Resolved: In the United States, campaigns that support candidates for public office ought to be financed exclusively by public funds.

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# Topic Overview

In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt recommended public financing for federal elections as well as a ban on private contributions to election campaigns. Every President since George Washington has been elected using private funds during their elections. Recently, tension has begun to rise between the first amendment right to free speech and preserving the integrity of the campaign and election process by limiting the influence of special and private interests. Because of this tension there has been an increase in restrictions on funding sources like corporate and union contributions, financial disclosure requirements and limits on the size of contribution. Finally, in the `1970s Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for public financing of presidential elections.

According to New York University School of Law’s Brennan Center for Justice, “campaigns funded principally or entirely by private contributions distort democracy and pull elected officials away from the interests of ordinary, often unorganized citizens.” Most of the affirmative topic literature involves criticism of how privately financed candidates must focus more on raising funds from and then creating legislation for private interest groups. The affirmative topic literature covers a lot of advantages to public funding that would change the way in which democracy is actually implemented in the United States. These points include the decrease of wealthy donors over politicians and therefore legislation, the ability for candidates with limited financial resources to seek office; which would broaden both prospects for greater citizen participation and the time for politicians to serve their constituents rather than focusing on raising money.

Public participation on check-off donation funds for elections has declined recently. Many people have used this as evidence for a lack of general support for publically funded elections. Most negative topic literature comes from libertarian academics who argue the restricting elections to public financing restricts the free speech of individuals with potential to donate and imposes an unnecessary associate with the general public. There will be a lot of negative arguments referring the First Amendment calling publically funded elections a restriction on political speech acts. The libertarian position argues that mandated public funding forces citizens into voting for candidates that they may disagree with. Many negatives will make arguments referring to the Supreme Courts decisions to uphold the right to contribute money to political campaigns as protected by free speech. In June 2007 *FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life* and *McCain et al v Wisconsin Right to Life* Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that for the majority "the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it."

# Further Reading

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# Affirmative Case

Resolved: In the United States, campaigns that support candidates for public office ought to be financed exclusively by public funds.

I affirm and value morality because the word ought in the resolution prescribes a moral obligation or duty

All ethical theories must respect inherent differences between agents in order to properly judge actions. For example, while most ethical systems would say that stealing is immoral, they would excuse taxation based on the different responsibilities assigned to individuals and the state. The only ethical system that makes sense for the state is utilitarianism.

Woller 97:

Gary Woller [BYU Prof., “An Overview by Gary Woller”, A Forum on the Role of Environmental Ethics, June 1997, pg. 10]

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently, public policies in a democracy must be justified to the public, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such justification cannot simply be assumed a priori by invoking some higher-order moral principle. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that public policies inevitably entail trade-offsamong competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and since public policies inherently imply winners and losers, the policymakers' duty [is] to the public interest requires them to demonstrate that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by their polices are somehow to the overall advantage of society. At the same time, deontologically based ethical systems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best,apriorimoral principlesprovide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs anddo not themselves suggestappropriate public policies,and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem oractuallymaking it worse**.** For example, a moral obligation to preserve the environment by no means implies the best way, or any way for that matter, to do so, just as there is no a priori reason to believe that any policy that claims to preserve the environment will actually do so. Any number of policies might work, and others, although seemingly consistent with the moral principle, will fail utterly. That deontological principles are an inadequate basis for environmental policy is evident in the rather significant irony that most forms of deontologically based environmental laws and regulations tend to be implemented in a very utilitarian manner by street-level enforcement officials. Moreover, ignoring the relevant costs and benefits of environmental policy and their attendant incentive structures can, as alluded to above, actually work at cross purposes to environmental preservation. (There exists an extensive literature on this aspect of regulatory enforcement and the often perverse outcomes of regulatory policy. See, for example, Ackerman, 1981; Bartrip and Fenn, 1983; Hawkins, 1983, 1984; Hawkins and Thomas, 1984.) Even the most die-hard preservationist/deontologist would, I believe, be troubled by this outcome. The above points are perhaps best expressed by Richard Flathman, The number of values typically involved in public policy decisions, the broad categories which must be employed and above all, the scope and complexity of the consequences to be anticipated militate against reasoning so conclusively that they generate an imperative to institute a specific policy. It is seldom the case that only one policy will meet the criteria of the public interest **(1958, p. 12). It therefore** follows that in a democracy, policymakers have an ethical duty to establish a plausible link between policy alternatives and the problems they address, and the public must be reasonably assured that a policy will actually do something about an existing problem; this requires the means-end language and methodology of utilitarian ethics. Good intentions, lofty rhetoric, and moral piety are an insufficient though perhaps at times a necessary, basis for public policy in a democracy.

