep ecology the view that the foundations of the environmental crisis lie in the dominant ideology of modern western societies. Thus, just as with deep ecology, social ecology claims that in order to resolve the crisis, a radical overhaul of this ideology is necessary. However, the new ideology that social ecology proposes is not concerned with the ‘self-realization’ of deep ecology, but instead the absence of domination. Indeed, domination is the key theme in the writings of Murray Bookchin, the most prominent social ecologist. For Bookchin, environmental problems are directly related to social problems. In particular, Bookchin claims that the hierarchies of power prevalent within modern societies have fostered a hierarchical relationship between humans and the natural world (Bookchin, 1982). Indeed, it is the ideology of the free market that has facilitated such hierarchies, reducing both human beings and the natural world to mere commodities. Bookchin argues that the liberation of both humans and nature are actually dependent on one another. Thus his argument is quite different from Marxist thought, in which man’s freedom is dependent on the complete domination of the natural world through technology. For Bookchin and other social ecologists, this Marxist thinking involves the same fragmentation of humans from nature that is prevalent in capitalist ideology. Instead, it is argued that humans must recognize that they are part of nature, not distinct or separate from it. In turn then, human societies and human relations with nature can be informed by the nonhierarchical relations found within the natural world. For example, Bookchin points out that within an ecosystem, there is no species more important than another, instead relationships are mutualistic and interrelated. This interdependence and lack of hierarchy in nature, it is claimed, provides a blueprint for a non-hierarchical human society (Bookchin, 2001).

## The alt creates a mindset shift

Seed 88

John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Beyond Anthropocentrism,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm

When humans investigate and see through their layers of anthropocentric self-cherishing, a most profound change in consciousness begins to take place. Alienation subsides. The human is no longer an outsider, apart. Your humanness is then recognised as being merely the most recent stage of your existence, and as you stop identifying exclusively with this chapter, you start to get in touch with yourself as mammal, as vertebrate, as a species only recently emerged from the rainforest. As the fog of amnesia disperses, there is a transformation in your relationship to other species, and in your commitment to them. What is described here should not be seen as merely intellectual. The intellect is one entry point to the process outlined, and the easiest one to communicate. For some people however, this change of perspective follows from actions on behalf of Mother Earth. "I am protecting the rainforest" develops to "I am part of the rainforest protecting myself. I am that part of the rainforest recently emerged into thinking." What a relief then! The thousands of years of imagined separation are over and we begin to recall our true nature. That is, the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain (3), sometimes referred to as "deep ecology". As your memory improves, as the implications of evolution and ecology are internalised and replace the outmoded anthropocentric structures in your mind, there is an identification with all life, Then follows the realisation that the distinction between "life" and "lifeless" is a human construct. Every atom in this body existed before organic life emerged 4000 million years ago. Remember our childhood as minerals, as lava, as rocks? Rocks contain the potentiality to weave themselves into such stuff as this. We are the rocks dancing. Why do we look down on them with such a condescending air. It is they that are immortal part of us. (4) If we embark upon such an inner voyage, we may find, upon returning to present day consensus reality, that our actions on behalf of the environment are purified and strengthened by the experience. We have found here a level of our being that moth, rust, nuclear holocaust or destruction of the rainforest genepool do not corrupt. The commitment to save the world is not decreased by the new perspective, although the fear and anxiety which were part of our motivation start to dissipate and are replaced by a certain disinterestedness. We act because life is the only game in town, but actions from a disinterested, less attached consciousness may be more effective. Activists often don't have much time for meditation. The disinterested space we find here may be similar to meditation. Some teachers of meditation are embracing deep ecology (5) and vice versa(6).

## K is first step to solving all impacts

Henning 09

Brian; Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University; “Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy”; Ethics & the Environment- Volume 14, Number 1

In the opening decade of this new millennium, long-simmering conflicts have exploded into a rolling boil of fear, hostility, and violence. Whether we are talking about the rise of religious fundamentalism, the so-called "war on terror" or the much touted culture wars that define the [End Page 101] contemporary American political landscape, there is a move away from tolerance and appreciation of diversity toward the ever more strident formulation of absolutist positions. Dogmatism in its various forms seems to be on the rise as the rhetoric and reality of compromise and consensus building is replaced with the vitriol of moral superiority and righteousness. As the psychologist and philosopher William James noted more than a century ago, the problem is that we are in a world where "every one of hundreds of ideals has its special champion already provided in the shape of some genius expressly born to feel it, and to fight to death in its behalf" (James 1956 [1891], 207–08). The force of this point was made brutally clear by the events of and following September 11, 2001. Given a world fraught with such conflict and tension, what is needed is not a moral philosophy that dogmatically advances absolute moral codes. More than ever, what is needed is an ethic that is dynamic, fallible, and situated, yet not grossly relativistic. This project takes on added urgency when we consider the environmental and social crises that threaten not only human civilization, but all forms of life on this planet. Unhealthy air and water, species extinction, overpopulation, soaring food prices, fresh water shortages, stronger storms, prolonged droughts, the spread of deserts, deforestation, melting ice caps and glaciers, the submersion of low-lying lands—there are no shortage of challenges facing us in this young century. Complex and multifaceted, these issues are at once technological, scientific, economic, social, and political. Yet we will have no hope of successfully addressing the root cause of these crises until we also squarely confront fundamental issues concerning epistemology, axiology, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Although debates over carbon taxes and trading schemes, over carbon offsets and compact fluorescents are important, our efforts will ultimately fail unless and until we also set about the difficult work of reconceiving who we are and how we are related to our processive cosmos. What is needed, I believe, are new ways of thinking and acting grounded in new ways of understanding ourselves and our relationship to the world, ways of understanding that recognize our fundamental interdependence and interconnection with everyone and everything in the cosmos, ways of understanding that recognize the intrinsic beauty and value of every form of existence. What is needed, I suggest, is a moral philosophy grounded in Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism. Recognizing this [End Page 102] need, it is the primary aim of this essay to present the key elements and defend the value of a moral philosophy inspired by, though not dogmatically committed to, Whitehead's organic, beauty-centered conception of reality.

# \*\*\*Framework\*\*\*

## **Debate Key**

Bell and Russell 2k

Anne C. by graduate students in the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University and Constance L. a graduate student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf

So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our inability to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them. Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-tions as “empowerment.” Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational mind (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis & Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro, 1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991). Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan. A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge, they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston, 1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race, class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61). The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci, each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights. Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory, ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered (A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994; Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993). N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity, and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 621). We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vulnerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the humancentred frameworks that structure their endeavours. No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard. Nevertheless, anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and agency will need to be revisited. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks. Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of humanists to pause for a moment at least.

