# Japan Relations DA - BFI 2016

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#### US and Japanese military exercises have signaled a newly strengthened conjoined stance on China

“U.S., India, Japan Begin to Shape New Order on Asia’s High Seas” By GORDON **FAIRCLOUGH** June 15, **2016** http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-india-japan-begin-to-shape-new-order-on-asias-high-seas-1466005545

From the waters of the Philippine Sea this week emerged a partial outline of Washington’s vision for a new Asian maritime-security order that unites democratic powers to contend with a more-assertive and well-armed China. A U.S. Navy aircraft-carrier strike group along with warships from India and Japan jointly practiced anti-submarine warfare and air-defense and search-and-rescue drills in one of the largest and most complex exercises held by the three countries. The maneuvers were being tracked by a Chinese surveillance vessel, a U.S. Navy officer aboard the carrier USS John C. Stennis said on Wednesday. Last week, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Beijing hoped the training “will be conducive to regional peace, security and stability.” Washington and Tokyo have long cooperated closely on defense. And the U.S. has been working to deepen strategic ties with India and to encourage New Delhi to play a more active role, not just in the Indian Ocean but also in the Pacific, as China’s rise shifts the regional balance of power. “Americans are looking for those who can share the burden,” said C. Raja Mohan, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s India center. A strengthened three-way partnership among the U.S., Japan and India is “an important strategic shift.” India, which is proud of its tradition as a nonaligned state, is unlikely to agree to any formal military alliance. But the countries already have a trilateral ministerial dialogue process that began last year. Cementing those relationships has been an important U.S. objective as it grapples with what American officials have called China’s growing “militarization” of the South China Sea, where Beijing is embroiled in territorial disputes with its neighbors and is building up artificial islands and reefs with runways capable of handling military aircraft. The U.S. has sent warships and planes through a series of operations to challenge Chinese claims, saying its aim is to ensure freedom of navigation in waters that carry one-third of global trade. Some smaller nations have felt threatened by Beijing’s activities, but haven’t always been able to agree on how to respond. This week, discord among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—a 10-member bloc comprising countries of disparate economic stature and cultures—surfaced when, under pressure from Beijing, the group failed to agree on a statement of concern about rising tensions in the South China Sea. The episode exposed Asean’s limited ability to manage regional security issues and China’s success in frustrating the bloc’s efforts to find a common voice. During a visit to the U.S. last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that “the absence of an agreed security architecture creates uncertainty” in Asia and that a strong partnership between India and the U.S. would help ensure freedom of navigation and the security of sea lanes. India sent two stealth frigates, a guided-missile corvette and a fleet-support ship to join the multiday Malabar exercises, part of an annual series of U.S.-India maneuvers that have grown increasingly sophisticated and wide-ranging. Japan has been a regular participant since 2014. Before the drills, which officially started last week, Indian vessels made port calls in Vietnam and the Philippines, countries that have disputes with China in the South China Sea. India’s defense minister, Manohan Parrikar, speaking at a regional security meeting in Singapore earlier this month, said: “All countries in the region need to recognize that our shared prosperity…will be put at risk by aggressive behavior or actions by any one of us.” India, the world’s largest democracy and its second-most-populous country, is wary of China’s increasing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, as well as its growing influence among New Delhi’s neighbors in South Asia, where Beijing is funding infrastructure projects. The two countries share a long, disputed land border, over which they fought a war in 1962. Wariness of China has helped accelerate the transformation of India’s relationship with the U.S. from one of strained suspicion during the Cold War to one of increasing warmth. Washington and New Delhi have agreed to cooperate on logistics—with a deal allowing the countries’ armed forces to use each other’s bases for replenishment and repair—as well as defense production. Mr. Modi has declared plans to spend billions of dollars upgrading India’s navy. Still, it will be some time before India has the strength to routinely project meaningful power outside the Indian Ocean region. India’s relations with Japan have also strengthened. The two nations have declared a “strategic partnership” and agreed to deepen security cooperation. They have also agreed to tighten cooperation on economic matters. During a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to New Delhi in December, the two sides said India and Japan would work together on infrastructure projects in South Asia, a move aimed at blunting inroads by China.

#### However, Japan-China relations are tenuous now, tensions are escalating

“Japan: Chinese Spy Ship Entered Territorial Waters” **VOA News** June 15, **2016** http://www.voanews.com/content/japan-chinese-ship-entered-territorial-waters/3376672.html

Officials in Tokyo say a Chinese spy ship entered Japanese waters early Wednesday. The intelligence ship was spotted around 3:30am local time Wednesday near Kuchinoerabu island in southern Japan. The ship reportedly left Japanese waters 90 minutes later. China claims it was acting within its rights according to international law and freedom of navigation. The area in question divides the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, and is not part of the heated territorial dispute over islands in the South China Sea. Japan has previously warned that any foreign naval vessels entering its claimed waters for any reason other than “innocent passage” would be instructed to depart by Japanese patrols. Last week Japan expressed a strong vow to protect its territory following the passage of a Chinese naval vessel close to islands claimed by both countries. Japan's defense ministry says a Chinese ship was spotted entering a protected zone northeast of Kuba island, part of the islands known as Senkaku in Japanese, and Diaoyu in China. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told reporters in Tokyo that Japan will protect the Senkaku islands “by any means," and criticized China for "unilaterally escalating tensions." But a spokesman for China's defense ministry says it has every right to sail through those waters. The uninhabited islands are claimed by China and Taiwan, but controlled by Tokyo. The islands and rocks are in a strategically significant position in shipping lanes, as well as desirable fishing grounds and are near potential oil and gas reserves.