#### Political philosophy, which concerns government actions and structure, must be practical. Political actions are taken for the entire body politic, and must account for the conditions required to achieve ends.

MARTIN RHONHEIMER 2005 [Prof Of Philosophy at The Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome. “THE POLITICAL ETHOS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PLACE OF NATURAL LAW IN PUBLIC REASON: RAWLS’S “POLITICAL LIBERALISM” REVISITED” The American Journal of Jurisprudence vol. 50 (2005), pp. 1-70]

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. ¶ Political philosophy belongs to ethics, which is practical, for it both reflects on practical **¶** knowledge and aims at action. Therefore, it is **not only** normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of political institutions **and action** must be understood as embedded in concrete **cultural and, therefore, historical** contexts **and** as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the [ignore] conditions of realizability would be ¶ trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in ¶ fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such a purely metaphysical view, however, [and is] is doomed to failure. As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political.¶ 14¶ Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which ¶ deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. ¶ Moreover, unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the ¶ actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of the political is ¶ characterized [shown] by acts like framing institutions and establishing legal rules by which not only personal actions but the actions of a multitude of [many] persons are regulated by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. ¶ Political actions are, thus, both actions of the whole of the body politic and referring to ¶ the whole of the community of citizens.¶ 15¶ Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which [would say that] some persons are by ¶ nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule¶ 16¶ : unlike domestic rule, ¶ which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same ¶ good [despotism] and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of [have many] interests and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of [searches for] consent among those who are [the] ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

Thus the value criterion is maximizing well-being

 **Contention 1:**

The current system allows individuals and corporations with extreme wealth to decide elections and then therefore the legal structure of this country. **Briffault ‘99 explains:**

Briffault, Richard. "Public Funding and Democratic Elections." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* (1999): 563-590.

Our existing federal campaign finance system-the product of Watergate Era legislation' and the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo-is in a state of disarray. **The system is no longer capable of accomplishing the goals pursued by Congress and embraced by the Court** a quarter-century ago**: full disclosure of the sources of campaign money; limitations on large contributions by individuals; prohibitions on the use of corporate and union treasury funds; and voluntary, partial public funding, with spending limits, in the Presidential election.** Indeed, **the current law may actually ha[s]**ve **negative consequences, with unindexed contribution limits encouraging evasion, driving up the burdens of fundraising, providing a major role for organized interest groups** and bundlers**, and placing a premium on the personal wealth of candidates. More fundamentally, our system fails to take seriously the concerns that ought to be central to the campaign finance system of a democratic society. These include: (i) fair and vigorous competition among candidates; (ii) equality of voter influence on electoral outcomes; and (iii) recognition that the campaign finance system can affect the integrity of the political process. Instead, many of our elections are uncompetitive, with one candidate**-typically the incumbent-**wildly outspending the others. A tiny number of very wealthy individuals have enormous influence over** the financing of election campaigns, and, **ultimately,** on **the elections themselves.** Large campaign donations and candidates' dependence on those donations for the funds necessary to fuel their campaigns provide major donors with opportunities for special access to elected officials**. The campaign finance system, thus, raises troubling questions about the integrity of the government that makes and enforces our laws.**

**Contention 2:** Publically funded elections are key to more liberal environmental policies. Klein ‘02.

Klein, Naomi. "Stock Market Capitalism vs. Welfare Capitalism." New Political Economy 7.1 (2002): 115-27. Value Message. The Nation, 28 Nov. 2011.