## Policy debate bad

Stables 02

Andrew Stables, Reader in Education at University of Bath, 2002; Trumpeter 18.1

Wordsworth is here describing a mood, but one to treasure, and from which he derives (as he makes clear in many other poems) significant personal and ethical guidance. When moods become habitual, as seems certainly to have been the case with Wordsworth, they also tend to become dispositions. I would argue, then, that education for sustainability should, in part, be concerned with enabling the kinds of experience that promote the kind of mood Wordsworth describes. This is, of course, by no means easy; after all, Wordsworth ascribed his own love of nature to an often solitary rural childhood coupled with a naturally sensitive disposition. I shall return to the challenges for educators in providing appropriate experiences below. If a frame of mind is more than just a mood, then the term must refer to some more enduring organizational structure for thinking and feeling. Framing, thus understood, has many, vaguely related connotations in various literatures, but all of them seem to relate to categorizations and definitions determined, to some degree, by human agency. Thus, when I think of Frames, I am reminded of the Kantian definition of the Category, of Wittgensteinian “language games,” of Erving Goffman’s “Frame Analysis,” and, more broadly, of genres, disciplines, ways of thinking, even communities of practice; also, of course, of art, photography, and film. Dispositions relate to tendencies to respond in certain ways within these frames, or to utilise certain frames rather than others, depending on the definition used. Regarding educational processes, I am reminded of Bernstein’s distinction between Weak and Strong Framing and Classification, and the need for teachers to frame things more strongly for children from certain backgrounds than for others. Of course, “determined by human agency” does not imply conscious control. Paul Guyer**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "1)** defines Kant’s Categories broadly as “those general concepts by means of which our intuitions are converted into representations of objects or judgments.” Although our intuitions, thus conceived, relate to an absolute reality, bound by time and space, the Categories function prior to our conscious judgments despite being essentially human constructs (and common to all humanity, according to Kant—though not to all sentient life). What Kant does not give much consideration to is the degree of possible variation in how judgments can be made. Put simply, how much might the same frame of mind allow for different arguments and approaches? A belief in cause and effect, for instance, can be enacted very differently in positivist and post-positivist research paradigms in the social sciences. Some of this is also true in a sense of the Wittgensteinian language game:**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "2)** truths are constructed from within language games, even though there is no good reason to suppose that the games/frames exist anywhere other than in the human psyche. Millennial global politics, as recent events have all too starkly reminded us, bear witness to the huge differences between perspectives and dispositions at the cultural and religious levels. We may all operate within the same Kantian Categories—even the same Wittgensteinian language games—but the worldviews we construct can still be radically different. Even within the Christian community (to take a currently relatively uncontroversial example) there are stark differences between liberals who interpret the Bibleaccording to cultural context, evangelicals, who interpret the contemporary context according to the Bible, and fundamentalists, who use the Bible to keep their distance from the modern world as entirely as possible. Looked at this way, language games can certainly be played very differently, and we do not necessarily need a new frame of mind. Goffman’s social-psychological account construes frames as indeed dependent on social and cultural change.**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "3)** He sees frames as something like spectacles, or the selective focusing of a camera lens. To see life through rose-coloured spectacles implies the adoption of particular—in this case, overoptimistic—assumptions about spatial and temporal context. Goffman’s frames enable us to read events as appropriate or otherwise within their contexts (and to Goffman, context is all important), thus allowing us, for example, to be unsurprised when a naked person enters the room and sits before us in a life-drawing class, though less composed in the unlikely event that this should happen under other everyday circumstances. (My example, not Goffman’s.) Goffman’s frames are thus heavily culturally determined. Goffman also differs from Kant, and perhaps from Wittgenstein, in his view of the relative teachability of frames. In his discussion of “breaking frames” through bursting into laughter, Goffman refers to the sense of absurdity that recalcitrant youths often feel when their elders and betters ask them to undertake role plays designed to teach them life skills. A simple example arises from the experience of many of us who have been involved in the upbringing of children: it seems ridiculous to say “please” and “thank you” if you have not been taught to do so habitually. Goffman’s frames, therefore, seem less fundamental than Kant’s Categories, or Wittgenstein’s language games; nevertheless, this does not imply that new frames are created at will. However, Goffman’s analysis does seem to leave the educator with some room for manoeuvre, at least with respect to prioritization. Basil Bernstein**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "4)** has perhaps done most to highlight the pedagogical importance of framing, pointing out that schooling at the end of the twentieth century, at least in Britain and countries like it, tended to reproduce the cultural norms and practices of the socially privileged, with well-meaning liberal teachers misguidedly tending to use weak framing and classification in classrooms, whether or not their students shared their preconceptions about how to “play the game” of schooling. Bernstein’s account, taken all in all, is essentially sociological and structural, and more deterministic than Goffman’s, with cultural practices divided along social class lines in relation to Codes that embody both work and domestic practices and are expressed via language and schooling. Thus, for a variety of reasons, working-class children tend to grow up in homes where questions are not invited and feelings are little articulated, where lines of authority are rigid and hierarchical, and where rules are hard and fast, and are made explicit (i.e. strongly framed), whereas the children of the professional classes, particularly in the Post-Fordist West, are invited to enter debate and open exploration of feelings, rules, and opinions, so are more at ease in weakly framed situations (such as when a teacher simply tells pupils to “find out about” something). Bernstein’s key insight in the context of the present debate is that children experience educational events differently according to their backgrounds and prior experiences—and teachers should take this into account. To misquote Tony Blair on schools in England and Wales, in word if not in spirit: “One sizeshould not fit all.” This serves as a reminder to environmental educators, for example, that the same experience will not always be interpreted in the same way or produce the same result; the teacher’s frames will not always match those of the taught.

## Our K = good debate

Stables 02

Andrew Stables, Reader in Education at University of Bath, 2002; Trumpeter 18.1

Taken together, what do these formulations imply about frames of mind? Perhaps: (i) they organize, and/or determine and constrain thinking. We see the world from within them, not outside them; (ii) yet we do have some metacognitive, aesthetic, or deconstructive capacity to recognize frames, if not from the outside, at least from other frames. Also, our frames can be at least shaken by experience (cf. Kant’s views on the Sublime in the Critique of Judgment). Also, either frames change, or our uses of them or operations within them change; (iii) what we cannot do is ever fully articulate the relationship of our frames to the material conditions prior to their development. My ways of seeing the world, which cannot be entirely separate from yours (as Wittgenstein argued at some length in the section ofPhilosophical Investigations devoted to the impossibility of a private language), nevertheless retain an essentially arbitrary relationship to biophysical reality, in the sense that we cannot understand the degree to which our cultural options are constrained by material reality any more than we can understand why a dog is called a dog or a hund or achien. This is true even of Kant’s use of the Category. (An interesting corollary of this is that if intelligent life has developed on other planets, there seems little reason to believe that we should be able to communicate with it, as there is no compelling argument that the same material conditions would produce identical frames of mind, let alone identical strategic and tactical judgments within them. Even if material reality can be explained mathematically, there is no reason to suppose that mathematical languages would be replicated. Contexts for action never completely replicate.) I would argue that we tend to see sustainability in terms of the basic Category of cause and effect: modern industrial practices have been the cause; environmental and social degradation are the result; sustainability is the answer. To put it differently, sustainability as a regulative ideal is a product of the dialogue that produced the current sense of environmental and ecological crisis. Given a broad acceptance of this, however, sustainability dialogue is riddled with assumptions that do not really add up. Harré, Brockmeier, and Muhlhausler**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "5)** have shown clearly in Greenspeak, for example, how environmentalist rhetoric has cleverly combined palaeontological, cultural, and personal timeframes to create a sense of imminent disaster. Given these paradoxes, and conflicting views about both frames of mind and sustainability, where might we look to develop new orientations to action, whether or not these amount to frames of mind according to the various definitions above? These possibilities occur: (i) in the postmodern science advocated by Aran Gare and others,**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "6)** influenced by Jean-Francois Lyotard’s rejection of scientific progress as anything more, or less, than a narrative, and not one that can override all others,**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "7)** or (ii) in some kind of spiritual, deep ecological movement, involving perhaps a revival of Hegelian idealism, thoroughgoing Romanticism, or religious, mystical and quasi-mystical discourses and practices of transcendence and renunciation. Certain features could be said to be common to each of these, differentiating each from the mainstream of Western modernist thought: a sense of interrelationship; a love of the intangible Other; a delight in the unknown and the unknowable (yet perceivable, under the right circumstances); a belief that the whole is greater than the part will ever apprehend (including the human reason part), so an acceptance of both our power to be at one with nature and the healthy limitation of our powers; and a belief that there may be no ultimate technological answer, including no ultimate recipe for sustainability. I have argued elsewhere that scientific and critical realist readings of the environmental crisis tend to lack one or more of these crucial ingredients.**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "8)** The modernist obsession with control over both nature and society, though it has brought us many benefits, has, for example, tended to blind us to the fact that many of our most fulfilling experiences are encounters with the non-human, often when we are alone. A few weeks ago, I sat on a stile in a Wiltshire field and watched a fox as it approached me, stopped and looked at me while I looked at it, and we mutually failed to understand each other. A little later, I spent even longer observing gorillas in a zoo. (The very existence of zoos raises questions about environmental learning, of course.) We remember such things, I would suggest, because they disrupt, or make us question, or make us somehow aware of, our frames and remind us that there is always life beyond the narrow limits of our reason: life to which we are related in some way, though we cannot understand it. We are reminded, as Shakespeare wrote, that there is more in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophies. Some experiences can rattle our frames. So a sustainable world may be one that continues to contain more than we can understand. To bring about sustainability, thus defined, we have to leave open the possibilities for surprise and wonder by reminding ourselves that the real riches of living lie inthe world beyond that which we control. Life can be perfect (cf. Kant’s idea of the Beautiful) and awe-inspiring (the Sublime). Whether we can actually guarantee keeping a balance in what we cannot understand or control is a moot question, though we can certainly try to keep a balance within ourselves. How can we pursue knowledge in pursuit of the unknowable? Only, I would suggest (and this makes no pretence at an original answer), by acknowledging some force, a mind, greater than our own, individually, collectively, or historically. While scientific modernity, encouraged perhaps by Kant, may tend to see people as moral agents within a mechanical universe, perhaps a healthy reversal is due. We might rather conceive of much of ourselves, much of the time, as mechanical agents within a mysteriously purposeful universe: little technicians who have often lost sight of our significant insignificance in the greater scheme of things that will always, in its entirety, remain closed to us. Thus understood, we are trapped within frames of mind, or patterns of judgment, dictated by a rather reductionist rationalism and impoverished empiricism, but by opening ourselves up to new experience we can reawaken our sense of wonder and of place, if not ever fully know what we’re here for, or guarantee our sustainability.

