**RESOLVED: The United States ought to end its provision of arms to foreign insurgents.**

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# Topic Analysis

RESOLVED: The United States ought to end its provision of arms to foreign insurgents.

 While this topic can be frustrating in terms of research and directional establishment, this resolution opens a lot of doors for different focuses in terms of kritikal arguments, and policy-centric arguments.

 This topic can in part be contextualized by the fact that a google search of “United States arms foreign insurgents” outputs several articles that, unsurprisingly, reference the United States’ aid to Iraq and its consequences. At first glance/first attempt at research, the resolution can appear fairly one sided and complicated. Trying to find current non-kritikal literature on examples of why we need to arm insurgents is slightly more difficult than trying to find evidence about why we shouldn’t. Literally, if you google “why should the US aid the Iraqi insurgency,” you will be met with more articles about “why the US should not aid the Iraqi insurgency.”

 A 2015 The Fiscal Times article that is hilariously titled “U.S. Shoots Itself In the Foot by Accidentally Arming ISIS” is essentially the “big idea” of the Affirmative case. Perhaps the easiest and most obvious argument that you can go for on the Affirmative is to appeal to the notion that ISIS has built a substantial arsenal of weapons, and a significant portion of those weapons are US made weapons that were obtained from the Iraqi army and Syrian opposition groups. If you haven’t read the Amnesty International report on ISIS’s stock of weapons, you need to. The evidence within the report is fairly damning for the Negative side of the debate, and a lot of key affirmative ground is rooted in the notion that allowing provisions to continue results in the arming of dangerous groups and increases regional tension in unstable regions like Bosnia, Chechnya, Syria, and the Ukraine. The criterion of political realism shifts the paradigm allowing for regional tensions to be solved by the State actor and still reduces the likelihood that American hegemony decreases. In an Affirmative world, the likelihood that US-provided weapons either fall into the wrong hands, or escalate a conflict when compared to the potential risk of the insurgency going well is rarely worth it, especially if you value the reduction of human suffering.

 At this point in the Affirmative, access to death/suffering/war impacts becomes pretty simple. You have 100% access to the argument that there is at least a risk of exacerbating suffering/regional conflict through provision of arms. This ties in well to values about human rights/prevention of human suffering.

 The Negative side of this resolution opens up the potential for a myriad of kritikal arguments. If you want to find more K-based literature about why democracy is good, why US intervention in foreign affairs is good, why provision of arms is beneficial to deterring the spread of Islamophobia, you probably won’t have a very difficult time. However, the negative case you'll see in this brief takes a more “straight up” approach in arguing that foreign weapons aid by the US is key to basically any insurgency that hopes to achieve democracy. The main idea is that US presence in regions with high insurgent activity through arms provisions and soft power allows for democratic influence, which leads to stability.

 A really important strategy for the Neg is to clearly articulate that freedom/personal agency is a prior question to questions of ethics or morality. It is arguably more moral to allow insurgents to be armed, and therefore have the material means to at least attempt to overthrow oppressive regimes and yield their own self-determined individual agency.

 All things considered, the most beneficial thing you can do for yourself is to research and understand insurgencies that are occurring right now, and how the United States has interacted with them in the past. Good luck, and have fun with this topic!

# Further Readings

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/04/syrian-civil-war-arm-rebels-160403113531178.html>

<http://www.inspiretochangeworld.com/2016/01/simple-solution-for-defeating-daesh-us-should-stop-selling-arms-to-saudis/>

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/01/where-the-insurgent-groups-of-the-world-get-their-weapons/>

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2812/2015/en/> (download the free PDF)

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/050-in-their-own-words-reading-the-iraqi-insurgency.aspx>

<http://www.understandingwar.org/report/beyond-islamic-state-iraqs-sunni-insurgency> (download the free PDF)

<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer112/arms-sales-militarization-middle-east?ip_login_no_cache=34a4161ca398c064da8ad240d2e7d1b5>

# AFF CASE

**I affirm the resolution: Resolved: The United States ought to end its provision of arms to foreign insurgents.**

**I will provide the following definitions for clarity.**

**The US Department of State defines an insurgency as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given territory. Cambridge Dictionary defines an insurgent as: someone who is fighting against the government in their own country.**

**Next, the value: The value of this debate must be the prevention of human suffering - the debater that best secures human rights should win the round. When answering questions in regards to “when the US should intervene or provide aid,” we must recognize that we have a moral obligation to protect human rights, and therefore should not engage in actions that will knowingly cause more violence and suffering.**

Hsieh ’04 [ Cadet Anne Hsieh, “When should we Interverne?” ,West Point, Naval Academy. http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI\_1204\_Intervene,00.html]

In light of the goals of the 2002 U.S. National Security Policy, which asserts that the United States will champion aspirations for human dignity, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy, it is evident that formulating policy regarding humanitarian and peace operations has become increasingly important to our national interest. Nevertheless, cases in which military intervention may be the only way to prevent human slaughter often do not concern, and may even oppose, the nation’s vital interests. Our dilemma arises when certain absolute moral imperatives call us to act anyway. For example, **genocide should be recognized universally as immoral**. **However, U.S. foreign policy traditionally has followed realist “power politics” thinking**, where national interests always overrule humanitarian ones. Hence, in Rwanda in 1994, the United States refrained from taking action when more than half a million people were slaughtered by primitive methods in only six weeks, and 15,700 cases of rape were reported (the actual figure may have been 250,000 to 500,000). The extremity of the genocide in Rwanda not only serves as an example of universal moral injustice, but also shows how humanitarian crises are fraught with moral complications for other countries that have an ethical responsibility to intervene. The United States no longer can ignore global moral imperatives. Those who have the capability have a moral obligation to intervene in certain cases, even when national interests are not at stake. At the same time, **no nation should dive heedlessly into a humanitarian crisis simply because the perceived injustice is emotionally appalling.** Leaders who act purely from emotion may risk straining the nation’s resources while neglecting their primary responsibility of serving the interests of the citizens.Instead, **we must approach each situation by carefully considering several factors**. First, we must look closely at the need or problem at hand. Each crisis is different, and most humanitarian needs do not require full-fledged military interventions. In fact, we need to invest more in pursuing solutions that do not require military presence, such as diplomacy, funding, or other types of aid, until such measures are exhausted. Responding differently to various crises has been criticized as selective; however, such selectivity may be, in the words of Mark Evans, necessary and desirable: The fact that we cannot intervene to prevent every violation of human rights, or even to prevent every case of genocide, is . . . no reason why we should not intervene where we can, even if the choice of when to do so is determined by pragmatic considerations or by the accidents of geography. Although it would be sound in theory if we could undertake interventions in all comparable cases, doing so is impossible in practice, even for the United States. We must scrutinize every humanitarian crisis before deciding what actions to take.