So let’s summarize. **Responding to climate change requires that we break every rule in the free-market playbook** and that we do so with great urgency. **We will need to rebuild the public sphere, reverse privatizations, relocalize large parts of economies**, scale back overconsumption, bring back long-term planning, **heavily regulate and tax corporations, maybe even nationalize some of them, cut military spending and recognize our debts to the global South.** Of course, **none of this has** a **hope** in hell **of happening unless it is accompanied by a** massive, broad-based **effort to radically reduce the influence that corporations have over the political process. That means, at a minimum, publicly funded elections and stripping corporations of their status as “people” under the law. In short, climate change supercharges the pre-existing case for virtually every progressive demand on the books, binding them into a coherent agenda based on a clear scientific imperative.**

#### Scientists agree—climate change decimates multiple levels of biodiversity culminating in extinction.

Bellard 12, (Céline Bellard, pHD of Ecology at the University of Paris ,Cleo Bertelsmeier, Prof of Ecology at the University of Paris,Paul Leadley, Prof of Ecology at the University of Paris, Wilfried Thuiller, Director at the Laboratoire d’Ecologie Alpine, Franck Courchamp, Prof of Ecology at the University of Paris ,Impacts of climate change on the future of biodiversity, Ecology Letters Volume 15, Issue 4, pages 365–377, April 2012)

**Many studies in recent years have investigated the effects of climate change on the future of biodiversity**. In this review, we first examine the different possible effects of climate change that can operate at individual, population, species, community, ecosystem and biome scales, notably showing that species can respond to climate change challenges by shifting their climatic niche along three non-exclusive axes: time (e.g. phenology), space (e.g. range) and self (e.g. physiology). Then, we present the principal specificities and caveats of the most common approaches used to estimate future biodiversity at global and sub-continental scales and we synthesise their results. Finally, we highlight several challenges for future research both in theoretical and applied realms. Overall, our review shows that current estimates are very variable, depending on the method, taxonomic group, biodiversity loss metrics, spatial scales and time periods considered. Yet, **the majority of models indicate alarming consequences for biodiversity, with the worst-case scenarios leading to extinction rates that would qualify as the sixth mass extinction in the history of the earth.¶** Predicting the response of biodiversity to climate change has become an extremely active field of research (e.g. Dillon et al. 2010; Gilman et al. 2010; Pereira et al. 2010; Salamin et al. 2010; Beaumont et al. 2011; Dawson et al. 2011; McMahon et al. 2011). Predictions play an important role in alerting scientists and decision makers to potential future risks, provide a means to bolster attribution of biological changes to climate change and can support the development of proactive strategies to reduce climate change impacts on biodiversity (Pereira et al. 2010; Parmesan et al. 2011). Although there is relatively limited evidence of current extinctions caused by climate change**, studies suggest that climate change could surpass habitat destruction as the greatest global threat to biodiversity over the next few decades** (Leadley et al. 2010). However, the multiplicity of approaches and the resulting variability in projections make it difficult to get a clear picture of the future of biodiversity under different scenarios of global climatic change (Pereira et al. 2010). Hence, there is an urgent need to review our current understanding of the effects of climate change on biodiversity and our capacity to project future impacts using models. To this end, we have reviewed both the ranges of possible impacts of climate change that operate at individual, population, species, community, ecosystem and biome scales and the different responses that could occur at individual, population or species levels. We then present the principal specificities and caveats of the most common approaches used to model future biodiversity at global and sub-continental scales and we synthesise their results focusing on how model combinations are used to project the impacts of climate change on species loss. Finally, we highlight several challenges for future research, from theoretical (e.g. emerging models) and applied (e.g. population conservation and exploitation) realms.¶ **The multiple components of climate change are anticipated to affect all the levels of biodiversity, from organism to biome levels** (Fig. 1, and reviewed in detail in, e.g. Parmesan 2006). They primarily concern various strengths and forms of fitness decrease, which are expressed at different levels, and have effects on individuals, populations, species, ecological networks and ecosystems. At the most basic level of biodiversity, **climate change is able to decrease genetic diversity of populations due to directional selection and rapid migration, which could in turn affect ecosystem functioning and resilience** (Botkin et al. 2007 but, see Meyers & Bull 2002). However, most studies are centred on impacts at higher organisational levels, and genetic effects of climate change have been explored only for a very small number of species.¶ Beyond this, **the various effects on populations are likely to modify the ‘web of interactions’ at the community leve**l (Gilman et al. 2010; Walther 2010). In essence, **the response of some species to climate change may constitute an indirect impact on the species that depend on them**. A study of 9650 interspecific systems, including pollinators and parasites, suggested that around **6300 species could disappear following the extinction of their associated species** (Koh et al. 2004). In addition**, for many species, the primary impact of climate change may be mediated through effects on synchrony with species’ food and habitat requirements** (see below). **Climate change has led to phenological shifts in flowering plants and insect pollinators, causing mismatches between plant and pollinator populations that lead to the extinctions of both the plant and the pollinator with expected consequences on the structure of plant–pollinator networks** (Kiers et al. 2010; Rafferty & Ives 2010). Other modifications of interspecific relationships (with competitors, prey/predators, host/parasites or mutualists) also modify community structure and ecosystem functions (Lafferty 2009; Walther 2010; Yang & Rudolf 2010).¶ **At a higher level of biodiversity, climate can induce changes in vegetation communities that are predicted to be large enough to affect biome integrity**. The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment forecasts shifts for 5–20% of Earth’s terrestrial ecosystems, in particular cool conifer forests, tundra, scrubland, savannahs and boreal forest (Sala et al. 2005). **Of particular concern are ‘tipping points’ where ecosystem thresholds can lead to irreversible shifts in biomes** (Leadley et al. 2010).¶ A recent analysis of potential future biome distributions in tropical South America suggests that large portions of Amazonian rainforest could be replaced by tropical savannahs (Lapola et al. 2009). At higher altitudes and latitudes, alpine and boreal forests are expected to expand northwards and shift their tree lines upwards at the expense of low stature tundra and alpine communities (Alo & Wang 2008). **Increased temperature and decreased rainfall mean that some lakes**, especially in Africa, **might dry out** (Campbell et al. 2009). **Oceans are predicted to warm and become more acid, resulting in widespread degradation of** tropical coral **reefs** (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). **The implications of climate change** for genetic and specific diversity have potentially strong implications **for** **ecosystem services. The most extreme and irreversible form of fitness decrease is obviously** **species extinction**. To avoid or mitigate these effects, biodiversity can respond in several ways, through several types of mechanisms.