## Education Impact

Stables 02

Andrew Stables, Reader in Education at University of Bath, 2002; Trumpeter 18.1

Certain kinds of sense-making are both exploratory and enriching, and resist easy closure. In conclusion, therefore, education for sustainability as a frame of mind, or towards sustainability as a condition of the planet, might take the view that it remains important to learn languages and sciences and history—but that these should be learnt as much as possible as adventures towards encounters with the unknown, and that students might have some other adventures, too, whether in or out of school, so that, even in education, the experience can exceed the expectations, whether or not the frames are changed (because the latter depends on how we conceive of frames of mind). Let the educational quest always be for the unknowable. How else can coming generations learn to live in awe of life? The twentieth century has been characterised as the century of the attempted extermination of the Other by the exploitation of frighteningly powerful technologies, and we continue to suffer the aftershocks. Alain Finkielkraut,**[Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.](../../Users/Lebowski/Users/Lebowski/AppData/Local/Temp/anthro final fixed.docx" \l "8)** for example, cites both Stalinism and Nazism as the excesses of a coldly instrumental rationality that demonized difference in the pursuit (quite sincere, in their own terms) of Utopia. It would, I fear, be quite possible to demonize difference in pursuit of a sustainable society, based on principles of scientific ecology. Perhaps almost as uncomfortably, Finkielkraut sees the Millennial postmodern condition as also retreating from encounters with the Other, but this time through a failure to respect any ties, ideologies, traditions, or arguments, so that all human living on Earth is conducted from the superficial perspective of the tourist. Recent events have reminded us just how paper-thin the veneer of mutual tolerance can be. Finkielkraut concludes In The Name of Humanity by quoting Hannah Arendt, who considered resentment the natural, and understandable, condition of post-Holocaust humanity, and gratitude as its only feasible alternative. What price an education that makes us grateful for life on Earth?

# \*\*\*A2s and 2NC Tricks\*\*\*

## A2: Perm

### State cooption bad

Papadopoulos 10

Dr. Dimitris Papadopoulos, teaches politics, culture and organization at the School of Management, University of Leicester. 2010, ephemera, Vol. 10 “Insurgent posthumanism,” http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/10-2/10-2papadopoulos.pdf

It is true that left politics have largely ignored the complexity and unpredictability of the entanglement between a deeply divided society and that of a deeply divided nonhuman world. The principle avenue for social transformation, at least in the main conceptualisations of the political left 3 , passes through seizing the centres of social and political power. The dominant motivation for left politics after the revolutions of 1848 (and definitely since 1871) has been how to conquer institutional power and the state. Within this matrix of radical left thinking the posthumanist moment becomes invalidated, subsumed to a strategy focused solely on social power. But here I want to argue that a post-humanist gesture can be found at the heart of processes of left political mobilisations that create transformative institutions and alternatives. This was the case even when such moves were distorted at the end, neutralised or finally appropriated into a form of left politics solely concerned with institutional representation and state power. What such an appropriation conceals is that a significant part of the everyday realities put to work through radical left struggles have always had a strong posthumanist character through their concentration on remaking the mundane material conditions of existence beyond and outside an immediate opposition to the state. In what follows I will try to excavate this posthumanist gesture from the main narratives of radical left political struggles along the following three fault lines: the first is about the exit from an alienated and highly regulated relation to the material, biological and technological realms through the making of a self-organised common world – a move from enclosed and separated worlds governed by labour to the making of ecological commons. A second posthumanist move is one that attacks the practice of politics as a matter of ideas and institutions and rehabilitates politics as an embodied and everyday practice – an exit from the representational mind to the embodiment of politics. Finally, the third, involves the decentring of the human subject as the main actor of history making. History is a human affair but it is not made (only) by certain groups of humans – a move towards a post-anthropocentric history.

### Util kills the perm

Doyle 12

Jessica Jayne, “Key Concepts and Rationalities in Canada’s Environmental Enforcement Act: Tensions between Environmental Protection and Economic Development,” Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies University of Ottawa, www.ruor.uottawa.ca/fr/handle/10393/22813

This section discusses the viewpoint of philosophical anthropocentrism to explain why risk- based and utilitarian approaches to environmental harm tend to be the most common methods of environmental governance. Anthropocentrism is a philosophical approach to the environment that “giv[es] exclusive or arbitrarily preferential consideration to human interests as opposed to the interests of other beings” (Hayward in Dobson, 2000: 51). Philosophically, anthropocentrism is a belief that humans are biologically, mentally, and morally superior to all other living and non-living beings (Halsey & White, 1998: 31). According to existing research, philosophical anthropocentrism conceptually reinforces the movement towards neoliberal, risk-based methods of governance (Halsey & White, 1998: 32). These “utilitarian” and risk-based solutions to environmental harm are problematic because they involve a decision-making process that does not consider the intrinsic value of things such as biodiversity or clean water (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982: 70; Halsey & White, 1998: 31-33; Hessing et al, 2005: 7-21). Although this research project cannot examine whether the actors in the policy-making process accept this viewpoint, existing research problematizes the dominance of this viewpoint in the environmental policy-making process (Halsey, 2006: 43; Halsey & White, 1998: 33). Existing research sees non-anthropocentric philosophies towards environmental harm as more effective than anthropocentric philosophies. Non-anthropocentric philosophies of environmental harm involve a reconsideration of the current structural economic context. Several dichotomies attempt to separate anthropocentric thought from non-human centered thought. These include the differences between anthropocentrism, ecocentrism, and biocentrism (Halsey & White, 1998), environmental and ecological justice (White, 2007), and reformist and radical assumptions towards the causes of environmental harm (Levy, 1997: 126). Alternative approaches question the lack of emphasis in capitalist economics on the intrinsic value of the environment (O‟Connor, 1994: 125-127). Non-anthropocentric approaches threaten economic growth because they propose limits on the consumption of environmental resources (Snider, 2000: 177-178). Existing research tends to see environmental governance strategies that are based on the principles of anthropocentrism are ineffective in protecting the environment (Halsey & White, 1998; Hessing et al, 2005). Environmental criminologists who question the effectiveness of anthropocentrism must propose structural changes to the political, economic, and social contexts of the policy-making process (Lynch & Stretesky, 2003: 87). This is because shifts away from human- centered solutions to environmental harm must also involve a counter-discourse to neoliberalism, globalization, risk management and the current political economic context (Benton, 2008; Gillespie, 2006; Seis, 1999).

### Perm= Unethical

Lupisella & Logsdon 97

Mark, masters degree in philosophy of science at university of Maryland and researcher working at the Goddard Space Flight Center, and John, Director, Space Policy Institute The George Washington University, Washington, “DO WE NEED A COSMOCENTRIC ETHIC?” <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.25.7502>

Steve Gillett has suggested a hybrid view combining homocentrism as applied to terrestrial activity combined with biocentrism towards worlds with indigenous life.32 Invoking such a patchwork of theories to help deal with different domains and circumstances could be considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable especially when dealing with something as varied and complex as ethics. Indeed, it has a certain common sense appeal. However, instead of digging deeply into what is certainly a legitimate epistemological issue, let us consider the words of J. Baird Callicott: “But there is both a rational philosophical demand and a human psychological need for a self-consistent and all-embracing moral theory. We are neither good philosophers nor whole persons if for one purpose we adopt utilitarianism, another deontology, a third animal liberation, a fourth the land ethic, and so on. Such ethical eclecticism is not only rationally intolerable, it is morally suspect as it invites the suspicion of ad hoc rationalizations for merely expedient or self-serving actions.”33

## A2: Anthro Inevitable/Human Nature

Seed 88

John Seed, founder and director of the Rainforest Information Centre in Australia, 1988, “Beyond Anthropocentrism,” from Thinking Like A Mountain - Towards A Council Of All Beings, http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/deep-eco/Anthropo.htm

Of all the species that have existed, it is estimated that less than one in a hundred exist today. The rest are extinct. As environment changes, any species that is unable to adapt, to change, to evolve, is extinguished. All evolution takes place in this fashion In this way an oxygen starved fish, ancestor of yours and mine, commenced to colonise the land. Threat of extinction is the potter's hand that molds all the forms of life. The human species is one of millions threatened by imminent extinction through nuclear war and other environmental changes. And while it is true that the "human nature" revealed by 12,000 years of written history does not offer much hope that we can change our warlike, greedy, ignorant ways, the vastly longer fossil history assures us that we CAN change. We ARE the fish, and the myriad other death-defying feats of flexibility which a study of evolution reveals to us. A certain confidence ( in spite of our recent "humanity") is warranted. From this point of view, the threat of extinction appears as the invitation to change, to evolve. After a brief respite from the potter's hand, here we are back on the wheel again. The change that is required of us is not some new resistance to radiation, but a change in consciousness. Deep ecology is the search for a viable consciousness. Surely consciousness emerged and evolved according to the same laws as everything else. Molded by environ mental pressures, the mind of our ancestors must time and again have been forced to transcend itself. To survive our current environmental pressures, we must consciously remember our evolutionary and ecological inheritance. We must learn to think like a mountain. If we are to be open to evolving a new consciousness, we must fully face up to our impending extinction (the ultimate environmental pressure). This means acknowledging that part of us which shies away from the truth, hides in intoxication or busyness from the despair of the human, whose 4000 million year race is run, whose organic life is a mere hair's breadth from finished.(7) A biocentric perspective, the realisation that rocks WILL dance, and that roots go deeper that 4000 million years, may give us the courage to face despair and break through to a more viable consciousness, one that is sustainable and in harmony with life again.