While crises of human rights abuses are appalling, it must be taken into consideration that intervention can often exacerbate conflicts. In the context of state politics and specifically to the resolution, “ought” is used to express “obligation”

**And thus, Political Realism ought to be the only framework for this debate, because it takes into account the political atmosphere.**

Aron, Raymond, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Anette Baker Fox, Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/

Mon Jul 26, 2010

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as **political realism**, **is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side**. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side of the realists' emphasis on power and self-interest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states. Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The distinction should be drawn between classical realism—represented by such twentieth-century theorists as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau—and radical or extreme realism. While classical realism emphasizes the concept of national interest, it is not the Machiavellian doctrine “that anything is justified by reason of state” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorification of war or conflict. The classical realists do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in international politics. Rather, they are critical of moralism—**abstract moral discourse** that **does not take into account political realities**. They assign supreme value to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the rightness of a given action from among possible alternatives on the basis of its likely political consequences. Realism encompasses a variety of approaches and claims a long theoretical tradition. Among its founding fathers, Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes are the names most usually mentioned. Twentieth-century classical realism has today been largely replaced by neorealism, which is an attempt to construct a more scientific approach to the study of international relations. Both classical realism and neorealism have been subjected to criticism from IR theorists representing liberal, critical, and post-modern perspectives.

**Specifically, we must look to international realism**.

Raymond, Continued

International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on politics by the nature of human beings, whom they consider egoistic, and by the absence of international government. Together these factors contribute to a conflict-based paradigm of international relations, in which the key actors are states, in which power and security become the main issues, and in which there is little place for morality. The set of premises concerning state actors, egoism, anarchy, power, security, and morality that define the realist tradition are all present in Thucydides. (1) Human nature is a starting point for classical political realism. Realists view human beings as inherently egoistic and self-interested to the extent that self-interest overcomes moral principles. At the debate in Sparta, described in Book I of Thucydides' History, the Athenians affirm the priority of self-interest over morality. They say that considerations of right and wrong have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength” (chap. 1 par. 76). (2) Realists, and especially today's neorealists, consider the absence of government, literally anarchy, to be the primary determinant of international political outcomes. The lack of a common rule-making and enforcing authority means, they argue, that the international arena is essentially a self-help system. **Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define its own interests and to pursue power.** Anarchy thus leads to a situation in which power has the overriding role in shaping interstate relations. In the words of the Athenian envoys at Melos, without any common authority that can enforce order, “the independent states survive [only] when they are powerful” (5.97). (3) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they likewise view security as a central issue. To attain security, states try to increase their power and engage in power-balancing for the purpose of deterring potential aggressors. Wars are fought to prevent competing nations from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while distinguishing between the immediate and underlying causes of the Peloponnesian War, does not see its real cause in any of the particular events that immediately preceded its outbreak. He instead locates the cause of the war in the changing distribution of power between the two blocs of Greek city-states: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens, and the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta. According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security, and thus propelled them into war (1.23). (4) Realists are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality to international politics. This can lead them to claim that there is no place for morality in international relations, or that there is a tension between demands of morality and requirements of successful political action, or that states have their own morality that is different from customary morality, or that morality, if any, is merely used instrumentally to justify states' conduct. A clear case of the rejection of ethical norms in relations among states can be found in the “Melian Dialogue” (5.85–113). This dialogue relates to the events of 416 B.C.E., when Athens invaded the island of Melos. The Athenian envoys presented the Melians with a choice, destruction or surrender, and from the outset asked them not to appeal to justice, but to think only about their survival. In the envoys' words, “We both know that the decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion, but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means to be under the force of law, and thus to be subjected to a common lawgiving authority (Korab-Karpowicz 2006, 234). Since such an authority above states does not exist, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, the only right is the right of the stronger to dominate the weaker. They explicitly equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice from foreign affairs.

**Contention 1) Regional Tensions and Exacerbation of Conflict**

**Sub Point A) Provisions of arms increase regional conflict:**

Allowing provisions to continue will increase regional tension in unstable regions like Bosnia, Chechnya, Syria, and most importantly the Ukraine. Political realism shifts the paradigm allowing for regional tensions to be solved by the State actor and reduces the likelihood that American hegemony decreases.

Shaprio 2015 (Jeremy Shapiro, February 3, 2015 11:30am, Why Arming the Ukrainians is a Bad Idea, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/02/03-why-arming-ukrainians-is-a-bad-idea-shapiro 7/7/16,)

Steve Pifer is a good friend and a treasured colleague. And Strobe Talbott is my boss—so it goes without saying that I greatly admire his work. But as important as friendship and job security are to me, I still can only conclude that their proposal to arm Ukrainians will lead only to further violence and instability, and possibly a dangerous confrontation with Russia. Steve and Strobe’s article (and the supporting report with several other prominent authors) rings with fury at Russian actions. And Russian actions are indeed outrageous. But moral indignation, no matter how righteous and satisfying, is not a strategy. A strategy needs to describe just how provision of American arms would make the situation better. Rather than such a description, the article suggests that a just cause and the Ukrainian need and desire for weapons are enough to justify their provision. But **it is hardly surprising that the Ukrainians want American arms in their war against Russia and Russian-backed separatists—they face the possibility of territorial dismemberment and would run any risk to preserve their state intact.** The Ukrainian calculus is one of immediate desperation. But **the United States needs to think for the longer-term. And if U.S.-provided weapons fail to induce a Russian retreat in Ukraine and instead cause an escalation of the war, the net result will not be peace and compromise**. **There has recently been much escalation in Ukraine, but it could go much further. As horrible as it is, the Ukrainian civil war still looks rather tame by the standards of Bosnia, Chechnya or Syria. Further escalation will mean much more violence, suffering and death in Ukraine.** The report authors counter that if the United States does not stand up to Russia in Ukraine, the Putin regime will be emboldened to make similar mischief all over Europe and beyond. This is the familiar credibility argument that gave us the war in Vietnam, among other misadventures. In fact, U.S. credibility is not enhanced by making bluffs that we will not ultimately fulfill or by embarking on wasting wars that we do not need. In any case, Ukraine is a unique situation, both for the Russians and for the United States. It is culturally and geographically supremely important to the Russians and yet for the United States it has no intrinsic geopolitical importance and is not a treaty ally. The Russians would be foolish to judge U.S. credibility in responding to provocations in areas of greater importance to the United States on the basis of its non-military response to Ukraine. And there is no evidence that they are that foolish. In the meantime, to meet a Russian counter-escalation in Ukraine, the United States would have to either escalate the conflict beyond where it was originally willing to go or be forced into a humiliating retreat. Neither is a very attractive or credibility-enhancing option. U.S. policy should work very hard to avoid confronting that unpalatable choice. Otherwise, this dynamic might well draw the United States deeper into what could become a direct confrontation with a seriously pissed-off and still heavily nuclear-armed Russia. To Escalate or Not to Escalate So the key question becomes: what will the Russians do in response to America’s provision of arms to its enemy? For Steve and Strobe, the goal is to give “the Ukrainian military sufficient means to make further aggression so costly that Putin and the Russian army are deterred from escalating the fight.” This seems a tall order. Ukraine is clearly much more important to Russia than it is to United States. Ukraine is also, unfortunately, located much closer to Russia than to the United States. Russia would appear to have many escalation options and a clear incentive to exercise them. Indeed, the Russian military is far stronger than the Ukrainian military, as we learned in late August when a one-off injection of regular units led to hundreds of dead Ukrainians at Ilovaisk. No program of U.S. assistance will change that balance. As the authors of the report admit, “[e]ven with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian military.”