#### And, the roles of US capabilities is particularly important issue in consultation, the plan’s lack of consultation with Japan breaks the alliance.

Michael Schiffer 6-17-10, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. KEYNOTE ADDRESSES “150 YEARS OF AMITY & 50 YEARS OF ALLIANCE: ADOPTING AN ENHANCED AGENDA FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP” Center for New American Security

SEC. SCHIFFER: As we think of what’s entailed in a more equal alliance, which is a concept that we are supportive of and want to see come about into being, that necessitates a more equal sharing of responsibilities. Now, there are a number of different ways in which you can take a run at that question. And that’s something that we’re in constant and continuous discussion with the government of Japan about. It doesn’t necessarily mean that we have an equal set of responsibilities. It means – or an equal set of capabilities. It means that we as an alliance together need to closely consult on the roles, missions, and capabilities question that Nagashima-san raised, so that the alliance as a unitary whole can develop the right sort of capabilities that it needs, that we need together to face the challenges that we have in the region and globally. What exactly that division would look like is obviously something that we discuss on a regular basis and will be in a constant state of afflux as the challenges that we face change as well. The region, as you know, is an extraordinarily dynamic one and that requires an alliance that is equally responsive.

#### Economic factors are the biggest turning point in Japan-China relations, a deal made with China before consulting Japan could set off the rising tension

“Avoiding Landmines: Trajectory of the Japan-China Relationship in 2016” By J. Berkshire Miller February 12, 2016 <http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/avoiding-landmines-trajectory-of-the-japan-china-relationship-in-2016/>

From a surface view, it appears that strained relations between Tokyo and Beijing are experiencing a slight détente. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held two summit meetings with his Chinese counterparts—one with Chinese President Xi Jinping last April in Jakarta and the second with Premier Li Keqiang on the sidelines of the Trilateral Summit with South Korea this past November in Seoul. There also has been increased dialogue between foreign ministers, resuscitated talks on security and maritime affairs, and high-level commitments to implement crisis avoidance mechanisms to avert a potential clash over their dispute in the East China Sea. There were other positive signs too. Abe appears more willing to accommodate Chinese concerns about Japan’s approach toward history through his decision not to visit the controversial Yasukuni shrine (after his provocative visit in December 2013 enraged Beijing). And, while it received boiler-plate criticism from Beijing, Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II last August made reference to upholding previous statements—including the Murayama Statement—on Japan’s wartime contrition and guilt. China, too, has responded with a more pragmatic approach to its relations with Japan. Beijing finally abandoned its stubborn and ineffective approach of pre-conditioning high-level dialogue upon Japan’s willingness to make concessions over the disputed Senkaku (referred to as Diayou in China) Islands. Meanwhile, despite constant public statements of concern, Beijing has ratcheted down the overt rhetoric of its criticisms of Japan’s attitude toward history. Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. On the economic front, trade continues to be the linchpin of the relationship—China remains Japan’s largest trading partner by far; likewise, despite adverse impacts from their political rift, China also relies on trade with Japan (which is its second most important partner after the United States). According to Japan’s External Trade Organization, trade between the two countries amassed over $343.7 billion in 2014. Another positive is the momentum on a potentially historic trilateral free trade agreement (FTA), currently under advanced negotiation, alongside South Korea. The China-Japan-Korea FTA would combine three of the largest economies in the Asia-Pacific and represent a convergence of more than $16.5 trillion, as measured through gross domestic product. However, this “glass half-full perspective” should not blind observers to the real troubles that remain in the bilateral relationship—most of which are systemic and bound up in the countries’ competing strategic interests in East Asia. Indeed, despite their economic interconnectedness, Tokyo and Beijing appear to be diverging more than converging. Last year, Japan refrained from joining the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)—being the only country in East Asia besides North Korea that has opted out. Meanwhile, Tokyo remains wary of China’s ambitious plans to increase connectivity and infrastructure through its “One Belt, One Road” strategy, which prescribes massive development in Central and South Asia. Aside from these differences, trade between Japan and China has also suffered. According to JETRO, bilateral trade decreased 12.1 percent over the first half of 2015. The most precipitous decline was on Japanese imports of Chinese products, which plummeted more than 13 percent during this same period. These trends are unlikely to subside. Indeed, some of the most impacted areas—such as trade in textiles—are likely to decline even more in the coming years as Japanese companies have relocated many of their manufacturing bases to Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam or Indonesia. This economic decline is magnified by strained political relations that—despite the resumption of high-level dialogue—remain at their nadir. Beijing continues to play hardball with Japan over their dispute in the East China Sea and has upped the ante recently with the introduction of armed coast guard vessels traversing the territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku/Diayou islands. Meanwhile, the number of incursions by Chinese vessels over the past year has actually increased—despite Abe and Xi breaking the ice and sitting down twice to ostensibly improve bilateral relations. But perhaps most unnerving is the fact that Tokyo and Beijing have failed to implement even the baseline crisis avoidance tools in the disputed waters—such as a hotline or common radio frequency. Political ties will likely suffer even more due to Japan’s improvement in relations with China’s neighbors. Abe has invested an unprecedented amount of travel time and political capital through international visits. Japan is also reaching new heights with its traditionally good relationships with Australia, India, and even Taiwan. Even ties with South Korea, which had been on ice since Abe was elected in late 2012, are improving now under the momentum of last month’s deal on “comfort women” (sex slaves). Japan’s diplomatic surge in the region further isolates assertive Chinese behavior in the maritime domain—including the East and South China Seas—and solidifies its image in China as a growing strategic competitor. The coming months provide opportunity for Japan and China to adopt a pragmatic approach to their ties. Both sides should push through on crisis mitigation measures in the East China Sea before an unintended incident pits them in an intractable situation. Similarly, they can restore political trust through strong reengagement in the trilateral context with South Korea, with the priority being a swift conclusion of the CJK FTA. Whether the political leadership on both sides can overcome the pressures on the relationship will be the key determinant on whether pragmatism wins over antagonism.