## A2: case O/W

Sivil 2k

Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. “WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT”, 2000, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>

It is fair to say that the success of the environmental movement is largely "a result of the power of anthropocentric arguments, for the general population began to realise that the degradation of the natural environment would have serious consequences for human health, safety, and survival" (Katz 1999: 378). This is of little relevance when regarding the development of an environmental ethic, for the awareness raised by anthropocentric arguments is restricted to the consequences affecting humans alone. Above I argued that anthropocentric value systems are unsuitable to the development of an environmental ethic. Traditional ethical theories (teleological, utilitarian, and deontological) were shown to be anthropocentric. This makes such theories unsuitable to the development of an environmental ethic. Clearly a wider and more encompassing ethic is required, one which extends moral concern beyond human boundaries. What is required is a "change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations" (Zimmerman 1998: 17), with the assumptions of an environmental ethic being "broader and more inclusive than the mere consideration of human interests" (Katz 1999: 378). Whether and how such an ethic is possible is the task of another paper.

## Human extinction good

Miller 09

Jason Miller, associate editor for the Journal for Critical Animal Studies, 2009: http://thomaspainescorner.wordpress.com/2009/02/03/homo-rapiens-be-damned-savagery-is-not-programmed-into-our-dna/

Steve Best, Associate Professor of Philosophy at UTEP, and a leading philosopher in the animal liberation movement, suggested that perhaps humanity is, “A biological experiment with advanced primate intelligence gone horribly wrong, as if all of planet earth is an Island of Dr. Moreau set up by an evil God.” While hopelessly anthropocentric apologists for humanity’s ongoing rape of the Earth and its inhabitants will probably dismiss Best’s observation as the ravings of a misanthropic animal fanatic, critical thinking people of conscience and humility will consider the possibility that Best may be right. Certainly there is no dearth of evidence supporting the fact that the human evolutionary path has veered into a deadly and destructive cul-de-sac. Homo rapiens have succeeded Homo sapiens in humanity’s evolutionary development. How long can we sustain, or better yet, how long will the Earth allow us to sustain a “civilization” that is premised on violence, greed, over-consumption, endless growth, “success” and pleasure attained at the expense of the suffering of other sentient beings, narcissism, ego fulfillment, and a host of other nauseating grotesqueries? It doesn’t take much contemplation of the human race to leave one yearning for the companionship of Moreau’s Beast Folk. Not unlike the Zionists in Palestine, the broader human race clings to an aggressive, violent and defensive way of interfacing with the world as a perverse reaction to having been vulnerable and victimized. We have maximized our frontal lobes, opposable thumbs, and capacities to engage in complex social behaviors in such a way that we are now uber-predators, so firmly astride the top of the food chain even were all non-human animals to somehow join forces and assail us, they’d be overwhelmingly defeated. Early hominids probably perceived their numerous predators as monsters. In collectively equipping ourselves to fight those ‘monsters,’ we have ignored Nietzsche’s cautionary aphorism and become more than monsters; we have morphed into world-destroying abominations. Western Civilization (read Eurocentric, patriarchal, capitalist, speciesist, imperialist, and Christian), the most powerful perpetrator in the brutal and merciless assault on non-human animals and the Earth, codified its sociopathic license to rape by inventing an anthropomorphic deity that gave it the “divine right” to dominate and exploit. “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. They shall rule the fish of the sea, the birds of the sky, the cattle, the whole earth, and all the creeping things that creep on earth,” proclaimed the Christian deity in an ancient tome written by a collection of largely unknown authors. And since many still hold the Bible to be sacrosanct, dominionism remains deeply embedded in our collective psyche. As the sun set on monarchial rule and the Enlightenment unfolded, we humans entered what appeared to be a golden age of “liberal democracy,” reason, and free markets. Yet ironically, this transition marked the advent of the darkest and most psychopathic phase of Homo rapien existence. Kings were replaced by soulless corporations; Descartes’ mechanistic worldview assured us that non-human animals don’t consciously suffer, thus enabling guilt-free industrialization of their torture and murder; and capitalism spawned runaway growth, unbridled avarice, and a deep obsession with property and profits. Buttressed by new and powerful theoretical underpinnings, we began our relentless attack on the Earth and its inhabitants in a futile effort to slake our seemingly insatiable thirst for control, prosperity and security. Catalyzed and sustained by the deep-seated terror of an animal sans fang or claw and by our most despicable attributes, such as gluttony, belligerence, self-centeredness, and mean-spiritedness (each of which has been validated in some way by the fundamental theologies and philosophies of our society), we have unleashed an apocalyptic Hell upon the rest of the world. Overpopulation, deforestation, Climate Change, nuclear waste, potential nuclear destruction, the Sixth Extinction, rampant pollution, potable water shortages, factory farming, and endless resource wars are the bitter harvest the world is reaping from the noxious seeds we’ve sown. While Senator James Inhofe, George Bush 41, and myriad other ardent supporters of Western Civilization, the American Way of Life, corporatism, imperialism, patriarchy, speciesism, and a host of other malevolent social, cultural, political and economic dynamics which comprise the anthropocentric mechanisms by which we dominate and exploit the planet, may have deluded themselves into believing that the rape, pillage and plunder by which we exist is morally palatable (or perhaps they simply don’t care), there are plenty of people who are deeply concerned. These individuals want to find a way to develop that “natural equilibrium” to which Agent Smith referred by breaking down the physical and psychological barriers we’ve erected, rejoining nature, and ceasing to exist as alienated, belligerent, and vampiric entities. Hence the questions become, are we human animals a lost cause and does Mother Earth need to eradicate us to enable life to perpetuate on this planet? A widely accepted notion is that peaceful, gentle Homo sapiens began their metamorphosis to barbaric Homo rapiens about 10,000 years ago when hunter-gatherers became sedentary agrarians—working the land meant that ruthless men rose to power by hoarding surpluses, territorial wars were waged, and women and animals were subjugated. However, it is much more likely that our ancestors were brutal war-mongers as far back as 45,000 years ago. Evidence indicates that when early Homo sapiens migrated from Africa into Europe, they waged a 15,000 year genocide that eventually drove the Neanderthals to extinction. Even the Bible, which many Homo rapien apologists utilize as a validation for our savage domination of the planet, provides numerous examples of our cruel propensities. Poignant example number one is Cain murdering Abel. We know how bad we can be. Now how good can we become? Our moral evolution is not necessarily limited by our genetic make-up. It has become obvious that the common characterization of nature versus nurture is a false dichotomy. Genetics and learning dialectically shape who we become and how we interact with the world, both individually and collectively. So the lines between humanity’s innate tendencies and those qualities we acquire through parenting, education, and experience are often blurred and indiscernible.

## Vote neg on presumption

**Anthropocentrism misunderstands value, this means they have no way to qualify the good of the aff, vote neg on presumption**

Henning 09

Brian; Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University; “Trusting in the 'Efficacy of Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy”; Ethics & the Environment- Volume 14, Number 1

Until we shed our self-deluding arrogance and recognize that who and what we are as a species is fundamentally bound up in and dependent on the wider scope of events unfolding in the universe, the ecological crisis will only deepen. Taken seriously, our understanding of reality as composed of vibrant, organically interconnected achievements of beauty and value, has a dramatic effect on how we conceive [End Page 109] of ourselves, of nature, and of our moral obligations—morality can no longer be limited merely to inter-human relations. In rejecting modernity's notion of lifeless matter, we come to recognize that every form of actuality has value in and for itself, for others, and for the whole. In aiming at and achieving an end for itself, every individual—no matter how ephemeral or seemingly insignificant—has intrinsic value for itself and in achieving this self-value it thereby becomes a value for others and for the whole of reality. Every individual, from the most fleeting event in deep space to centuries old redwoods, has value for itself, for others, and for the whole of reality and it is from this character of reality that our moral obligations derive (Whitehead 1938, 111). Given that every individual in our universe, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has some degree of value, the scope of our direct moral concern15 can exclude nothing. Thus, in rather sharp contrast to the invidious forms of anthropocentrism that characterize much of western moral thought, our scope of direct moral concern cannot be limited to humans, to sentient beings, or even to all living beings. Morality is not anthropocentric, but neither is it sentientcentric or biocentric. In affirming the value of every individual, we must begin to recognize that every relation is potentially a moral relation. As Whitehead vividly puts it, "The destruction of a man, or of an insect, or of a tree, or of the Parthenon, may be moral or immoral.… Whether we destroy or whether we preserve, our action is moral if we have thereby safeguarded the importance [or value] of experience so far as it depends on that concrete instance in the world's history" (1938, 14–15). Morality is not merely about how we ought to act toward and among other human beings, other sentient beings, or even other living beings. Morality is fundamentally about how we comport ourselves in the world, how we relate to and interact with every form of existence.