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#### Runaway warming is beginning now – if we hit a 4 degrees Celsius rise, extinction is inevitable.

Tickell 08, (Oliver, The Guardian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, 8/11, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction.¶ The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die.¶ Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way.¶ To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### First, ethical uncertainty means we should prevent existential risk to ensure the future has value.

Nick Bostrom 2011 [“Existential Risk Prevention As the Most Important Task for Humanity”, 2011, Faculty of Philosophy at Oxford]

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our [that our] present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to

increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value

#### Even a risk of util is sufficient to make my impact matter.

Bostrom 2011

There will be some types of putative existential risks for which the main uncertainty is evaluative and others where the main uncertainty is descriptive (e.g., how likely an event is to occur or what consequences it would have). With regard to descriptive uncertainty, we saw earlier that if something is not known to be objectively safe, it is risky, at least in the subjective sense relevant to decision making. We can make a parallel move with regard to normative uncertainty. Suppose that some event X would reduce biodiversity. Suppose (for the sake of illustration) it is known that X [but] would have no other significant consequences and that the reduced biodiversity would not affect humans or any other morally considerable beings. Now, we may be uncertain whether biodiversity has final value (is valuable “for its own sake”). Hence we may be uncertain [and hence] about whether or not X [the event] would really be bad. But we can say that if we are not sure whether or not X would really be bad (but we are sure that X would not be good), then X is bad in at least the subjective sense relevant to decision making.

# Negative Case

I negate and value morality because the word “ought” in the resolution definitionaly prescribes a moral obligation or duty.

All moral theories must respect each individual perspective in political spaces

 Butler:
Judith - Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature @ U.C. Berkeley, 2004 [Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, p. xix-xxi]

To decide what views will count as reasonable within the public domain, however, is to decide what will and [won’t] will not count as the public sphere of debate. And if someone holds views that are not in line with the nationalist norm, that person comes to lack credibility as a speaking person, and the media is not open to him or her(though the internet, interestingly, is). The foreclosure of critique empties the public domain of debate and (this harms) democra(cy)tic contestation itself, so that debate becomes the exchange of views among the like-mindedand criticism**,** which ought to be central to any democracy, becomes a fugitive and suspect activity.

**And:** Expressing the individuality autonomous action of the person is important because any ethic that doesn’t allow for free individual action would be impossible to have a coherent account of moral responsibility since someone isn’t responsible for their action if they are forced to perform it, so free individual action is a prerequisite to moral agency.