#### And, Japan is key to the economy, democracy and stability of the East Asian region

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, May 4 2015 “Why Japan’s alliance with the US is the key to stability in Asia” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/why-japans-alliance-with-the-us-is-the-key-to-stability-in-asia/

At World War II’s close in the Pacific, we Japanese, with feelings of deep remorse, embarked on the path of rebuilding and renewing our country. Our predecessors’ actions brought great suffering to Asia’s peoples, and we must never avert our eyes from that. I uphold the views expressed by Japan’s previous prime ministers in this regard. Given this recognition and remorse, we Japanese have believed for decades that we must do all that we can to contribute to Asia’s development. We must spare no effort in working for the region’s peace and prosperity. I am proud of the path that we have taken, but we did not walk that path alone. Seventy years ago, Japan had been reduced to ashes, and each and every month, citizens of the United States sent and brought gifts like milk for our children, warm sweaters, and even goats. Yes, 2,036 American goats came to Japan in the years right after the war. Former enemies had become close friends. And it was Japan that benefited earliest from the postwar international system that the US fostered by opening up its own market and calling for a liberal world economy. From the 1980s onward, we have seen the rise of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, and, before long, China – all taking the path of economic development enabled by the open world order created by the US. Japan, to be sure, did not stand idly by; it poured in capital and technologies to support these countries’ growth. Both the US and Japan fostered prosperity – the seedbed for peace – in the region. Today, the US and Japan recognize that they must continue to take the lead in fostering a rules-based international economic order – fair, dynamic, and sustainable – within which all countries can flourish, free from the arbitrary intentions of any national government. In the world’s great growth center, the Pacific market, we cannot overlook sweatshops or environmental burdens. Nor can we simply allow free riders to weaken intellectual property. Instead, we must spread and nurture our shared values: the rule of law, democracy, and freedom. That is exactly what the Trans-Pacific Partnership is all about. The TPP’s strategic value extends far beyond the economic benefits it promises. It is also about turning an area that accounts for 40% of the world economy and one-third of global trade into a region of lasting peace and prosperity for our children and theirs. As for US-Japan negotiations, the goal is near. Let us bring the TPP to a successful conclusion through our joint leadership. I know how difficult this path has been. Twenty years ago, I myself opposed opening Japan’s agricultural market. I even joined farmers’ representatives in a rally in front of Japan’s Diet. But Japan’s agriculture sector has declined over the last two decades. Our farmers’ average age has increased by ten years, to more than 66. If our agriculture sector is to survive, we must follow through on sweeping reforms, including to our agricultural cooperatives, which have not changed in 60 years. Change is coming to Japanese business, too. Corporate governance in Japan is now fully in line with global standards because we made it stronger. And I am spearheading regulatory overhauls in such sectors as medicine and energy as well. Moreover, I am determined to do whatever it takes to reverse the decline in Japan’s labor force. We are changing some of our old habits; in particular, we are empowering women to become more actively engaged in all walks of life. In short, Japan is in the midst of a far-reaching transition to a more open future. We are determined to press ahead with the structural reforms needed to succeed. But reform requires the continuation of the peace and security that is the bequest of US leadership. My grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, chose the path of democracy and alliance with the US when he was Prime Minister in the 1950s. Together with the US and other like-minded democracies, we won the Cold War. I intend to stick to that path; indeed, there is no alternative to it. Our two countries need to make every effort to strengthen our ties. This is why I support America’s strategic “rebalancing” to enhance peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will support this effort first, last, and throughout. Japan is doing so by deepening its strategic relations with Australia and India, and we are enhancing our cooperation with the ASEAN countries and the Republic of Korea. Adding these partners to the central pillar of the US-Japan alliance will strengthen stability throughout the region. And now Japan will provide up to $2.8 billion dollars to help improve US bases on Guam, which will have even greater strategic significance in the future. Regarding Asia’s ongoing maritime disputes, let me underscore my government’s three principles. First, states must stake their territorial claims on the basis of international law. Second, they must not use force or coercion to press their claims. And, third, they must settle all disputes by peaceful means. We must make the vast seas stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans a zone of peace and freedom, where all adhere to the rule of law. For this reason, too, it is our responsibility to fortify the US-Japan alliance. That is why we are working hard to enhance the legislative foundations of our security. These enhanced legislative foundations should make cooperation between the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces even stronger, and the alliance still more solid, providing credible deterrence in the service of peace in the region. Once these legal changes – the most sweeping in our post-war history – are in place by this summer, Japan will be better able to provide a seamless response for all levels of crisis. The new Defense Cooperation Guidelines between the US and Japan will serve the same purpose, and help secure peace in the region for years to come. Finally, Japan is ever more willing to bear its global responsibilities. In the early 1990s, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces removed mines in the Persian Gulf. For ten years in the Indian Ocean, we supported US operations to stop the flow of terrorists and arms. In Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Iraq, Haiti, and South Sudan, members of our Self-Defense Forces provided humanitarian support and participated in peace-keeping operations. Some 50,000 service men and women have participated in those activities thus far. Japan’s agenda is simple and straightforward: reform at home and proactive contributions to global peace based on the principle of international cooperation. It is an agenda that promises to lead Japan – and Asia – into a more stable and prosperous future.