## Ethics before truth

Weston 09

Anthony Weston, Professor of Philosophy at Elon University, 2009 The Incompleat Eco-Philosopher p. 9-11

If the world is a collection of more or less ﬁxed facts to which we  must respond, then the task of ethics is to systematize and unify our  responses. This is the expected view, once again so taken for granted  as to scarcely even appear as a “view” at all. Epistemology is prior to  ethics. Responding to the world follows upon knowing it—and what  could be more sensible or responsible than that? If the world is not  “given,” though—if the world is what it seems to be in part because  we have made it that way, as I have been suggesting, and if therefore  the process of inviting its further possibilities into the light is fundamental to ethics itself—then our very knowledge of the world, of the  possibilities of other animals and the land and even ourselves in relation  to them, follows upon “invitation,” and ethics must come ﬁrst. Ethics  is prior to epistemology—or, as Cheney and I do not say in the paper  but probably should have said, what really emerges is another kind of  epistemology—“etiquette,” in our speciﬁc sense, as epistemology.  But then of course we are also speaking of something sharply  different from “ethics” as usually understood. We are asked not for a  set of well-defended general moral commitments in advance, but rather  for something more visceral and instinctual, a mode of comportment more than a mode of commitment, more ﬂeshy and more vulnerable.  Etiquette so understood requires us to take risks, to offer trust before  we know whether or how the offer will be received, and to move with  awareness, civility, and grace in a world we understand to be capable  of response. Thus Cheney and I conclude that ethical action itself must be “ﬁ rst and foremost an attempt to open up possibilities, to enrich  the world” rather than primarily an attempt to respond to the world  as already known.  Cheney, true to his nature, also takes the argument on a more  strenuous path, exploring indigenous views of ceremony and ritual.  Once again the question of epistemology turns out to be central.  Euro-Americans, Cheney says, want to know what beliefs are encoded  in the utterances of indigenous peoples. We treat their utterances as  propositional representations of Indigenous worlds. But what if these  utterances function, instead, primarily to produce these worlds? Cheney  cites the indigenous scholar Sam Gill on the fundamentally performa-  tive function of language. When Gill asks Navajo elders what prayers  mean, he reports, they tell him “not what messages prayers carry, but  what prayers do.” More generally, Gill asserts that “the importance of  religion as it is practiced by the great body of religious persons for  whom religion is a way of life [is] a way of creating, discovering, and  communicating worlds of meaning largely through ordinary and com-  mon actions and behavior.”11  What then, Cheney and I ask, if this performative dimension of language is fundamental not just in indigenous or obviously religious   settings, but generally? How we speak, how we move, how we carry  on, all the time, also literally brings all sorts of worlds into being—and  thus, again, the ethical challenge put mindful speech, care, and respect  ﬁ rst. Indeed we would now go even further. Here it is not so much  that epistemology comes ﬁ rst but that, in truth, it simply fades away.  The argument is not the usual suggestion that the West has misunder-  stood the world, got it wrong, and that we now need to “go back” to  the Indians to get it right. Cheney is arguing that understanding the  world is not really the point in the ﬁ rst place. We are not playing a  truth game at all. What matters is how we relate to things, not what  things are in themselves. Front, center, and always, the world responds.  The great task is not knowledge but relationship.

# \*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

## Human centered thinking good

Light 2

Andrew Light, professor of environmental philosophy and director of the Environmental Conservation Education Program, 2002, Applied Philosophy Group at New York University, METAPHILOSOPHY, v33, n4, July, p. 561

It should be clear by now that endorsing a method­ological environmental pragmatism requires an ac­ceptance of some form of anthropocentrism in envi­ronmental ethics, if only because we have sound empirical evidence that humans think about the value of nature in human terms and pragmatists insist that we must pay attention to how humans think about the value of nature. Indeed, as I said above, it is a common presupposition among committed nonan­thropocentrists that the proposition that humans are anthropocentrist is true, though regrettable. There are many problems involved in the wholesale rejec­tion of anthropocentrism by most environmental philosophers. While I cannot adequately explain my reservations to this rejection, for now I hope the reader will accept the premise that not expressing reasons for environmental priorities in human terms seriously hinders our ability to communicate a moral basis for better environmental policies to the public. Both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric claims should be open to us.

## Calculative thought good

Campbell 99

David, Prof of Int’l Politics @ Univ. of Newcastle, Moral Spaces, p. 50-51

In pursuing Derrida on the question of the decision, a pursuit that ends up in the supplementing of Derridean deconstruction with Levinasian ethics, Critchley was concerned to ground political decisions in something other than the "madness" of a decision, and worried that there could be a "refusal of politics in Derrida's work" because the emphasis upon undecidability as the condition of responsibility contained an implicit rejection of politics as "the field of antagonism, decision, dissension, and struggle," the "domain of questioning s Yet from the above discussion, I would argue that Derrida's account of the procedure of the decision also contains within it an account of the duty, obligation, and responsibility of the decision within deconstruction. Moreover, the undecidable and infinite character of justice that fosters that duty is precisely what guarantees that the domain of politics bears the characteristics of contestation rightly prized by Critchley. Were everything to be within the purview of the decidable, and devoid of the undecidable, then (as Derrida constantly reminds us) there would be no ethics, politics, or responsibility, only a program, technology, and its irresponsible application. Of course, for many (though Critchley is clearly not among them), the certainties of the program are synonymous with the desires of politics. But if we seek to encourage recognition of the radical interdependence of being that flows from our responsibility to the other, then the provocations give rise to a different figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is the struggle for-or on behalf of-alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity. Such a principle -one that is ethically transcendent if not classically universal-is a powerful starting point for rethinking, for example, the question of responsibility vis-avis "ethnic" and "nationalist" conflicts.'°6 But the concern about politics in Derrida articulated by Critchley is not about politics per se, nor about the possibilities of political analysis, but about the prospects for a progressive, radical politics, one that will demand-and thus do more than simply permit-the decision to resist domination, exploitation, oppression, and all other conditions that seek to contain or eliminate alterity. Yet, again, I would argue that the above discussion demonstrates that not only does Derridean deconstruction address the question of politics, especially when Levinasian ethics draws out its political qualities, it does so in an affirmative antitotalitarian manner that gives its politics a particular quality, which is what Critchley and others like him most want (and rightly so, in my view). We may still be dissatisfied with the prospect that Derrida's account cannot rule out forever perverse calculations and unjust laws. But to aspire to such a guarantee would be to wish for the demise of politics, for it would install a new technology, even if it was a technology that began life with the markings of progressivism and radicalism. Such dissatisfaction, then, is not with a Derridean politics, but with the necessities of politics per se, necessities that can be contested and negotiated, but not escaped or transcended.

## Government action good

Taylor 2k

Bron, Professor of Religion & Social Ethics, Director of Environmental Studies, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, BENENEATH THE SURFACE: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEEP ECOLOGY, P. 282-284

A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, industrial societies) to cooperative behavior. This debatable assumption appears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness. Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, it is doubtful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by selfish and well-entrenched elites. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not voluntarily cede authority. Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require “widespread violence and dislocation.” Few bioregionalists seem to recognize this likelihood, or how devastating to nature such a transitional struggle would probably be. Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns: The sizes of the bioregionality based states would vary greatly because bioregions vary greatly. This would mean that some states would be much more powerful than other [and] it is not inevitable that balances of power would emerge to constrain the possible imperial pretensions of the larger and stronger states. Andrew Bard Schmookler, in his critique of utopian bioregional progeny). For ignoring a specific problem of power. He asked: How can good people prevent being dominated by a ruthless few, and what will prevent hierarchies from emerging if decentralized political self-rule is ever achieved? One does not have to believe all people are bad to recognize that not all people will be good, he argued; and unless bad people all become good, there is no solution to violence other than some kind of government to restrain the evil few. Schmookler elsewhere noted that those who exploit nature gather more power to themselves. How, then, can we restrain such power? There must be a government able to control the free exercise of power, Schmookler concluded. Once when debating Green anarchists and bioregionalists in a radical environmental journal, Schmookler agreed that political decentralization is a good idea. But if we move in this direction, he warned, “there should be at the same time a world order sufficient [to thwart] would-be conquerors.” Moreover, “Since the biosphere is a globally interdependent web, that world order should be able to constrain any of the actors from fouling the earth. This requires laws and means of enforcement.” Schmookler concluded, “Government is a paradox, but there is no escaping it. This is because power is a paradox: our emergence out of the natural order makes power and inevitable problem for human affairs, and only power can control power. Bioregionalism generally fails to grapple adequately with the problem of power. Consequently, it has little “answer to specifically global environmental problems,” such as atmospheric depletion and the disruption of ocean ecosystems by pollution and overfishing. Political scientist Paul Wapner argues that this is because bioregionalism assumes “that all global threats stem from local instances of environmental abuse and that by confronting them at the local level they will disappear.” Nor does bioregionalism have much of a response to the “globalization” of corporate capitalism and consumerist market society, apart from advocating local resistance or long-odds campaigns to revoke the corporate charters of the worst environmental offenders. These efforts do little to hinder the inertia of this process. And little is ever said about how to restrain the voracious appetite of a global-corporate-consumer culture for the resources in every corner of the planet. Even for the devout, promoting deep ecological spirituality and ecocentric values seems pitifully inadequate in the face of such forces. Perhaps it is because they have little if any theory of social change, and thus cannot really envision a path toward a sustainable society, that many bioregional deep ecologists revert to apocalyptic scenarios. Many of them see the collapse of ecosystems and industrial civilization as the only possible means toward the envisioned changes. Others decide that political activism is hopeless, and prioritize instead spiritual strategies for evoking deep ecological spirituality, hoping, self-consciously, for a miracle. Certainly the resistance of civil society to globalization and its destructive inertia is honorable and important, even a part a part of a wider sustainability strategy. But there will be no victories over globalization and corporate capitalism, and no significant progress toward sustainability, without new forms of international, enforceable, global environmental governance. Indeed, without new restraints on power both within nations and internationally, the most beautiful bioregional experiments and models will be overwhelmed and futile.