**Subpoint B) Regional Conflict Leads to War and Increases Suffering**

**Increasing regional tension will only exacerbate the conflict within the region. Death due to war/violent death, including all out war/nuclear war is one of the greatest forms of suffering and should be considered one of the greatest impacts in the round.**

LIPTON 1991 (Judith, MD, Psychologist, Horrendous Death and Health: Toward Action, google books)

**Although "plain old death ” has challenged human imagination since the dawn of conscious-ness. the concept of “horrendous death "is relatively new. and even more diffiadt. The ultimate form of horrendous death is** nuclear **war**, which represents not only the death of the human species, but quite possibly the termination of life on earth. Nuclear war would be a cataclysm in stages, each one building upon and expanding from the earlier stages. Social effects of nuclear war would include the destruction not only of populations but of civilizations as a result of the direct effects of bombing as well as economic collapse. Psychological effects, consisting of acute and chronic posttraumatic stress syndromes, would cripple survivors, who would probably ultimately perish anyway. **More than any other form of horrendous death, nuclear war highlights this basic concept: plain old death is inevitable, while horrendous death in general and nuclear war in particular can be prevented**. Nuclear war is a man-made problem, with man- and woman-made solutions. **It is not inevitable**. All that is necessary to prevent nuclear war is the collective will and imagination to do so.

**Contention 2) The United States Provision of Arms is Militarizing Violent Extremist Groups**

**Sub Point A) The United States provision of arms is responsible for the arming that has caused thousands of deaths by ISIS**

Nicks, 2015 (Denver Nicks, Senior writer for Times, The U.S. Is Still No.1 at Selling Arms to the World, Dec. 26, 2015, 7/8/16 http://time.com/4161613/us-arms-sales-exports-weapons/)

**The United States remains the world’s preeminent exporter of arms, with more than 50 percent of the global weaponry market controlled by the United States as of 2014.** Arms sales by the U.S. jumped 35 percent, or nearly $10 billion, to $36.2 billion in 2014, **according to the Congressional Research Service report,** which analyzed the global arms market between 2007 and 2014.Trailing the U.S. in weapons receipts is Russia, with $10.2 billion in sales in 2014, followed by Sweden with $5.5 billion, France with $4.4 billion and China with $2.2 billion, reports The New York Times. The top weapons buyer in 2014 was South Korea, a key American ally, which has been squaring off with an increasingly belligerent North Korea in recent years. Iraq was the second biggest weapons buyer, as the country seeks to build up its military capacity following the withdrawal of the bulk of American ground troops there.

**AND, these weapons fall into the hands of ISIS.**

Cohen, 2015 (Zachary Cohen, Senior writer and reporter for CNN, Amnesty report: ISIS armed with U.S. weapons, Wed December 9, 2015, 7/8/16, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/08/politics/amnesty-international-isis-weapons-u-s-/)

A new report from a prominent human rights group has found that ISIS has built a substantial arsenal, including U.S.-made weapons obtained from the Iraqi army and Syrian opposition groups. Amnesty International's 44-page report, released late Monday, found that **much of ISIS' equipment and munitions comes from stockpiles captured from the U.S.-allied Iraqi military and Syrian rebels**.The findings come as President Barack Obama has recommitted to leaning on regional forces, including the Iraqis, Kurds and Syrian opposition, to try to wipe out ISIS rather than committing significant numbers of U.S. ground troops."The strategy that we are using now -- airstrikes, (U.S.) Special Forces and working with local forces who are fighting to regain control of their own country -- that is how we'll achieve a more sustainable victory," Obama said in a speech Sunday. "And it won't require us sending a new generation of Americans overseas to fight and die for another decade on foreign soil."These local forces will receive assistance in the form of weapons, backup via coalition airstrikes and training from U.S. special operations forces. The Amnesty International report, however, concluded that it was these local forces that had inadvertently contributed arms to ISIS. **After analyzing thousands of videos and images taken in Iraq and Syria, Amnesty determined that a large proportion of ISIS' current military arsenal is made up of "weapons and equipment looted, captured or illicitly traded from poorly secured Iraqi military stocks."** ISIS has also gained access to weapons from other sources through the capture or sale of Syrian military stocks supplied to armed opposition groups in Syria by countries including Turkey, the Gulf States and the U.S., according to the organization. These weapons, including many accumulated by Iraq over five war-torn decades, were designed or manufactured in 25 countries and range from assault rifles to tanks and anti-aircraft defense systems, the report said. Amnesty International found that **the quantity and range of ISIS' arms and ammunition "ultimately reflects decades of irresponsible arms transfers to Iraq and multiple failures by the U.S.-led occupation administration to manage arms deliveries and stocks securely**, as well as endemic corruption in Iraq itself." **By failing to account for the weapons** that have been transferred to Iraq over the last several decades, **the U.S.** and other supplier nations **have allowed them to freely flow through the region and fall into the hands of ISIS and other armed groups in the region**, the human rights group charged.

If The United States wishes to prevent human suffering, they ought not provide weapons to ISIS.

Amnesty International, 15 (Amnesty International, non governmenetal political orginzaiton, IRAQ: TAKING STOCK: THE ARMING OF ISLAMIC STATE, 7 December 2015, 7/8/16, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/2812/2015/en/ )

The armed group calling itself Islamic State (IS) [**ISIS**] deploys a substantial arsenal of arms and ammunition, designed or manufactured in more than 25 countries. IS to **has used these weapons commit serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law across Iraq and Syria, including abductions, summary killings and torture.** Their military campaign has relentlessly targeted civilians with small arms, artillery fire and huge quantities of improvised explosive devices. Drawing on expert analysis of thousands of videos and images, this report catalogues the array of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment observed in the possession of IS. The report concludes that the bulk of the arms and ammunition currently in the possession of IS has been seized from or has leaked out of Iraqi military stocks. Supplier states and the Iraqi authorities urgently need to implement far stricter controls on the transfer, storage and deployment of arms to avoid further proliferation to armed groups and abuses of human rights. Drawing on expert analysis of thousands of videos and images, this report catalogues the array of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment observed in the possession of IS and charts their probable chains of custody. It finds that there is a close match between the types of weapons currently being used by IS and the inventory of the Iraqi military, built up over the past five decades. The report concludes that a substantial proportion of IS’ current military arsenal comprises weapons and equipment looted, captured or illicitly traded from poorly secured Iraqi military stocks. IS has also gained access to weapons from other sources – notably capture or sale of Syrian military stocks and arms supplied to armed opposition groups in Syria by countries including Turkey, the Gulf States, and the USA. This report examines these sources briefly but focuses on the supply to and mismanagement of arms by the armed forces of Iraq, as this is the origin of the majority of IS’ arms. IS fighters are now equipped with large stocks of mainly AK variant rifles, but also US military issue M16, Chinese CQ, German Heckler & Koch G3 and Belgian FN Herstal FAL type rifles. Experts have also observed in the IS’ arsenal: Austrian Steyr and Russian Dragunov SVD sniper rifles; Russian, Chinese, Iraqi and Belgian machine guns; former Soviet Union. **From 2003 to 2007, the USA and other coalition members transferred more than 1 million infantry weapons and pistols with millions of rounds of ammunition to the Iraqi armed forces, despite the fact that the army was poorly structured, corrupt and ill-disciplined. Hundreds of thousands of those weapons went missing and are still unaccounted for. During this period illicit markets flourished, as did covert supplies from Iran, making arms and ammunition readily available to armed groups operating in Iraq. [ISIS]**