#### Conflict in East Asia goes nuclear

Jonathan S. Landay, national security and intelligence correspondent, March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts,” p. Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

## Extensions/A2s

#### Even after Brexit, Japan and US relations are still stable enough in the status quo due to unification against China

**KYODO** **JUN 28, 2016** “Japan, U.S. affirm coordination over Brexit fallout, maritime security” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/28/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-u-s-affirm-coordination-brexit-fallout-maritime-security/#.V3V1trgrLIU

WASHINGTON – The Japanese and U.S. governments pledged close coordination over fallout from Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, which has sparked global economic uncertainty and doubts about continued European unity. Speaking to reporters after talks Monday with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, Vice Foreign Minister Shinsuke Sugiyama said the two nations will act to cushion the blow. “We agreed that Japan and the United States will coordinate and make maximum efforts so that this issue will not have an unnecessary impact on the international community,” Sugiyama said. “Japan and the United States agree Britain shares basic values with the two countries and that Britain is an important country with which they have firm cooperative relations in various areas, such as the political, economic and security fields.” Sugiyama said he will continue talks on the matter with British and EU policymakers when he travels to London and Brussels after visiting Washington and New York. Meanwhile, he said Tokyo and Washington agreed on continued cooperation in questions of maritime security ahead of a ruling by an international court on the South China Sea. Sugiyama said he is “closely watching” to see how the U.N. tribunal will rule in the arbitration case brought by the Philippines to challenge Chinese territorial claims in the waters. Many experts believe the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague will reject the legitimacy of Beijing’s claims to almost the whole South China Sea. The court is expected to hand down its ruling shortly. China has said it will not accept arbitration. Beijing has stepped up island construction and militarization of outposts in the disputed waters in an apparent attempt to alter the status quo in the South China Sea. “We discussed in general terms that after closely studying the results, it would be appropriate to raise our voices in the international community individually, jointly, together with the Group of Seven industrialized nations and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” Sugiyama said. “It is important to analyze the ruling first.” Sugiyama said he and Blinken agreed that the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region has become “increasingly severe” due to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and missile launches, as well as China’s attempts to force a shift in the status quo in the East and South China Seas. Earlier this month, a Chinese warship sailed near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea for the first time. The group of islets are administered by Japan but claimed by Beijing and Taiwan. Sugiyama said he and Blinken affirmed closer trilateral cooperation with South Korea in countering North Korea’s provocations. Blinken promised Washington’s assistance in addressing Pyongyang’s abductions of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s.