## Incrementalism Good

Bradley 9

Robert Bradley, PhD in Political Economy, M.A. in Economics, “Capitalism at Work: Business, Government and Energy,” pg. 103

There are good revolutions and bad ones. There must be continual improvement, or incrementalism, between sea changes. Often, if not quite always, revolution comes by steps, not bounds. Business thinker Jim Collins enriched the Schumpeter-Drucker-Hamel view by noting how good-to-great companies were disciplined change makers whose entrepreneurship was less about revolutionary moments than revolutionary process. In his words: Good-to-great transformations never happened in one fell swoop. There was no single defining action, no grand program, no one killer innovation, no solitary lucky break, no wrenching revolution. Good to great comes about by a cumulative process—step by step, action by action, decision by decision, turn by turn of the flywheel—that adds up to sustained and spectacular results. Success was “an organic evolutionary process . . . a pattern of buildup leading to breakthrough.” The “doom loop,” noted Collins from his case studies, was “big programs, radical change efforts, dramatic revolutions, chronic restructuring— always looking for a miracle moment or new savior.” Collins saw greatness in disciplined thought and action; failure, in “fads and . . . management hoopla.” There was no silver bullet, no magic, that could substitute for sustained, well- directed effort.

## Perm solves the environment

Delicath, 96

John W., Earthtalk, Communication Empowerment for Environmental Action, Eds. Muir & Veenendall, pg. 162

First, “radical environmentalists” can no longer simply avoid politics. A viable ecology movement requires action within existing structures, something that “radical environmentalists” have so far rejected in their refusal to compromise. The movement needs to direct its attention to when and where to compromise. Even utopian politics recognizes the need to engage existing political processes. The very fact that one must move individuals to want utopia necessitates working out some instrumental means of getting to ecotopia. Any such instrumentality involves using politics that remain this side of utopia. An excellent example of this is the need for a radical environmental voice on global issues that must inevitably require action on the part of the nation-state. Dealing with crises like global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer requires international action and the responses of governments in the form of effective energy, defense, trade, and foreign policies.

## Dominating nature good

Zey 1

Michael, professor at Montclair State University School of Business and executive director of the Expansionary Institute, a research and consulting organization focusing on future trends in technology, society, the economy, politics, “MAN'S EVOLUTIONARY PATH INTO THE UNIVERSE” The Futurist, Vol. 35, May 2001

We must examine the many ways such developments impact the individual, society, and the economy. And we must explore the underlying reasons why our species is feverishly working to advance the planet and ourselves and transform all we encounter. When we truly understand the depth and strength of [hu]man's overwhelming imperative to grow and progress, we can more clearly anticipate the future. At first blush, it would seem that there is little mystery about the impulses driving the human species in this quest: We engage in such productive activities merely to enhance our material condition. We invent technologies that will improve our standard of living and make our lives more pleasant and comfortable. Our species from the earliest periods of prehistory seems compelled not just to survive, but to grow, progress, and enhance itself and its environment. At each new level of our development, we endeavor to master our environment as well as the physical dynamics governing our universe. Humanity's activities, including the entire scientific and technological enterprise, represent a unified attempt by the species to spread "humanness" to everything we encounter. Over the centuries, we have labored to improve planet Earth, and we are now preparing to transform the universe into a dynamic entity filled with life. We will accomplish this by extending our consciousness, skills, intellect, and our very selves to other spheres. I label the sum total of our species' endeavors to improve and change our planetary environment--and ultimately the universe itself-vitalization. Vitalization is a force that is conditioning human behavior. The drive to vitalize--to imbue our planet and eventually the cosmos with a consciousness and intelligence--is a primary motivation behind all human productive activity. Vitalization is the primary force shaping human behavior. However, in order to pursue vitalization successfully, the human species must master four other forces, what I label the "building blocks of vitalization." These four processes encompass the extraordinary advances in areas such as space, medicine, biogenetics, engineering, cybernetics, and energy. The four supporting forces are: \* Dominionization: control over physical forces, such as energy. \* Species coalescence: unity through built systems, such as transportation and communications. \* Biogenesis: improvement of the physical shell, such as through bioengineering. \* Cybergenesis: interconnection with machines to advance human evolution. Each of these forces plays a critical catalytic role in the achievement of vitalization. Dominionization: Controlling Nature The term dominionization refers to the process whereby humankind establishes control over several key aspects of its physical universe. With each passing decade, we enhance our ability to manipulate matter, reshape the planet, develop innovative energy sources, and control fundamental aspects of the physical universe, such as the atom and electromagnetism. Someday, we will learn to influence weather patterns and climate. In a host of ways, dominionization helps humanity vitalize the planet and eventually the universe. As we master the basic dynamics of nature, we are more able to shepherd the evolution of our planet as well as others. As we develop novel and powerful forms of energy, we can rocket from one sphere to another. Moreover, by improving our already formidable skills in moving mountains and creating lakes, we will be better able to change both the topography and the geography of other planets. Examples of dominionization abound. Major macroengineering projects attest to man's ability to transform the very surface of the earth. By constructing man-made lakes, we will be able to live in previously uninhabitable areas such as intenor Australia. Shimizu Corporation envisions a subterranean development called Urban Geo Grid--a series of cities linked by tunnels--accommodating half a million people. In the emerging Macro-industrial Era, whose framework was established in the 1970s and 1980s, we will redefine the concept of "bigness" as we dot Earth's landscape with immense architectural structures. Takenaka, a Japanese construction firm, has proposed "Sky City 1000," a 3,000-foot tower, to be built in Tokyo. Another firm, Ohbayashi, plans to erect a 500-story high-rise building featuring apartments, offices, shopping centers, and service facilities. We will establish dominion over the very heart of physical matter itself. Through nanotechnology, our species will attain control over the atom and its tiniest components. Such control will enable us to effortlessly "macromanufacture" from the bottom up, one atom at a time, any material object. This will enable us to permanently eradicate age-old problems such as scarcity and poverty.

## Radical alts fail

Reitan 98

Eric Reitan (Seattle University Writer for the Electronic Green Journal) Pragmatism, Environmental World Views, and Sustainability. December 1998

With the urgency of the current environmental crisis, we cannot afford to get bogged down in theoretic disputes that mask a common mission and get in the way of making the practical changes that are so pressing. Pragmatic Mediation of Deep Ecology and Christian Stewardship The example I have chosen to discuss is the theoretic debate between two environmental philosophies that have emerged in the last few decades: the philosophy of stewardship that has evolved in Christian communities, and the philosophy of deep ecology. I choose these two not on the basis of any special status they have, but rather because they are the two environmental perspectives with which I have the most personal acquaintance, and because the nature of the debate between them usefully illustrates the value of using pragmatic principles to guide theoretic environmental discourse. Before applying pragmatic principles to this example, some preliminary comments may be helpful. First, it is important to keep in mind that complex worldviews or philosophical systems may impact more than one domain of human life, and that they may have radically opposing pragmatic implications in one or more of those domains while implying substantially the same behaviors in the domain of the human-nature relationship. In such a case, we can say that while the worldviews do not have the same pragmatic meaning overall, they have the same environmental meaning. As such, it is important not to let the real differences in other areas mask the genuine agreement in the environmental domain. Second, it is worth noting that there is almost certainly more than one human social arrangement that harmonizes sustainable with the natural environment. Put another way, there is more than one set of human practices that works in terms of promoting a healthy human-natural system. And it follows from this observation that more than one worldview can be pragmatically true: while two worldviews may imply environmental behaviors that are different, and hence have a different pragmatic meaning, insofar as they both promote sustainable behaviors they are both true from a pragmatic standpoint. Pragmatic truth is not monistic, but pluralistic. Given the urgent pragmatic goals of environmental philosophy, sustained theoretic debates about meaning differences of this sort appear to be unwarranted, and should be put aside in favor of the task of finding practical ways of integrating and accommodating those alternative social arrangements which serve the common goal of sustainable human-natural systems.