**Sub Point B) Extremist Violence:**

**The impacts of extremist groups’ increasing access to weaponry are staggering.**

Chorley, 15 (MATT CHORLEY, POLITICAL EDITOR FOR MAILONLINE

Revealed: Number of people killed by terrorists worldwide soars by 80% in just a year, 17 November 2015, 7/8/16, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3322308/Number-people-killed-terrorists-worldwide-soars-80-just-year.html)

**The devastating toll of terror attacks is laid bare today with a shocking study revealing the number of people slaughtered worldwide has risen by 80 per cent in a year. A total of 32,658 people were killed by terrorists around the world in 2014 - an 80 per cent increase on the previous year**, **according to the Global Terrorism Index.**  Researchers said that while Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria bore the brunt of deaths last year, the attacks in Paris on Friday mark a 'watershed within Europe'. The **Institute of Economics and Peace** (IEP), which produced the index before Friday's attacks in Paris, said the atrocity in the French capital had shown ISIS could now launch 'sophisticated and deadly attacks' in Europe. The IEP's **executive chairman Steve Killelea said: 'Terrorism is gaining momentum at an unprecedented pace.** 'The Paris incident in many ways is a watershed within Europe. It shows that **Isil has the capabilities to be able to launch sophisticated and deadly attacks in Europe.** 'The UK certainly could be the victim of one of these types of attacks. We saw with al Qaida, its ability to be able to perform deadly attacks in London which brought the city to a standstill. 'However the UK, because of its border protection from being an island, makes it a lot harder for terrorists to get in.' The index ranks the level of terrorism in 162 countries - representing 99.5% of the world's population - by measuring the number of attacks, injuries, deaths and property damage as a result of terror attacks. The UK ranked 28th in the index - higher than the United States, Iran and France, although the report did not include the impact of the Paris attacks in which 129 people were killed. Terrorism remained highly concentrated in just five countries, with Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria accounting for 78% of terror-related deaths in 2014, the index found. The UK recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents of Western countries with 102 last year, although they did not result in any deaths. The majority of the attacks were in Northern Ireland and involved the New IRA, the report said.

# NEG Case

**I strongly negate the resolution: Resolved: The United States ought to tend its provision of arms to foreign insurgents.**

**Value: The term “ought” implies that the value for this debate should be morality.**

**Criterion: The criterion is consequentialism.**

Jeffrey **Issac** (professor of political science at Indiana University) **2002** Dissent, Spring, ebsco

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but i**t suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but **if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; **and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant.** Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**The only way to achieve morality in this case is to provide insurgents with the material means to liberate themselves, and allow them to bring about their own consequences and self determination. You cannot achieve morality without freedom.**

Doug Bandow (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) March 7, 19’97: Freedom and Virtue are Inseparable. http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=6186.

**Virtue cannot exist without the freedom to make moral choices. Coerced acts of conformity with some moral norm, however good, do not represent virtue**; rather, compliance with that moral norm must be voluntary. **Virtue rejects a standard of intra-personal morality.** As such it is an area that lies largely beyond the reach of state power. Of course societies can be more or less virtuous. But blaming moral shifts on legal changes mistakes correlation for causation. America's one-time cultural consensus eroded during an era of strict laws. Only cracks in this consensus, which provided the moral foundation of the laws, led to statutory changes. Government has proved that it is not a good teacher of virtue. The state tends to be effective at simple tasks, like jailing people. It is far less successful in shaping individual consciences. New laws would not make America a more virtuous nation. Even if there were fewer overt acts of immorality, there would be no change in peoples hearts and thus in society's moral core. Indeed attempting to forcibly make people virtuous would make society it self less virtuous: First individuals would lose the opportunity to exercise virtue. They would not face the same set of temptations and be forced to choose between good and evil. This approach might make their lives a bit simpler. But they would not be more virtuous.

**Contention 1) Foreign weapons aid by the United States is key to legitimizing insurgencies.**

**Subpoint A) External Aid Bolsters Insurgent Legitimacy**

**Foreign actors need to participate in the insurgency.**

<http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/COIN/Doctrine/Guide%20to%20the%20Analysis%20of%20Counterinsurgency.pdf>

The most important task for the government once an insurgency has reached this stage is to reestablish security. If the security forces cannot protect the population from insurgent intimidation and reprisals, the people are unlikely to actively support the government. Indicators of the strength of government security forces include: - The degree to which the population indicates that it trusts the security forces to protect it. This trust might manifest itself through the population’s willingness to provide intelligence on the insurgents, to associate with government personnel, or to use government services. Conversely, the departure of subgroups targeted by the insurgents from certain areas or the spontaneous formation of civilian self-defense forces would indicate a lack of faith in the security forces. - Whether the size, composition, role, leadership, and training of the military, police, and intelligence services meet the government’s counterinsurgency needs and whether the strategy and tactics the government is employing are appropriate to the specifics of the particular insurgency. - Security forces are able to expand their numbers without undermining the cohesion, discipline, or effectiveness of the forces. - Civilians, especially across subgroups, voluntarily join government organized civilian self-defense groups. External Assistance With the insurgency more in the open, support from foreign actors, if it exists, is probably more evident. **Indicators of effective** external **support for** both **the insurgents** and the government **include**: - **The assistance—including diplomatic, financial, arms, nonlethal equipment, sanctuary, intelligence, training, or advisers—enhances the political or military operations of the recipient.** - **The patron provides assistance without restrictions or constraints.** The foreign actor and the recipient have some shared purpose that has created their alliance, but they most likely have their own broader interests that diverge. An external patron, in accordance with its own interests, may limit the type, scope, or location of attacks; attempt to change the nature of the conflict; or seek to prevent its client from winning, wishing instead to prolong the conflict indefinitely. - **External aid bolsters the recipient’s legitimacy rather than causing it to be portrayed as a puppet to foreign interests.**