#### Relations with Japan are super key, otherwise we risk Japan and South Korean prolif and ruin US power projection

**Yonhap News** 06/30/**16** Yonhap News is South Korea’s largest news network “Blinken: U.S. protection prevents S. Korea, Japan from going nuclear” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/30/26/0301000000AEN20160630000200315F.html

WASHINGTON, June 29 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and Japan would seek to develop their own nuclear weapons if the U.S. ends protection of the Asian allies, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken said Wednesday. Blinken made the remark at a security forum in Washington, stressing the importance of U.S. alliances and security commitments overseas, as concerns have grown about the potential negative effects Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump could have on alliances if he is elected. "Without our security guarantees, advanced nations like Japan and South Korea would seek to develop their own nuclear arsenals, plunging the world into regional nuclear arms races, something the administrations of both parties have worked so hard to prevent for decades," he said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Trump has long argued that the U.S. should no longer be the "policeman of the world," claiming that it makes no sense for the U.S. to help defend such wealthy allies and partners as Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia in exchange for little. He says allies should pay 100 percent of the cost of stationing American troops, or the U.S. should be prepared to end their protection. He even suggested allowing South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons for self-defense so as to reduce U.S. security burdens. In an apparent swipe at Trump, Blinken stressed that the benefits of alliances greatly outweigh their costs. "There are those who suggest that alliances are simply more of a burden than a benefit. They cost too much. They achieve too little. They encourage free riders. They risk embroiling us in another people's problems. They distract us from investing at home. They generally leave us with the short end of the stick," Blinken said. The No. 2 American diplomat said the argument is "fundamentally flawed" as it overstates the cost of the alliance while underestimating the "risks of turning inward and abandoning them, and certainly downplaying their benefits and virtues." "Everyday, our allies and partners serve as the frontline of our defense, enabling us to stay ahead of our enemies and project our presence without the even higher cost of a permanent footprint in every corner of the globe. Put simply, the world is safer for the American people when we have friends, partners and allies," he said. Blinken also said alliances are "our insurance policy worth the cost of their premiums for the moment when we need them most." Blinken also noted that the U.S. is working closely with allies to modernize their relationships. "Just in the last three years, we've updated our guidelines for our defense cooperation with Japan to expand its contributions to international security. We concluded a new host nation support agreement with both Japan and the Republic of Korea to help support our military presence in both countries," he said.

#### China outcompeting Japan now, US-Chinese alliance would mark a major economic reversal, salting the wound and pissing off Japan

**Bloomberg** June 8, **2016** — 3:29 AM MDT China Steel Exports Rise, Defying Japan, U.S. Call for Curbs http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-08/china-s-steel-exports-climb-after-mills-ramp-up-output-to-record

Steel exports by China, which produces half the world’s supply, increased in May after a surge in domestic prices boosted output, defying calls from competitors for the nation to rein in shipments and curb excess capacity. The country shipped 9.42 million metric tons overseas, 3.7 percent more than April and 2.3 percent higher than a year earlier, according to customs data on Wednesday. Exports expanded 6.4 percent to a record 46.3 million tons in the first five months of the year. Sales soared after output advanced to a daily all-time high in April in response to a jump of as much as 56 percent in prices. “Chinese exports will stay elevated because of higher production and also thanks to expanding demand for building materials in places such as Southeast Asia and Africa,” Wei Yingsong, an analyst at Mysteel Research, said by phone from Shanghai after the data were released. A credit-fueled property boom and government stimulus lifted demand in China earlier this year, sparking a speculative frenzy that drove up steel rebar futures and boosted mills’ profitability to the highest since 2009. A government clampdown on speculation cooled the market in May, prompting the biggest loss since trading in rebar futures started in 2009. The record exports have prompted protests from countries whose mills are suffering from the global glut. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in May that China wasn’t doing enough to tackle oversupply and that government support was distorting markets. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said this week that China hasn’t yet implemented policies to deal with excess capacity. Shipments are running at a higher level than last year when they jumped 20 percent to 112 million tons, more than production in Japan, the second-biggest supplier. That’s spurred protests from Europe to the U.S. and hikes in import tariffs, as well as forcing Tata Steel Ltd. to put its U.K. operations up for sale. While China has pledged to cut as much as 150 million tons of capacity, Japan says the country needs to do more, estimating there’s an excess of 400 million tons. Li Xinchuang, deputy secretary-general of the China Iron & Steel Association, says the country won’t waver in its capacity cuts, but he also said in April he sees exports staying high for years as local demand shrinks. China also stepped up iron ore imports in May to feed the steel boom. Purchases by the world’s biggest buyer rose to 86.75 million tons, the highest since December, while inbound shipments expanded 9 percent in the first five months to 412 million tons, customs data show. Higher steel production “supported buying activities for iron ore,” Di Wang, an analyst at CRU Group in Beijing, said by e-mail.

#### US and Japan relations are key right now to hold back China and maintain stability

Seima **Oki and** Hiroyuki **Ishida** June 5th **2016** “Japan, U.S. to boost presence over China” http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-wp-japan-us-china-1629af4e-2b46-11e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4-20160605-story.html