## “root cause” thinking bad

Ellis 96

Jeffrey Ellis, Chief, Environmental, Safety and Health Engineering at United States Air Force, MS in Civil Engineering, 1996, Uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in nature, pg. 260

Because of the complexity and seeming intransigence of environmental problems, it is clearly time for radical environmentalists to focus less on defining their differences and more on determining the common ground that might provide the basis for a more coherent and unified ecology movement. As I hope this essay illustrates, if they hope to achieve a working consensus, radicals must strive to resist the well-established tendency in environmental discourse to identify the single most important and fundamental cause of the many environmental problems that have become increasingly apparent in recent decades. The desire to essentialize environmental problems and trace them all to one root cause is obviously a powerful one. If a root cause can be identified, then priorities can be clearly established and a definite agenda determined. Although the intention behind this silver bullet approach to understanding the global environmental crisis has been to provide the environmental movement with a dear focus and agenda, its impact has been very nearly just the opposite. It has repeatedly proven to be more divisive than productive in galvanizing a united front against environmental destruction. This is not surprising. It would indeed be convenient if all ecological problems sprang from the same source, but this is far from likely. If nothing else, during the last forty years it has become abundantly clear that environmental problems arc deeply complex. Not only have they proven extremely difficult to unravel scientifically, but they have social and political aspects that further compound their complexity. Global warming, species extinction, pollution human population growth, depletion of resources, and increased rates of life-threatening disease are just some of the many problems that confront us. The idea that there is a single root cause to any one of these problems, let alone to all of them taken together, is, to put it mildly, absurd. Because environmental problems arc each the result of a multiplicity of causal factors, there can be no one comprehensive solution to all of them.

## Cede the political/Perm solves

Sapontzis 95

S. F., California State University, Hayward, “The Nature of the Value of Nature”, spring 1995, <http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1995.spring/sapontzis.1995.spring.html>

[5] Finally, if the motivating concern about the value of nature really is practical, it must be political. In order to overcome the environmental crisis, we must convince peoples and governments to change their behaviors and institutions in the ways necessary to achieve that end. If the peoples and governments which are devastating nature are anthropocentric, then environmentally enlightened anthropocentric arguments have an immediate relevance to political debates concerning environmentally significant practices. In contrast, arguments employing ideas of the overriding, objective value of nature are politically irrelevant until these anthropocentric, nature-devastating peoples and governments come to believe that nature has such value. While neither task is easy, convincing peoples and governments to change their fundamental value systems seems a far more problematic and time-consuming task than convincing them that continuing their nature-devastating practices is contrary to their anthropocentric values. Especially in a time of crisis, pursuing the less problematic and time-consuming course of argument is the course to take to make a real, political difference. Consequently, the practical motivation of overcoming the environmental crisis does not direct us to establish the overriding, objective value of nature; rather, it directs us to develop politically compelling, anthropocentric arguments for environmentalism.

## **Perm solves (individual+government good)**

Sivil 2k

(Richard Sivil studied at the University of Durban Westville, and at the University of Natal, Durban. He has been lecturing philosophy since 1996. “WHY WE NEED A NEW ETHIC FOR THE ENVIRONMENT”, 2000, <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-7/chapter_vii.htm>)

Science and environmental policy options each have distinctive roles to play in addressing the environmental crisis. Science is a useful tool for developing technology and increasing our understanding of the complexity of life, while governmental policies regulate human social behaviour. We must, however, remember that each also has its respective problems. It would be unwise to assume that on their own they could effectively solve the current environmental crisis. Furthermore, handing over the task to science or government entails a relinquishing of personal responsibility that will not make the environmental crisis go away. The point is that we all act in ways that contribute to the crisis, and we are thus all responsible for what happens to the world around us. Accepting responsibility entails not only an acknowledgement that our individual actions contribute to the environmental crisis, but also that we are accountable for our actions. We should be willing to amend or change our actions in an attempt to remedy the current situation. Our actions, both individually and collectively, depend largely upon what we believe to be good, what is right, and what is permissible (Pierce & Van De Veer 1995: 1). Therefore we need to ask fundamental questions about what we as human beings value, why we value the things we do, the way we should live our lives, our place in nature, and the kind of world we want to leave behind for others (Des Jardins 1997:5). This places our value system at the heart of the environmental crisis. Clearly then, placing the burden of responsibility on either science or government policy will do little to correct the situation as long as the values informing our actions remain unchanged. We will alter our attitudes and actions through questioning and changing our values, and in such a way we can begin to address the problems of the environment. In no way should this suggest that ethical theories can solve the environmental crisis on their own, for "ethical and philosophical analysis done in the abstract, ignorant of science, technology, and other relevant disciplines, will not have much to contribute to the resolution of environmental problems" (Des Jardins 1997: 9). Science, legislation, and ethics need to combine forces in order to address the crisis at hand.

## Perm solves (some domination of nature good)

Grundmann 91

Reiner, “The Ecological Challenge to Marxism,” New Left Review I/187, May-June, <http://newleftreview.org/I/187/reiner-grundmann-the-ecological-challenge-to-marxism>

It seems evident, therefore, that the definition of ‘nature’s nature’ and of eco- logical balance is a human (and, therefore, a social) act, a human definition which sets an ecological balance in relation to social needs, pleasures and desires. If we characterize human beings as living in, and dominating, nature, this does not produce two incompatible statements. When we term ecological a problem that arises as a con- sequence of society’s dealings with nature, many might agree. But I think it is useful to push the point further. It does not mean that the very fact of dealing with nature (manipulation, domination, harness- ing or inducing) is the crucial point, the ‘cause’, so to speak, of ecolog- ical problems. Ecological problems arise only from specific ways of dealing with nature. To repeat my earlier claim: both society’s existence in nature and its attempt to dominate nature are compatible; human beings do indeed live in, and dominate, nature.51 By their misunderstanding of this relation, both ecologists and their declared enemies maintain the mutually exclusive character of the two predicates. Consider the following argument which takes the ecocen- tric approach to extremes, thereby revealing its absurdity. It is difficult to know what is ‘normal’ for nature. Ecologists will probably argue that the ‘normal’ state of nature is one of balance. Since I can- not see how this definition makes sense without reference to human interests and definitions, I maintain that nature is always in ‘balance with itself’. Take the example of a river in which, due to pollution (detergents), no fish can survive. But instead of fish, other animals and plants (for example, algae) are flourishing. The ecologist, con- fronted with such an argument, would probably say that if the river cannot return to the former (‘normal’) state under its own powers, its ecosystem would have to be called ‘unbalanced’. But in so arguing, she would only reveal her preference for higher living organisms. Lower animals such as insects and bacteria are usually outside the concern of ecological reasoning. (Albert Schweitzer tried to be consist- ent and defended the right of living for the tsetse fly and the tubercle. This position, radical in ethical and religious respects, makes a consistent course of human action impossible. Consider the case of the AIDS virus!) Let us again take the argument a step further and consider the example of a river that is drying out. In this case we once more have ‘nature’, in the form of sand, rocks, plants, insects, amphibians, rep- tiles, mammals. The ecologist would probably maintain that nature’s diversity and complexity were being destroyed. And here, ironically, we have the re-emergence (if only implicit) of the anthropocentric view: namely, that it is man who has an interest in conserving natural complexity.