Free speech rights are necessary to rejection of government power and empowering voices.

Burawoy,

Michael Burawoy et al. [If you doubt his qualifications, you fail: <http://burawoy.berkeley.edu/>] Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. University of California Press, 1991.

For Habermas the “new social movements,” with their concerns for issues that transcend class, such as peace,(war,) environment, and civil rights, exemplify collective resistance to the encroachment of the lifeworld by the system. Josepha Schiffman’s study of due tendencies in the peace movement and Joshua Gamson’s study of gay and AIDS activism can be seen in the same light. Both movements are wary about participation within the system and devote their most original efforts to confronting it or holding it at bay. The peculiarities of their strategies of organization and protest do not derive simply from their antistatist stancebut from the difficulties of dealing with a form of domination that is at once ubiquitous and invisible**.** Before they can begin to think about asserting control over the state and the economy,they have to make what is invisible visible.

**And:** Any system in which individuals are obligated to assist those in need forces redistributive uses of the goods they have acquired for themselves. We cannot compel people to assist those in need without interfering with their ability to self-legislate. **Nozick
Robert [popular libertarian philosopher and prof at Yale] Anarchy State and Utopia pp 163**

The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example and the example of the entrepreneur in a socialist society is that **no** end-state **principle or distributional** patterned **principle** of justice **can be** continuously **realized without** continuous **interference with people’s lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unflavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways**; **for example**, **by people exchanging goods and services with other people**, or giving things to other people, this **the transferrers are entitled** to under the favored distributional pattern. **To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or** continually (or periodically) **interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them.** (But if some time limit is to be set on how long people may keep resources others voluntarily transfer to them, why not let them keep these resources for *any* period of time? Why not have immediate confiscation?) **It might be objected that all persons voluntarily will choose to refrain from actions which would upset the pattern.**  **This presupposed unrealistically (1) that all will** most **want to maintain the pattern** (are those who don’t to be “reeducated” or forced to undergo “self-criticism”?), **(2) that each can gather enough information about his own actions and the** ongoing **activities of others to discover which of his actions will upset the pattern**, **and (3) that diverse and far-flung persons can coordinate their actions to dovetail into the pattern.**  Compare the manner in which the market is neutral among persons’ desires, as it reflects and transmits widely scattered information via prices, and coordinates persons’ activities.

**Thus:** the value criterion is respecting individuals rights to free speech

Also prefer this standard because the First Amendment in the constitution constrains which moral actions the United States takes. Disregarding the constitution in terms of the debate round would make it impossible for us to discuss governmental actions because we have no other notion of what the government ought to do outside of the constitution. Just as baseball does not make sense absent the rules of the game neither does the United States government absent the constitution. This means I always preempt the affirmative’s framework because constitutional obligations are a prerequisite to understanding the implications of actions taken.

**Thus** I contend that solely publically funded elections restrict free speech Bonin explains
Bonin, Adam. [Senator and political theorist] "Supreme Court Strikes down Arizona Clean Elections Law." Supreme Court Strikes down Arizona Clean Elections Law. Dailey Kos, 27 June 2011. Web

**“Leveling the playing field” can sound like a good thing. But in a democracy, campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. The First Amendment embodies our choice** as a Nation **that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom**—the “unfettered interchange of ideas”—**not whatever the State may view as fair**.

**And:** The courts current ruling allowing organizations to donate to campaigns is key to preserving the first amendment right to free speech. Abrams explains:

Abrams, Floyd. "Pro & Con: Is the Supreme Court's Ruling on Campaigns Bad for Dem." Pro & Con: Is the Supreme Court's Ruling on Campaigns Bad for Dem. AJC, 4 Mar. 2010

**Given the court’s ruling, corporations and unions will now be free to participate in the political process to a greater degree than had previously been possible. The suppression of speech by both not-for-profit and for-profit corporations is over, and short of a constitutional amendment Congress may not reimpose the current speech ban** or anything like it. **Twenty-six states already allow corporations to spend their funds on state elections and there has been no** discernible **impact on those elections. Justice** Anthony **Kennedy put it well in concluding that “under our law and our tradition it seems stranger than fiction for our government to make political speech a crime.”**