**The US must help the insurgency. Disbarring arms would cripple any chance that an insurgent group could rise up against the oppressive state. It is a try or die argument coming out of the negative. For example, provision of arms is key to allowing the Islamist insurgency to continue.**

**Contention 2:**

**Subpoint A) US presence through arms provisions and soft power in insurgent regions allows for democratic influence which leads to stability.**

**US soft power/presence increases chances of obtaining a democracy.**

Andrea E. Varisco 13, Ph.D. candidate at the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit of the University of York, holds a Master in International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies specialisation from the Australian National University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo and a Master in Politics and Comparative Institutions from the University of Milano, 6/3/13, “Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/>)

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse and dissolution of the USSR, the bipolar international system transformed in unipolarity and the US emerged as the only superpower. **In a unipolar system the power of a state is not balanced and controlled by the other states, this inequality allows the hegemon of the international system to influence and shape the rest of the world. After 1989 the US has been considered the militarily, economically and technologically leading country of the world** (Brooks and Wohlforth), a lonely superpower “able to impose its will on another countries” (Huntington, 39) and, in some cases such as the 2003 war to Iraq waged without the United Nations (UN) Security Council consensus, to act outside the laws of the international community. Traditional analytic approaches have little to offer in making sense of these seemingly contradictory trends. One conventional route, for example, would be to frame the international dynamic as one of rising and falling powers, pitting China’s advance against the United States’ decline. But this exaggerates the United States’ weaknesses and underestimates China’s. For all its problems, the United States is well positioned to thrive in the twenty-first century, whereas China faces a multitude of challenges, including slowing growth, rampant corruption, an aging population, environmental degradation, and wary neighbors. And no other country is even close to having the necessary mix of capacity and commitment to be a challenger to the United States for global preeminence.

**Subpoint B) Democracy checks state repression**

**Democratization helps terminate repressive spells, and makes the negative impacts of the Aff less cyclical.**

Davenport 14 (Christian Davenport, Political Science Professor at the University of Michigan, August 22 2014, “Stopping State Repression: An Examination of Spells, 1976-2004,” Social Science Research Network //MV)

In contrast, we find that **democratization significantly contributes to the termination of repressive spells. If one is trying to stop state repression, therefore, then they should consider how best to move the government toward full democracy. These findings on democratization reinforce[s] the general interest with democracy that has been put forward throughout history as a resolution to state repression.** The democratization finding is consistent with our argument that it takes something major and connected with core reasons for repression, such as regime-change, to terminate repression 35 spells that are underway. Taken together, the results suggest the importance of identifying and preventing the onset of repressive behavior, given that challenges to terminating repression. This work should reorient not just scholarship on the relevant topic but also public policy, advocacy, activism as well as discussion. Implications for researchers. Influenced by the current study, scholars interested in stopping state repression should incorporate regime change into their standard repertoire of resolutions. There is some discussion of the level of democracy and state repression but there needs to be more discussion of movement toward democracy as a solution to ongoing repressive action. Our research also suggests that there should be greater discussion of preferential trade agreements and their influence on state repression.

**Sub Point C) Allowing insurgents the material abilities to create their own destiny and obtain freedom, which is a prior question to questions of ethics, is the most moral under the value/criterion.**

**We are morally obligated to continue arms provisions**

Sampath, 1/16/13 [Rini, International Relations, “Should the US intervene in global human rights?,” point and counterpoint with Rini Sampath and Sheirdan Watson. 1/16/13. Accessed 2/14/16. Ghada. http://dailytrojan.com/2013/01/16/should-the-us-intervene-in-global-human-rights/]

As many 17-year-olds in the United States enjoyed the luxury of a formal education, Sri Lankan teenager Rizana Nafeek traveled from her homeland in 2005 to Saudi Arabia to serve as a maid. Though practically just a child herself, she swept up her employer’s home and looked after their four-month-old son by feeding, bathing and clothing the boy for just a few dollars a week. On Jan. 9, the Saudi Arabian government beheaded Nafeek for allegedly murdering the infant she was caring for. The verdict was seemingly determined based on biased evidence; they also gave her no conventional due process. Moreover, she only had limited access to a lawyer and no translator, according to ABC News. Now the world will never know whether or not she truly strangled the small boy or if the infant had choked on his milk because the Saudi Arabian government essentially decided the ruling before any trial could begin. Researchers at non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch, representatives of the European Union and the Secretary General of the United Nations have all verbally condemned Saudi Arabia’s actions. But **harsh words cannot spark corrective measures because they seem to have little to no effect on the international community. Verbal condemnation rarely persuades a government to act appropriately.** Syria, North Korea and China have all received criticism for inhumane treatment of people in the past, but have not changed their systems. To some, Nafeek is just one person. But when Saudi Arabia currently holds 50 other maids on death row, it is clear that the world must wake up and confront governments that perpetuate injustice. In the past, the U.S. has employed economic sanctions against China following gross human rights violations, such as the Tiananmen massacre. Yet the Peterson Institute for International Economics notes that economic sanctions, though usually effective, are not very common. Thus, further utilizing this measure is necessary in coercing these nations into acting in accordance with international norms that emphasize fair judicial processes. The world has failed to conduct humanitarian interventions where millions have died. The merciless governments of Rwanda, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo are just a few of those that have slaughtered innocent persons. The international community barely blinked at their actions because they had no personal investments in these areas. Admittedly, intervention requires the use of resources. Governments are wary of contributing aid for the purpose of stopping crimes in other regions because it might not appear to be their problem. Yet discarding this selfish approach to handling the world’s tribulations could rid our planet of unnecessary bloodshed. If the international community prioritized valuing all lives instead of valuing just some, change would come. **America prides itself on providing equality and opportunity for its people. But how can its citizens watch silently as other human beings are denied their basic rights?** Satinah binti Jumadi Ahmad. Siti Zaenab. Tuti Tursilawati binti Warjuki. Darmawati binti Taryani. Siti Aminah. The International Business Times reports these names are just few of the women currently on Saudi Arabia’s death row without access to a fair legal process. If the United States and the international community does not act now, more blood will spill. **In the end, Americans have the duty to ensure justice for fellow citizens around the globe.** To simply ignore injustice would be to accept the principle of ending up in Nafeek’s situation, with the truth silenced and with no one to speak up for them.