SINGAPORE - Talks at the Asia Security Summit on Saturday highlighted once again the intensifying confrontation between the United States and China over disputes in the South China Sea. Known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, the summit was held in Singapore and attended by senior defense officials of more than 30 countries, mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The United States sternly criticized China's construction of military installations in the South China Sea, and Japan joined in that criticism. "China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation," U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said in a speech delivered on Saturday. He criticized China's unilateral maritime development and warned that China would be isolated in the international community if it does not adhere to international rules. There were sharp exchanges of words during the question and answer session that followed Carter's speech. Regarding China's construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, a Chinese participant said: "China's practice is not an exception. A lot of countries have engaged in this kind of practice, including Vietnam and the Philippines." Carter replied, "China is doing by far and away more of this kind of reclamation and militarization than any other party." According to the U.S. Defense Department, China has almost completed its reclamation work in the Spratly Islands and the militarization of the islands, including construction of radar facilities, is believed to be in its final stage. China has also installed surface-to-air missiles in the Paracel Islands. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported on Wednesday that China is ready to impose an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, citing sources close to the People's Liberation Army. In connection with territorial disputes over the South China Sea, the Philippines has brought a case before The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration over China's claims in the sea. The court is expected to hand down a decision as early as later this month, but China is expected not to recognize it. It is difficult to find effective measures to restrain China's assertiveness, and Japan and the United States have made complementary efforts to put more pressure on China while strengthening their cooperation with neighboring countries. During their talks on Saturday, held on the sideline of the summit, Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and Carter confirmed that their countries would strengthen their presence in cooperation with southeast Asian countries. Carter said the U.S. military is continuing to deploy "its most advanced capabilities," including F-22 stealth jets and P-8 patrol aircraft, as well as continuing freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea in an apparent effort to put pressure on China. On Friday, Carter flew over the Strait of Malacca aboard P-8 patrol aircraft that has been sent to Singapore in rotation. The Defense Ministry has focused on measures such as helping to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as the Self-Defense Forces are occupied with surveillance activities in the East China Sea. However, it remains unknown whether the measures taken by Japan and the United States will bear fruit. Philippine President Benigno Aquino has taken a hard line toward China but his term as president concludes at the end of this month. The policy stance of President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has yet to be made clear, as he mentioned that he would shelve territorial issues. Japan and the United States' backing of the Philippines may undergo a significant change in the near future.

#### Perception that the US is appeasing China or North Korea causes Japanese nuclear breakout

Toshi **Yoshihara and** James R. **Holmes**, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, “Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option”, Summer 20**09**, Naval War College Review, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0JIW/is\_3\_62/ai\_n32144580 | Suo

Japanese concerns over the Obama administration's recent moves to advance nonproliferation and disarmament objectives attest to such sensitivities. Specifically, Japanese policy makers fret that "extended deterrence could weaken if Washington appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these [global disarmament] issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective or if it permits a latent North Korean nuclear capability in exchange for safeguards against proliferation." (33) In 2006, North Korea's nuclear test compelled the Japanese government to seek public reassurances from the United States that extended deterrence remained intact. (34) Not surprisingly, even skeptics on the matter of Japanese nuclearization concede that an erosion of American credibility could fundamentally reshape the Japanese strategic calculus. The Congressional Research Service forcefully contends that "perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan's security. (35) The causes and processes by which U.S. extended deterrence could be undermined in Tokyo's eyes are beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we contend that a gradual or sudden collapse of the nuclear umbrella would be among the most decisive stimuli for a Japanese nuclear breakout.

## AFF Answers

### Impact Turn: Good Relations = Taiwan War

#### Strong US-Japan alliance causes Taiwan war

Wu Xinbo, IR professor at the center for American studies and dean of the school of international relations and public affairs at Fundan University in Shanghai, the end of the silver lining: a Chinese view of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, 2005, Washington quarterly page 119-130, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/34235886/Wu-Xinbo-2005-The-End-of-the-Silver-Lining-A-Chinese-View-of-the-US-Japanese-Alliance-The-Washington-Quarterly-%5BWinter-2005-2006%5D-Volume-29-Number-1-pp-119%EF%BF%BD130/

THE TAIWAN STRAIT Of Beijing’s various concerns about the U.S.- Japanese alliance, the most acute is the potential impact on China’s handling of the Taiwan issue. Unfortunately, the strengthened U.S.-Japanese alliance has led to Japan’s accelerated involvement in the Taiwan issue, as demonstrated by the February 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement, which in turn has further harmed Sino-Japanese relations. The widespread anti-Japa- nese protests in China in the spring of 2005 were aroused not only by his- torical and territorial disputes but also by Japan’s unwarranted interference in what China perceives as its core national interests in the Taiwan issue. To Washington and Tokyo, the alliance will serve first and foremost as a formidable deterrent against Beijing’s possible use of force against Taiwan. Should deterrence fail, their alliance would serve as a platform for a joint U.S.-Japanese response to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. In 1996 and 1997, when the United States and Japan worked to revise their defense co- operation guidelines, they included the Taiwan Strait in the parameters. Even though Tokyo insisted that the parameters are situational rather than geographical, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula have been listed by Tokyo and Washington as the two potential hot spots necessitating U.S.- Japanese security cooperation in East Asia. Since the defense cooperation guidelines were revised, both U.S.-Taiwanese and Japanese-Taiwanese secu- rity ties have been remarkably enhanced. Given the long-held U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, the expansion of U.S.-Taiwanese military relations may be expected. The growth of Japanese-Taiwanese security ties, however**,** should be attributed to the expanded mission of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. In fact, interaction between Washington and Tokyo on the Taiwan issue has been increasing, with Tokyo more actively consulting and coordinating with Washington in its relations with Taipei. After listing Taiwan as a common strategic objective in February 2005, Japan and the United States are re- ported to be working on a joint war plan for the Taiwan Strait. 16 As the U.S.-Japanese alliance assumes the function of security guarantor to Taiwan, it serves to embolden the separatist forces in Taiwan, who believe that, no matter which side provoked a war in the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Tokyo would be ready to come to their rescue. Based on this calculus, Taiwan has been pushing for the creation of a “U.S.-Japan-Taiwan security coali- tion” in recent years.17 For Beijing, the hard reality is that, if the situation in Taiwan spins out of control and requires force, it has to be prepared to deal not only with the United States but also with a militarily more active and capable Japan**.**