# Affirmative Add-Ons

**It’s the will of the people, more than half of Americans want it. Put away your polls NC because this Gallup poll account for the best methodological groups and timing. Saad ‘13:**Saad, Lyndia. "Half in U.S. Support Publicly Financed Federal Campaigns." Gallup.com. Gallup, 24 June 2013. Web **Half of Americans say they would personally vote for a law that establishes government funding of federal campaigns, while 44% would vote against it. The poll was conducted June 15-16, just days before the New York State Senate narrowly defeated a comprehensive campaign reform bill for that state that would have included public financing of campaigns. Most key subgroups of Americans express** fairly tepid **support for this type of reform proposal.** But Democrats, Easterners, and Midwesterners offer somewhat higher support; roughly six in 10 among these groups say they would vote for it. Among their counterparts, support drops below half. The only groups expressing majority opposition are those living in the South and Republicans. **Americans are much more likely to support limiting the amount of money that U.S. House and Senate candidates can raise and spend for their campaigns. Nearly eight in 10 say they would vote for such a limit, whereas 19% would oppose it.**

**The current system leads to corruption. Money is not speech therefore there is no restriction on anyone’s free speech in the aff. Filipovic ‘14:**

Filipovic, Jill. "OPINION: Time for Public Financing of Elections | Al Jazeera America." Time for Public Financing of Elections. Al Jazeeera, 5 Apr. 2014. Web

Ian Vandewalker, counsel for the Brennan Center, told me **it’s troubling that we see money as speech and that such a system means legislators spend more time fundraising than working on behalf of their constituents.** But the more insidious issue, he said, is which voices politicians are hearing and how that skews policy and governance. “**When legislators have questions about the problems we’re facing and how can we solve them, they’re hearing from the people with the big checks,”** he said. “**Frankly, rich people and average people have very different ideas about what our problems are and what the solutions might be.” Public financing means broader and more diverse representation.** If your campaign funding is mostly made up of constituents giving $50 or $100 donations that are multiplied into $300 or $600 donations, the influence of the rare constituent who can afford to write a $5,000 check is greatly reduced.

**Publically funded campaigns increase ethnic diversity in the political decision making process. Filipovic 14:**Filipovic, Jill. "OPINION: Time for Public Financing of Elections | Al Jazeera America." Time for Public Financing of Elections. Al Jazeeera, 5 Apr. 2014. Web
 **When constituents know their donations will be meaningful, they’re also more likely to donate.** For donations up to $175, for example, New York City matches them 6 to 1. New York State has no such system but is considering one. **The Brennan Center found that residents in low-income neighborhoods of color, who are often poorly represented by their elected officials, were [significantly more likely](http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/DonorDiversityReport_WEB.PDF%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)**(PDF) **to donate to publicly financed city elections than to state elections without such financing. Residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant, a low-income, predominantly black neighborhood, were 24 times more likely to donate to city council candidates than to candidates running for state assembly. In Chinatown, voters were 23 times more likely to donate to the city candidates. In the Latino neighborhoods in the Bronx and upper Manhattan, 12 times.**

**Affirming is key to decreasing the influence of economic capital and money in legislation and governance. Filipovic ‘14**Filipovic, Jill. "OPINION: Time for Public Financing of Elections | Al Jazeera America." Time for Public Financing of Elections. Al Jazeeera, 5 Apr. 2014. Web **Big money in politics is unfortunately a system that is excellent at perpetuating, replicating and building on itself.** The more money any one candidate gets, the more his opponent needs. And **candidates who ride into office on the backs of big donors are naturally sympathetic to those donors’ interests — in policy and, potentially more dangerous, in court appointments. Decisions such as McCutcheon and Citizens United were a long time coming and part of a well-funded,** Republican-led **strategy to ensure that judges across the federal courts would further open the door for a handful of wealthy influencers.** There’s no shady, sinister conspiracy to unravel, but instead a much more mundane money trail: **The wealthy donate to politicians who they believe will serve their interests; politicians compete to get more and larger donations for re-election and to curry favor** with their political party **by courting those with money — i.e., the wealthy**; the wealthy reward sympathetic policymaking with even more money; **politicians are further incentivized to push those pro-rich policies and to appoint judges to the bench who will uphold those policies and overturn the ones that challenge them. In this way, the corrupting influence affects all three branches of government. The task of reformers, then, is to stop this** vicious **cycle** at its source, **by upending the campaign financing system. To get political leaders who are responsive to the public, rather than just the wealthy, requires a public financing system. “What we need is a mechanism to ensure that wealth doesn’t equal power in the political process**,” Vandewalker said. **“Public campaign financing is one of the ways to do that. It should be one person, one vote, not one dollar, one vote.”**