**Even if some violence occurs as a product of the insurgency, it will always be more moral to allow the insurgents the means to liberate themselves from oppressive regimes. For these reasons, I negate the resolution.**

# Aff Cards

**\*DEMOCRACY:**

**A2 Iraq Will Become a Stable Democracy**

**Most Countries with Insurgencies Cannot Become Democracies/Change Forms of Government Anyways**

If democracy were just about majority rule, then Maliki’s approach of appealing solely to the two-thirds of Iraqis who are Arabs of the Shia denomination might work. But there’s a lot more to democracy than that — equality before the law, due process, personal freedoms, property rights, etc. For many Iraqis, those items remain as unattainable today as they were under Saddam Hussein. **The simple truth is that Iraq as currently constituted can never be a stable democracy, and thus American war fighters sent there to shore up Maliki’s faltering regime are likely to find themselves defending a dictatorship.** Here, in five concise points, are the reasons democracy is not feasible in Iraq. The wrong borders**.** **Iraqis do not have a shared sense of nationhood.**  The country was fashioned from three pre-existing Ottoman provinces after World War One when Britain exercised a League of Nations mandate in the region. The borders it drew around the state of Iraq did not correspond with the loyalties of the people within them. To the south, a native Shia population was split between Iraq and Kuwait. To the north, Kurdish lands were similarly splintered by arbitrary division. Kurds were unwilling to submit to Arab dominance, and Shiites were unwilling to be ruled by a Sunni minority. The British administrator of Iraq at the time observed, “What we are up against is anarchy plus fanaticism. There is little or no Nationalism.” Things haven’t changed much in the intervening century. A history of oppression. Given Iraq’s lack of an organic identity, local leaders have frequently resorted to force to hold the country together. Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab, brutally repressed a Kurdish uprising during the Iran-Iraq war using chemical weapons and other indiscriminate means that killed 100,000-200,000 Kurds. He was similarly unsparing in suppressing a Shiite revolt after Iraq was expelled from Kuwait in 1991 by coalition forces. Tens of thousands of Shia were killed, millions fled their homes. Instability was nothing new in Iraq, but Saddam raised the level of violence used in suppressing uprisings to genocidal intensity. The U.S. spent years during its post-Saddam occupation of the country trying to quell sectarian violence, but the enmity between Iraq’s major ethnic groups is deep-rooted and probably beyond remedy.Neighbors to die for. During the four centuries that it languished under Ottoman rule, the area that has come to be known as Iraq was often a battleground in which neighboring empires fought for dominance. That too hasn’t changed much. Because the dividing line between majority Sunni and majority Shiite areas in the Middle East runs through central Iraq, its domestic politics have become a pawn of more stable, theocratically-inclined countries on either side. **To the east, Iran is run by a Shiite elite that has repeatedly resorted to terrorism and subversion as a way of expanding the power of its co-religionists in the region. To the south, Saudi Arabia — protector of the most sacred sites in Islam — is ruled by adherents to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam; along with Abu Dhabi and Qatar, it bankrolls militant Sunni groups that seek to restore an Islamic caliphate. So Iraq is likely to remain a sectarian war zone.**

**\*VIOLENCE/HUMAN SUFFERING**

**A2 Pakinstani Insurgents Are Non-Violent/Don’t Lead to Human Suffering**

AFP ’16 (AFP, March 28, 2016. “Timeline of deadliest insurgent attacks in Pakistan” The Express Tribune

**At least 72 people have been killed and hundreds more injured by an explosion outside Lahore’s Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, where Christians celebrated Easter on Sunday. The death toll is expected to rise. Here is a list of major attacks by militant groups, including Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), since 2007:**

**2007 October 18: Bomb attacks targeting former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto kill 139 people in Karachi as she returns to Pakistan for the first time in eight years. She was killed in another gun and suicide attack on December 27. 2008 —August 21: Twin suicide attacks kill 64 people outside Pakistan’s main arms factory in Wah near Islamabad. September 20: Sixty people are killed when a suicide truck bomb brings down part of the five-star Marriott hotel in Islamabad. — 2009 October 28: A car bomb destroys a market in the northwestern city of Peshawar, killing 125 people.— 2010 —January 1: A suicide car bomb kills 101 people at a village volleyball game in the northwestern district of Bannu. March 12: Twin suicide attacks on the military in Lahore kill 57. May 28: Gun and suicide attackers storm mosques belonging to the Ahmadi religious minority in Lahore, killing 82 people. July 9: A suicide bomber blows himself up in a busy market in the northwestern Mohmand tribal district, killing 105 people. September 3: A suicide attack kills 59 at a Shia Muslim rally in the southwestern city of Quetta. November 5: A suicide bomber kills 68 people during Friday prayers in the northwest’s Darra Adam Khel area.**

**A2 Insurgencies Aim to Achieve Peace/Democracy**

**Insurgencies are often dangerous and violent, especially recently in the Middle East and Africa**

Lagos ’14 (E.W. Lagos of The Economist, July 28th 2014, “Ranking high on the wrong measures” The Economist <http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/07/africas-deadly-insurgencies>)

**FOR years Africa was a backwater for al-Qaeda-linked insurgents, but today it is rising axis for extremism. Two African insurgencies now rank among the most dangerous internationally: Boko Haram in Nigeria and Somalia’s al-Shabab. Going by the number of fatalities per attack, Nigeria now has the world’s deadliest insurgency (killing an average 24 people per assault, versus two in Iraq), according to Maplecroft, a risk consultancy. Violence has spilt into neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In Somalia, al-Shabab has come under pressure from regional African forces, but has responded by striking beyond its borders. Kenya has been particularly hard hit. Since the bloody siege on Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the capital, last year, a series of coastal attacks has cost hundreds of lives and hammered the tourism industry.** Further north countries are still struggling to contain the fallout of the 2011 protests, which left behind a dangerous combination of weak governments and available weapons. Terrorist incidents have doubled in the past year in Libya, where disorganised national forces are battling with power-seeking militias. Those groups have been causing chaos in the country since Muammar Qaddafi was overthrown in 2011, with dire economic consequences. And things could get worse. Maplecroft says that the prospect of Libya descending into civil war cannot be ruled out. On July 27th the American embassy evacuated its staff from Tripoli and a vehicle from the British embassy came under attack. Egypt’s popular revolt also left a legacy of extremism. A handful of Islamist groups have announced themselves in the Sinai since President Hosni Mubarak was ousted in 2011. But the scope of attacks increased after Egypt’s military booted out the country’s subsequent president, the Muslim Brotherhood leader Muhammad Morsi, last year. Analysts fear that more disaffected supporters of the now-banned Brotherhood may be pushed into terrorist ranks. Meanwhile, Tunisia is struggling to contain its own terrorist factions.

**\*WAR/REGIONAL CONFLICT**

**A2 War Will Not Turn Nuclear**

**And Status Quo opens the door to giving ISIS Chemical Weapons because of the lax security protocols already implemented**

Russian Times, 13 (RTNEWS, Yes, we can: Obama waives anti-terrorism provisions to arm Syrian rebels, Published time: 17 Sep, 2013, 7/7/16 https://www.rt.com/usa/obama-terrorist-arms-supply-966/)

**The Obama administration waived provisions of a federal law which ban the supply of weapons and money to terrorists.** **The move is opening doors to supplying Syrian opposition with protection from chemical weapons.The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) allows the US president to waive provisions in Sections 40 and 40A, which forbid providing munitions, credit and licenses to countries supporting acts of terrorism. But those prohibitions can be waived "if the President determines that the transaction is essential to the national security interests of the United States." President Barrack Obama ordered such a waiver for supplying chemical weapons-related assistance to "select vetted members" of Syrian opposition forces**, the administration announced on Monday. The announcement came after a UN report, which confirmed that sarin gas was indeed used in Syria on August 21, but didn’t point to either the Syrian army or the rebel forces as the culprits. US ambassador to the UN Samantha Power said she was convinced that details of the report “make clear that only the regime could have carried out this large-scale chemical weapons attack.” But Power’s counterpart from Russia Vitaly Churkin said the report has no “airtight proof or conclusions” pointing to the Assad government and that it allows “everyone to draw their own conclusions, hopefully professional and not affected by political pressure.” The US plan to provide chemical weapons-related assistance to Syrian opposition was in the works before the August attack a senior administration official said as cited by NBC News. Under the AEC rules, it will take at least 15 days before any of the materials can be officially shipped to Syria.