#### A war over Taiwan would involve the use of nuclear weapons.

Rex Li, Senior Lecturer @ Liverpool John Moores University. Editor: Suisheng Zhao, Professor of US-China studies @ University of Denver. 2004. Chinese Foreign Policy. Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. Pg. 40-41

Not surprisingly, America’s continued support for Taipei is seen as a means of obstruct­ing the PRC from achieving reunification with Taiwan. Beijing’s suspicion of U.S. inten­tions heightened when China was depicted as America’s “strategic competitor” by some foreign policy advisors of the George W. Bush administration.161 In April 2001, President Bush said in public that the United States would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself ?‘ In the meantime, he approved the sale of a massive arms package to Taipei that would enhance Taiwan’s capability to break potential Chinese blockades. Despite the need to secure Beijing’s support for its international campaign against terrorism, Washing­ton has not abandoned its commitments to Taiwan. If anything, it has developed closer defense ties with the Taiwanese military and allowed senior Taiwanese leaders and offi­cials to visit the United States. A leaked Pentagon report has allegedly suggested that nuclear weapons could be used against China in the event of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait.162 It is clear that on a variety of strategic, political, and economic issues, the perceptions of Chinese and American policy-makers differ profoundly.’63 While the events of September 11 and the “war on terror” may have provided a new opportunity for U.S.­China cooperation, the expansion of America’s antiterrorist networks in Central, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia has exacerbated Chinese fear of a strategic encirclement of - China. Chinese leaders and elites are convinced that the Bush administration is seeking to maintain America’s unipolar position in the global system through the development of a National Missile Defense system and a Theater Missile Defense system in Asia as well as other unilateral actions.

#### China will use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan.

Richard Fisher, with International Assessment and Strategy Center and John Tkacik, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, China’s Military Power, 2005, Federal News Service

First, the PLA is expanding its capabilities for strategic coercionand strategic denial. Chinese General Zhu Chenghu's recent comments indicate that China uses its nuclear weapons not just for deterrence but also for political coercion. GeneralZhu's willingness to consider nuclear Armageddon came in response to a question about possible U.S. defense of Taiwan**.**

#### Taiwan conflict causes nuclear war. –text modified

Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 5/14/2001, The

Nation, Pg. 20

China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China’s minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth**.** Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most populous country and would be defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear [war]holocaust. However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.

### Impact Turn: Good Relations = Sino-Japanese War

#### Strong US-Japan relations increase the probability of Sino-Japanese war

Wu Xinbo, IR professor at the center for American studies and dean of the school of international relations and public affairs at Fundan University in Shanghai, the end of the silver lining: a Chinese view of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, 2005, Washington quarterly page 119-130, http://www.docstoc.com/docs/34235886/Wu-Xinbo-2005-The-End-of-the-Silver-Lining-A-Chinese-View-of-the-US-Japanese-Alliance-The-Washington-Quarterly-%5BWinter-2005-2006%5D-Volume-29-Number-1-pp-119%EF%BF%BD130/

As the U.S.-Japanese alliance has strengthened, Japan has embraced the idea that a rising China is a strategic rival. In December 2004, Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines named China as a possible threat to its national security for the first time.10 Beyond discussions of the North Ko- rean threat, the guidelines turned to China, expressing strong concern over China’s modernization of nuclear and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces and the expansion of its area of operation at sea.The new guidelines, which set out Japan’s defense policies for the next decade, sug- gested that Japan should be attentive to China’s futurecourse. Prior to this, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force developed a defense plan to prepare for a possible Chinese attack. 11 Furthermore, in February 2005 the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee released a joint statement laying out a set of common strategic goals for the alliance. Noteworthy was its inclusion of China-related issues, including Taiwan. Although the wording was subtle, the fact that Japan and the United States officially recognized confronting these issues as one of their common strategic goals suggests that China will increasingly drive security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington and underscores Japan’s increased focus on China as a priority concern on its na- tional security agenda. From Tokyo’s and Washington’s perspectives, Japan’s return to normalcy means greater military might and a more active and assertive security policy. Beijing, however, is very concerned with the orientation of Japan’s security policy, viewing it as one of the key factors affecting stability in Northeast Asia as well as China’s security environment.12 Given Japan’s well-equipped Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and particularly its advanced naval and air forces, Japan is already a major military power in Asia. Moreover, its military strength continues to grow as Tokyo seeks to develop its power projection, intelligence collection, and ballistic missile capabilities. The Chinese also wonder whether Japan will continue to lower the threshold for its overseas military activities. In the late 1990s, the revised U.S.-Japanese defense guide- lines and the Laws Regarding Contingencies in the Surrounding Areas of Japan made it possible for Japanese troops to be involved in a conflict outside of Japanese territory.