# Negative Add-Ons

**These types of systems don’t work**

**Turque 14:**Turque, Bill. "Montgomery County to Vote Tuesday on Publicly Funding Campaigns." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 25 Sept. 2014 **“The people who propose these systems often oversell them,” said University of Wisconsin political scientist Kenneth Mayer,** who has spent a decade studying public campaign finance. **“From what we’ve observed in places that have various types of public funding, the impacts are actually a lot more marginal.”** Public funding has been in place at the presidential level since 1976. Nearly half of the 50states, including Maryland, and a handful of cities have some form of taxpayer subsidy for campaigns. Montgomery’s plan, sponsored by council member Phil Andrews (D-Rockville-Gaithersburg), will come before the council on Tuesday and is likely to pass. **Some localities have tried the idea and discarded it. In Portland, Ore., voters scrapped their system in 2010 after five years. Over three election cycles, just two of nine publicly funded candidates won their races. A scandal involving a city council candidate who used the money for personal expenses also soured residents.**

**Affirming does not increase voter turnout.**

**Primo ‘10**Primo, David. "Institute for Justice Research Brief." The Institute for Justice. Institute for Justice, Aug. 2010. Web.

**The strongest evidence shows that public funding has no effect on or reduces voter turnout. The most rigorous examination of this** question to date **studied turnout in all 50 states, controlling for a variety of factors that could affect turnout rates**.[9] **In a working paper, two co-authors and I find no effect of public funding (both full- and partial-funding systems) on turnout** in gubernatorial elections **and a modestly negative effect on turnout in legislative elections.** Looking specifically at **Clean Elections systems** for legislative candidates, we estimate that they **lead to a reduction in turnout of about two percent.** In another working paper, Miller studies Clean Elections in Maine and Connecticut and shows thatvoters who have already turned out to vote are more likely to cast a vote in a legislative race (rather than abstaining from that particular race) if at least one of the candidates has accepted publicfunds. Miller does not suggest that more voters are heading to the polls as a result of Clean Elections, only that fewer voters are failing to cast votes in certain races, and this effect is small—a 1.5 to 2 percentage point reduction in such ballot “roll-off.” In fact, Miller focuses on roll-off in part because he does not expect that public funding of state legislative races will affect turnout: **“Even in the fully funded state legislative elections, it is unrealistic to assume that down-ticket races alone can affect the number of citizens who turn out to vote.”** The results of previous research on public funding and turnout, which had methodological limitations, are mixed. **The strongest evidence, therefore, points to public funding** at best having a tiny positive effect in reducing roll-off, and at worst **having a negative effect on turnout overall.** There are at least two reasons why public funding may not increase turnout, as reformers promise. **First, public funding programs may depress turnout indirectly: When the promised effects on policymaking are not borne out, trust in government and citizens’ beliefs that they can make a difference are depressed, in turn lowering turnout. Second, public funding may lead to spending reductions in competitive races, which may depress turnout compared to a privately funded campaign.** Further research is necessary to examine these possibilities.

**Public Funding for campaigns is actually worse for underdog candidate’s increases repetitive politics. Lack of competition means other factors like incumbency and fame will skew elections.**

**Levy ‘01**Levy, Robert. "Public Funding for Judicial Elections: Forget It." Cato.org. Cato Institue, 13 Aug. 2001. Web

**Public funding favors current office-holders by denying to challengers the financial resources needed to overcome the advantages of incumbency. Public funding is opposed by taxpayers;** just **look at the small percentage who have opted to check off tax dollars for presidential campaigns. Ordinarily, public funding is tied to prior vote counts or fundraising, thereby penalizing new candidates.** Without those ties, however, public funding diverts resources to fringe candidates. **The Commission blithely wishes away that problem by asserting that only “serious” candidates will receive money. Yet our experience with presidential elections isn’t encouraging.** Big bucks have fattened the campaign coffers of luminaries like ultra-leftist Lenora Fulani and convicted felon Lyndon LaRouche.