## Anthropocentrism good (‘nature’ bad)

Grundmann 91

Reiner, “The Ecological Challenge to Marxism,” New Left Review I/187, May-June, <http://newleftreview.org/I/187/reiner-grundmann-the-ecological-challenge-to-marxism>

It is thus clear that any discourse on nature and ecological problems is not without presuppositions; and these presuppositions lie within the cultural background of the participants of the discourse—they are a product of history. A definition of ‘nature’ or of ecological problems, therefore, always relates to an anthropocentric element. Oechsle, for example, rightly defends humanity’s special position within nature; and she rightly refuses to accept ecological naturalism. However, her ambivalence towards anthropocentrism leads to an ambiguous defence of it. To repeat: in my view, humanity’s special position within nature is characterized by its domination of nature. In order to separate the question of whether humanity has a special status within nature from the question of whether it should dominate nature, Oechsle (approv- ingly) cites Mumford, who claimed that within occidental civilization there have been examples of a ‘democratic’ technology. This argument allows her to defend a sort of anthropocentrism without having to embrace the notion of domination of nature. However, a distinction between a democratic and an authoritarian technology makes sense only with respect to humanity, not with respect to nature. Every technology, even the softest, forms a part of humanity’s domination of nature.58 Oechsle agrees with authors like Amery, Bahro and Meyer- Abich that we have to research the origins of the destruction of nature. These are seen in the specific occidental human self- understanding and worldview. As Amery puts it: ‘We have to lay bare the roots of these historical and ideal attitudes in order to initiate the painful process of a planetary revolution . . . If one forgets these roots, all necessary proposals will meet political and social resistance; and only if we become aware how deep these roots reach into our col- lective unconscious, will the attempt succeed.’59 But this ‘planetary revolution’ seems to be something of a utopian project; some might consider it even quite dangerous. Therefore, I think it is worthwhile to investigate the possibilities that a modern approach to the problem- atic offers us. Human beings have no fixed place where they must live; virtually every place on this planet can be inhabited by them. By this they distinguish themselves from most other animals (and, of course, plants) which survive only within a limited geographical, biological, climatic zone. How are human beings able to survive in an ‘insecure environment’? The answer is: by constructing a second ‘nature’ around themselves.60 This artificial, human-made nature is the embodiment of their necessity to fight against nature; it is the solution of the appar- ent contradiction that they are in and against nature. But something further follows from this. Because human beings organize their lives in the described way, they have no ‘natural enemies’, in contradistinc- tion to all other species. However, there are times when they are opposed by specific elements of nature; nature exerts its resistance upon them. As John Stuart Mill observed, the powers of nature ‘are often towards man in the position of enemies, from which he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use.’61 Nature, as such, is not always beneficial to human beings. It is com- pletely mistaken to identify nature with ‘good’, and technology or human culture with ‘bad’.62 Moralizing rarely helps. As Passmore has rightly observed, ‘these natural processes may in fact be quite harm- ful; so that, let us say, oysters from granite regions ought to be con- demned for human consumption. The “natural” is not necessarily harmless, let alone beneficial to man.’63 In exactly the same vein, Adorno, reflecting on the landscape of the Swiss Alps, remarked: ‘Both the scars of civilization and the untouched zone beyond the timber line are contrary to the idea that nature is cheering and warm- ing, dedicated only to man; they reveal what the cosmos looks like. The usual image of nature is limited, narrowly bourgeois, sensitive only to the tiny space in which historically familiar life flourishes; the bridle path is philosophy of culture.’64 And again Passmore, in reply to Barry Commoner’s ‘Third law of ecology—nature knows best’, pointed out: It is true enough . . . that every human intervention in an ecosystem is likely to disturb the workings of that system in a way that is detrimental to some member of it. So much is true of every change, man-induced or nature-induced. But it by no means follows, as his ‘law’ might seem to sug- gest, that every such change, or even most of such changes, will be detri- mental to human beings. Unlike the watches to which he compares them, ecological systems were not designed for man’s use. When men picked seeds off plants and sowed them on cleared ground they acted in a way that was detrimental to the organic life which was accustomed to feed on the fallen seeds. But only the most unreconstructed primitivist would suggest that the actions of our agricultural forefathers were destructive of human interests. A nature left entirely alone as ‘knowing best’ would support only the dreariest and most monotonous of lives.

## Anthropocentrism good, k2 space colonization

Pinson 02

Robert, B.A. in biology from Oberlin College and third-year law student at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, “Ethical Considerations For Terraforming Mars,” Environmental Law Institute News & Analysis, Nov. 2002, http://pajamasmedia.com/instapundit/lawrev/pinson.pdf.

Does Mars have rights? Not really. It is beautiful and has its use in its present form, but it also has no life, at least that we know of. We will certainly research to see if life does in fact exist on Mars. But to a certain extent, even if it does, the good of all life should outweigh the good of a naturally soon-to-be extinct form of life. On earth, many would allow the killing of one animal for the good of the whole population or species. In nature, the good of the many indeed outweighs the good of the few (or the one). Planets must be vehicles for life in this universe; they are perfectly designed for it. Mars will not lose its uniqueness; earth certainly has not. In fact, it may be the life that grows on a planet that makes it truly unique. Life on Mars will evolve and adapt differently than life on earth. This difference will simultaneously make Mars unique, ensure the survival of life through diversification, and provide a wonderful opportunity to watch and learn. If there is life on Mars, does it have rights? The answer to that is yes and no. Many believe that we should nurture indigenous life on Mars. I believe we should let natural selection decide. Let us expose terrestrial life to the Martian environment and watch what develops. Perhaps there will be genetic blending among the groups and life will become enhanced in beauty and diversification. Just because some bacteria may exist on Mars should not mean that all life on earth must stop expanding. Perhaps the bacteria are there by accident; perhaps they are the ancestors to life on earth. Certainly we should study any indigenous life on Mars, but we should not put its interests ahead of our own.194A possibility exists that we will create new life that could destroy life as we know it. However, the possibility of this occurrence is so much smaller than the possibility of success that we must try. The most applicable environmental ethic to terraforming Mars is anthropocentrism. It puts our interests at the forefront while still ensuring the existence of all life. It seems obvious that we should give ourselves the highest level of intrinsic worth since we are the ones placing the value.195 Life, of course, has the ultimate intrinsic worth, but we are a part of that life. It is in our best interest to preserve and expand life. What better way than by changing a planet that is currently unable to sustain life into one that can. Not only will we enrich our lives but also the life around us. We cannot, of course, begin terraforming today, but we can research and plan for the future.

## Anthropocentrism good, k2 VTL

Smith 9

Wesley J., Senior Fellow in Human Rights and Bioethics at the Discovery Institute and a special consultant for the Center for Bioethics and Culture, “Poverty is the Answer: Radical Environmentalism Leading Us to a New Form of Human Sacrifice”, <http://stanford.wellsphere.com/bioethics-article/poverty-is-the-answer-radical-environmentalism-leading-us-to-a-new-form-of-human-sacrifice/632295>

I have written how radical environmentalism is becoming distinctly anti-human. With the fervent ideology of Deep Ecology, it is explicitly stated. But some of what we are witnessing among the neo Greens is a drive to sacrifice human flourishing and prosperity--without the explicitly stated misanthropic dogmas. This willingness to sacrifice human welfare is reaching a fever pitch among those who believe that global warming is a crisis of unimagined proportions-- a belief that can border on quasi-religion or pure ideology. An article by David Owen--pushing the importance of economic decline to saving the planet--in the New Yorker illustrates the point. From his column: [T]he world's principal source of man-made greenhouse gases has always been prosperity. The recession makes that relationship easy to see: shuttered factories don’t spew carbon dioxide; the unemployed drive fewer miles and turn down their furnaces, air-conditioners, and swimming-pool heaters; struggling corporations and families cut back on air travel; even affluent people buy less throwaway junk. Most of us view our current economic crisis with alarm. Apparently, Owen sees it is a positive: The environmental benefits of economic decline, though real, are fragile, because they are vulnerable to intervention by governments, which, understandably, want to put people back to work and get them buying non-necessities again--through programs intended to revive ordinary consumer spending (which has a big carbon footprint), and through public-investment projects to build new roads and airports (ditto). And the answer, apparently, is more of the same decline we are now experiencing: The ultimate success or failure of Obama's [anti-global warming] program, and of the measures that will be introduced in Copenhagen this year, will depend on our willingness, once the global economy is no longer teetering, to accept policies that will seem to be nudging us back toward the abyss.

## The K = genocide

Smith 9

Wesley J., Senior Fellow in Human Rights and Bioethics at the Discovery Institute and a special consultant for the Center for Bioethics and Culture, “Poverty is the Answer: Radical Environmentalism Leading Us to a New Form of Human Sacrifice”, <http://stanford.wellsphere.com/bioethics-article/poverty-is-the-answer-radical-environmentalism-leading-us-to-a-new-form-of-human-sacrifice/632295>

So, people need to be poorer, with all the concomitant increase in human suffering and shorter lives that would result from lower levels of prosperity. And remember, he only writes here about the well off areas of the world. But you can bet that he and his co-believers would strive mightily to stifle development in now destitute areas of the world--dooming perhaps billions of people to lives of continued squalor, disease, and lower life expectancies. More to the point of what we discuss here at SHS, human beings are a logical species: We take our ideas where they lead! (Thus, once Americans accepted the verity of Jefferson's "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal..."it doomed slavery, because servitude and equality are incompatible.) For the same reason, once we accept the fundamental premise of the piece--that we must sacrifice human prosperity to "save the planet"--the misanthropic ideology of Deep Ecology--humans as a viral infection afflicting Gaia--with radical depopulation as the cure--consider the genocidal implications--become a logical next step And thus we see how the healthy environmentalism that cleaned up filthy rivers and reduced Los Angeles air pollution is quickly mutating into an implicit and explicit anti-humanism that is in danger of leading to becoming so degraded in our self perception, that we could reach the point of being urged (forced?) to become human sacrifices on Gaia's altar.