**\*REGIONAL STABILITY**

**A2 US Arms Transfers Lead to Stability**

**Lots of Arms Transfers are Ineffective and Increase Human Death**

Hartung ’15 ( William D Hartung, [Senior Adviser to the Security Assistance Monitor program, at the event “Crisis in Yemen: Humanitarian and Security Consequences of Military Support to the Region” hosted by the Forum on Arms Trade and Security Assistance Monitor], “US Arms Transfers to the Middle East: Promoting or Fueling Conflict?” *Security Assistance Monitor* )

**Not all U.S.-supplied arms to the Middle East and Persian Gulf have been the forces for stability that the Pentagon routinely claims them to be when it provides notice of a new proposed arms deal to the Congress. U.S.-supplied arms have been used to put down the democracy movement in Bahrain and to bolster the repressive regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Abdul Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt.[11] Meanwhile, the use of U.S.-supplied helicopters, combat aircraft, bombs, and missiles in Yemen has contributed to the humanitarian catastrophe there.**[12] A recent attack on a wedding party that killed an over 130 people is just the latest example of the indiscriminate bombing that has resulted in the majority of the more than 2,300 civilian deaths caused by the war.[13] The bombing has been coupled with a naval blockade that has led to a situation in which four out of five people in Yemen are now in need of humanitarian aid. An estimated 12.9 million people in Yemen are considered food insecure, and more than 1.2 million children are suffering from moderate to acute malnutrition and half a million are severely malnourished, according to the United Nations World Food Programme.[14] There is a risk of mass starvation if the conflict is allowed to proceed on its current course. In addition, evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International indicates that this includes the use of U.S.-supplied cluster bombs in Yemen. Cluster bombs are indiscriminate weapons that are the subject of an international treaty banning their use – a treaty that unfortunately has not been signed up to by either the United States or Saudi Arabia.[15]

# Neg Cards

**\*US INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRACY**

**A2 Democracy Doesn’t Deter Terrorism**

**Democracy prevents more people from joining terrorist groups**

Hamid and Brooke 10 ( 2-1-10 Shadi Hamid A fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy. He served as director of research at the Brookings Doha Center until January 2014. Prior to joining Brookings, Hamid was director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.) and Steven Brooke (Professor if Government at the University of Texas at Austin). <https://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/graduate-program/student-profiles/profile.php?id=sb34222>

Meanwhile, Michael Freeman, in a thought-provoking 2008 study that appeared in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, attempts to disaggregate the effects of democracy on the underlying factors he contends motivate al Qaeda and affiliated networks, one of them being frustration over illegitimate authoritarian regimes. The article is a step forward in attempting a more focused analysis of the relationship between democracy and global jihadism, but it contains a significant flaw in its rejection of the tyranny-terror link. Freeman argues that for jihadists, “their own governments are illegitimate because they are insufficiently religious; secular democratic governments would be even worse.” First of all, with mainstream Islamist parties likely to do well in free elections, democratically elected governments in the Middle East would almost certainly be more religiously-inclined rather than less. In any case, proponents of a link between autocracy and terror have never argued that progress on political reform will completely eradicate terrorism. Democracy, whether in its liberal or Islamist manifestations, will not convince al Qaeda to give up arms or channel its efforts into the political process. Those in the jihadist hardcore can only be defeated through military and law enforcement means. For them, it is too late. **What democracy can do**, though, **is prevent those most susceptible to extremist recruitment — tens of millions of frustrated Arabs and Muslims throughout the Middle East — from turning to political violence, by giving them alternative outlets for peaceful political expression.** This recognition is crucial to moving our counterterrorism strategy beyond crisis management and towards prevention. **Polls have consistently shown widespread support for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide.** By choosing to focus specifically on the motivations of al Qaeda jihadists, Freeman neglects the Muslim population at large. It is true that among most doctrinaire Salafists, democracy is seen as an intrusion by man into God’s sacred domain. But neither these Salafists, nor al Qaeda, are representative of Islamists, let alone the broader Muslim community. Polls have consistently shown widespread support for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide, while popular Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood have, in recent years, publicly committed to many of the foundational components of democratic life. The 2006 Pew global attitudes survey notes that: There is enduring belief in democracy among Muslim publics, which contrasts sharply with the skepticism many Westerners express about whether democracy can take root in the Muslim world. Pluralities or majorities in every Muslim country surveyed say that democracy is not just for the West and can work in their countries. This is America’s audience, not the jihadists who refuse to accept.

**A2 Muslim Insurgents Don’t Want Democracy**

**There is enduring belief in democracy among Muslim publics.**

Hamid and Brooke 10 ( 2-1-10 Shadi Hamid (A fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy. He served as director of research at the Brookings Doha Center until January 2014. Prior to joining Brookings, Hamid was director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.) and Steven Brooke (Professor if Government at the University of Texas at Austin). <https://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/government/graduate-program/student-profiles/profile.php?id=sb34222>

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**GENERAL ARMS TRADE/SALES INFO**

Hartung ’15 ( William D Hartung, [Senior Adviser to the Security Assistance Monitor program, at the event “Crisis in Yemen: Humanitarian and Security Consequences of Military Support to the Region” hosted by the Forum on Arms Trade and Security Assistance Monitor], “US Arms Transfers to the Middle East: Promoting or Fueling Conflict?” *Security Assistance Monitor* )