#### This leads to nuclear war

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former Sect. Of State, the choice: global domination or global leadership, 2004, page 226 google books

How the power dynamics in the Far East are shaped by the inter­relationship among America, Japan, and China will also affect global stability. The United States should seek to translate the emerging equilibrium among itself, Japan, and China into a more structured security relationship. Geopolitically, Asia roughly resembles Europe prior to World War I. America has stabilized Europe but **it** still faces a potential structural crisis in Asia, where several major powers still contend, though checked by America’s peripheral strategic presence. That presence is anchored by the American-Japanese connection, hut the rise of a regionally dominant China and the unpredictability of North Korea signal the need for a more active U.S. policy to promote, at a minimum, a triangular security relationship. As argued earlier, such a triangular equilibrium, to be enduring, will require a more internationally engaged Japan that will have gradually assumed a wider range of military responsibilities. Creating this equilibrium might entail, in turn, fostering a trans­Eurasian multilateral security structure for coping with the novel dimensions of global security. Failure to engage China and Japan in at least a de facto security structure could eventually trigger a dangerous tectonic shift, perhaps involving the unilateral remilitarization of Japan, which already has the potential to very quickly become a nuclear power, in addition to the already grave challenge posed by North Korea’s quest for a nuclear arsenal of its own, The need for a collective regional response to North Korea reinforces the more general point that only a co-optive American hegemony can cope effectively with the increasingly pervasive spread of weaponry of mass destruction, whether among states or extremist organizations. [P. 226-227]

### No Link

#### US-Japan relations are resilient, despite conflicts – overwhelming security motivations

Ralph A. Cossa, Prof and Pres. Pacific Forum @ CSIS, 11-8-2004, “U.S. Security Strategy in Asia,” IIPS Int’l Conf., http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec\_cossa.pdf

U.S. security strategy in Asia today is built today, as it has been for the past half century, upon

the foundation of a solid U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. This foundation, which has seen its fair share of cracks and quakes, appears remarkably resilient at present. In fact, the depth and breadth of defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo in recent years have been unprecedented. While Japan may not yet be the “U.K. of Asia,’ as once envisioned by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, it is not too far a stretch to call Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro Asia’s answer to Tony Blair. Prime Minister Koizumi is one of a small, select group of Asia-Pacific leaders who have won Washington’s utmost trust and confidence (and sincere gratitude), given his unyielding support for the U.S. war on terrorism in all its manifestations and his willingness to buck domestic public opinion to provide support to the two major campaigns in Washington’s ongoing war Afghanistan and Iraq. This has paid handsome dividends in helping to achieve what both sides generally agree are the “best relations ever.”

#### It’s empirically denied, we’ve had major trade friction with Japan in the past

Sebastian Mallaby, NY Sun, 3-7-2006, “The China Card,” p ln

So the United States and China may be headed toward serious trade conflict. Both sides feel they have shown more than adequate good faith; both have political reasons not to make further efforts. Back in the 1980s and early 1990s, similar friction between the United States and Japan created poisonous resentment on both sides: U.S. politicians smashed Japanese products with sledgehammers, and in 1995 an anti-American demonstration in Japan became the biggest protest march in a quarter of a century.

#### The US-Japan alliance is the strongest it has ever been

Balbina Y. Hwang, policy analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, July 7, 2005 (The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1865.cfm, accessed 8/05)

Major disputes over trade and economic issues no longer dominate the bilateral discourse as they have in the past, and President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi seem to have forged a closer personal relationship than have previous leaders of the two countries. The conventional wisdom among observers of U.S.–Japan relations on both sides of the Pacific is that the bilateral relationship today is the best that it has been since the alliance was created in 1954.

#### Bush’s re-invigoration of the alliance will last for years.

Robert M. Hathaway, director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Foreign Policy Research Institute. May 13, 2005. “George Bush’s Unfinished Asian Agenda.” <http://fpri.org/enotes/20050513.asia.hathaway.bushasia.html>

First, the accomplishments: By any reckoning, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japanese alliance is a major achievement that is likely to pay dividends long after Bush vacates the White House. Prime Minister Koizumi has been one of Bush’s strongest backers on the war in Iraq, and has dispatched Japanese troops to Iraq (albeit, in a non- combatant, reconstruction role), the first such deployment into a combat zone since World War II. The new-found warmth in U.S.- Japanese relations today is all the more notable in comparison with Washington’s strained ties with many of its traditional European allies.