**The recent surge in U.S. arms transfers to the Middle East is part of an unprecedented boom in major U.S. arms sales that has been presided over by the Obama administration. In President Obama’s first six years in office, new agreements under the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program – the largest channel for U.S. weapons exports – totaled over $195 billion.[1] Overall, the Obama administration has approved more major weapons deals than any U.S. administration since World War II. The majority of the Obama administration’s major arms sales – over 56 per cent – have gone to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia topping the list with over $49 billion in new agreements.**[2] This is particularly troubling given the complex array of conflicts raging throughout the region, and given the Saudi regime’s use of U.S.-supplied weaponry in its military intervention in Yemen. The increase in arms sales under the Obama administration is rooted in two factors, one political and one economic. The political factor is grounded in President Obama’s pledge to avoid getting into any new, large-scale “boots on the ground” conflicts like Iraq or Afghanistan.[3] His alternative has been to rely on tactics designed to limit U.S. casualties, from drone strikes to arming and training allies to carry out fighting that might otherwise have been done by U.S. troops. This aspect of the Obama policy mirrors the approach taken by Richard Nixon in the wake of the Vietnam War, when he armed regional surrogates like Iran under the Shah to fight on behalf of U.S. interests in key regions.[4] On the economic front, the Obama administration has been a major promoter of exports in general and arms exports in particular. In doing so, it has been responding to pressure from weapons manufacturers like Boeing, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics who are seeking to increase export sales to counterbalance a leveling off of Pentagon procurement spending. Recent Deals to the Region: What is Being Sold? The figures on formal arms sales agreements cited above offer just a partial view of deals in the pipeline. For Saudi Arabia alone, offers notified to Congress since 2009 have topped $100 billion, followed by the United Arab Emirates at over $20 billion in arms sales offers from the United States and Kuwait at over $13 billion. Not all of these offers end up as formal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements for equipment that is ultimately delivered to the recipient nation, but the majority of them will go forward. They provide the best publicly available information on what kinds of weapons are being offered to states in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

The biggest packages to Saudi Arabia were announced in October of 2010. Four mega-packages worth a total over $60 billion cleared Congress that month. The offers included 70 Boeing Apache attack helicopters, 72 Sikorsky Black Hawk transport helicopters, 84 Boeing F-15S combat aircraft, thousands of bombs and missiles, and hundreds of cannons, machine guns, and automatic weapons with accompanying ammunition. These items were supplemented by radars, night vision devices, and other electronic equipment designed to enhance the performance of the weapons systems provided as part of the deal. The October 2010 deals also included offers of howitzers, transport and refueling aircraft, patrol boats, and a $6.8 billion package of land-attack missiles, Harpoon missiles, small diameter bombs and Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW). And in July of this year, a deal was announced to provide $500 million in ammunition to the Royal Saudi Land Forces to replenish stocks used up in the war in Yemen, along with one for $5.4 billion to provide an upgraded Patriot missile defense system. Perhaps most importantly, there is a deal in the works that has yet to be notified to Congress that would supply $1 billion or more in bombs and missiles for the Saudi Air Force, again for use in the Yemen war.[8]

The other most important recipient of U.S. weaponry in the region is the UAE, which has been the most active partner in the Saudi-led coalition that is involved in bombing and blockading Yemen. Equipment offered to the UAE since 2009 includes hundreds of HELLFIRE missiles, 60 Apache helicopters, a $1.1 billion missile defense system, artillery systems, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and thousands of other bombs and missiles. And in May of this year the United States offered the UAE 1,600 guided bomb units, explicitly for use in the conflict in Yemen.[9]

**\*GENERAL NEG/HUMAN RIGHTS**

**A2 Arms Sales Don’t**

**Arms sales get a bad rap: exports actually support human rights and democratic freedom, lead to multilateral cooperation and constrain proliferation**

**Blanton 2005** (Shannon Lindsay, Dean of the Honors College and professor of government at University of Alabama at Birmingham, “Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports,” International Studies Association, December 1 2005, http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/content/49/4/647.full)

This bodes well for the eventual adoption of a **U.S. “Code of Conduct.” As policy makers, in practice, place greater priority on linking arms transfers to human rights and democracy, it becomes increasingly probable that legislation will eventually formalize the linkage between the export of arms and the advancement of U.S. idealist foreign policy goals. It is even possible that these evolving norms and practices will provide the foundation for a multilateral framework—an international code of conduct—that selectively constrains the proliferation of weapons. The selective transfer of arms also suggests that U.S. relations with countries in the developing world may be qualitatively different from those of the past.** During the Cold War, U.S. arms were transferred to developing countries out of necessity—in order to bolster American national security and respond to the Soviet threat. However, as Jervis (1991/1992:62) has argued, “the realm of compulsion has contracted and that of freedom of choice has expanded.” In the absence of pressing military-strategic needs, it may be that **the United States no longer felt compelled to cultivate relationships with those developing countries that do not share its values for human rights.** These findings thus indicate that arms transfers, as an instrument of foreign policy, to some extent mirror the prevailing conceptualization of security. **During the latter years of the Cold War, military-strategic factors determined U.S. arms transfers. In the post-Cold War period, U.S. arms transfers reflect the rising prominence of idealist goals in U.S. foreign policy.** Thus, there is a measure of consistency between the professed goals of U.S. foreign policy and the manner in which U.S. arms are transferred.

**A2 Arms Trade is Non-Essential**

**Arms trade is essential for stable US India Relations**

**Kuhns 2015** (Ryan, economist for the USDA, “A “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” FOR THE 21ST CENTURY OPTIONS FOR US-INDIA RELATIONS,” Ex-Patt Magazine, 5:1 2015, http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ex-patt)

Here, **the United States could continue to expand its de facto defense and economic ties with the Indian government and encourage a melding of the two countries’ private sectors by actively lobbying for the removal of bi-lateral trade barriers.** The US-India relationship has many inherent qualities that foster increased development of national connections without the formality of treaties and institutional overlays. **In terms of informal defense ties, arms sales and limited technology transfers would feature heavily in the US-India security relationship. Sales of US weapons to India grew from $237 million in 2009 to $2 Billion in 2013, surpassing Russia’s arms trade with India for the first time.** In addition to arms sales, the Indian military conducts more military exercises with the United States than any other country. While these developments illustrate strengthening security ties between the two nations, they do not explicitly bind American foreign policy to that of India’s in the case of a regional conflict. Although, **it does send a clear message to potential aggressors that the United States includes the South Asian giant in the calculations of its AsianPacific interests. US defense ties to India also, in their current state, illustrate that American support of Indian security interests goes beyond rhetoric,** but is not set in stone, thus providing the US government the opportunity to conduct a flexible national security policy. In keeping with this policy, arms sales and stipulated technology transfers should take precedence over formal ties like the Defense Framework Agreement, renewed this summer for an additional 10 years. Economic relations should also maintain an informal quality, given the fact that Indian domestic interests don’t always suit the objectives of the American business community and are, at times, seemingly downright hostile to US efforts to encourage development. For example, the 2005 civil nuclear agreement has been stuck in somewhat of a holding pattern since the introduction of more stringent Indian liability laws. American companies are unwilling to invest and the economic opportunity afforded to the Indian state by the US deviation from its nuclear non-proliferation policies has been heretofore squandered. This is, of course, illustrative of the types of issues that come up in the relations of two democratic nations with complex domestic political systems that can often prove to make the alignment of priorities difficult, especially when the perceived welfare of their respective citizenry is involved. **Nurturing an informal economic relationship, outside of trade treaties and multilateral trade agreements, gives the US options in how it approaches its economic relationship with India – which has been quite fruitful as a whole for US corporations – while giving both parties the ability to modify it in ways they deem fit.**