**Resolved: The European Union ought to use economic pressure to combat the spread of illiberal democracy among its members.**

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**TOPIC INTRODUCTION**

Resolved: The European Union ought to use economic pressure to combat the spread of illiberal democracy among its members.

There is an absurd amount being written on this topic by pundits, academics, and amateurs alike. When doing your own research, it will be hard to sift through. With human rights, civil liberties, the nature of democracy and liberalism, far-right xenophobia, and all the usual international drama that comes with the EU, topic literature is a little all over the place. Add to that very relevant peripheral events like the 2008 Recession, Brexit, and the 2015 Refugee Crisis, and you’ve got a seemingly endless number of core issues on this topic. For this resolution in particular, the further readings section in this brief will by far be the best place to start.

The EU is currently facing challenges to its core political tenets, primarily by its members in Eastern Europe, Hungary and Poland in particular. While prospective members are examined with a fine-toothed comb to ensure their governments are properly liberal (minimal governmental encroachment on individual liberties, usually constitutionally ordained) and democratic (governments formed of and by the people), existing member states face far less scrutiny. Over the last decade, increasing globalization and cultural diffusion, along with a plethora of social, political, and economic crises (think: recession, refugee crisis, Greek bailout) have made conditions ripe for a populist, right-wing backlash. This “democratic-backsliding” comes in the form of sweeping constitutional amendments, weakened democratic institutions, and limits on basic liberties like free speech.

Negative teams have a lot of flexibility on this topic. With plenty of independently offensive arguments, the 1NR is as simple as narrowing the debate to whichever one the aff answered the least well. That said, beware losing sight of the larger narrative within detailed impact scenarios. Smart affirmative teams will take advantage of your hyper-specificity and potentially frame you out of the round.

Affirmative teams should spend a lot of time thinking about their definitions, and particularly their criterion. International action like this, especially action that intersects with movements involving racism or xenophobia, can result in a very broad set of impacts. The negative will usually out do you in terms of quantity, so choose one or two and constrain your framework tightly to those stories.

**FURTHER READINGS**

The rise of illiberal democracies

<https://fareedzakaria.com/columns/1997/11/01/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy>

Will human rights survive illiberal democracy? -Amnesty International

<https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2015/10/illiberal-democracy-PDF-20mrt.pdf?x89594>

Empirical qualities of illiberal democracies (Hungary and Poland)

<https://freedomhouse.org/report/modern-authoritarianism-illiberal-democracies>

Current EU “battle plan” for engaging with illiberal democracies

<https://www.politico.eu/article/mff-commission-eu-budget-proposal-brussels-looks-to-link-eu-payouts-to-justice-standards/>

Is it an illiberal democracy? A majoritarian state? An authoritarian state? All three?

<https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/06/13/is-europe-s-problem-illiberal-majoritarianism-or-creeping-authoritarianism-pub-76587>

Summary of Hungary’s illiberal democracy

<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-09/viktor-orban-s-vision-of-illiberal-democracy-is-here-to-stay>

Summary of Poland’s illiberal democracy

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2016/12/22/illiberal-democracy-comes-to-poland/?noredirect=on>

Democracy and its discontents

[www.fletcherforum.org/s/FletcherForum\_Sum16\_40-2\_173-186\_SHATTUCK-azm7.pdf](http://www.fletcherforum.org/s/FletcherForum_Sum16_40-2_173-186_SHATTUCK-azm7.pdf)

**AFFIRMATIVE**

**Definitions**

**Economic Pressure**

Brosche (1974)

Hartmut Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 3 (1974)

methods for utilizing the economic potential of one country in conjunction with international economic relations as countermeasures for dealing with this type of coercion.

**Illiberal Democracy**

Zakaria (1997)

Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, 1997, pp. 22–43.

Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.

**Ought**

Oxford

Used to indicate duty or correctness

**Value**

**Human Rights**

UN (2017)

“Human Rights.” United Nations, 2017, www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/.

Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

**Criterion**

**Liberalism**

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Gaus, Gerald, et al. “Liberalism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 22 Jan. 2018, plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/#DebAboLib.

[contends that] freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would use coercion to limit freedom. It follows from this that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit the liberty of citizens.

**C1: Illiberal Democracies**

**Subpoint A: Illiberal democracies are on the rise in the EU**

Krastev (2018)

Krastev, Ivan. "Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution: The Long Road to Democratic Decline." Foreign Affairs, May-June 2018, p. 49+.

Perhaps the most alarming development has been the change of heart in eastern Europe. Two of the region's poster children for post-communist democratization, Hungary and Poland, have seen conservative populists win sweeping electoral victories while demonizing the political opposition, scapegoating minorities, and undermining liberal checks and balances. Other countries in the region, including the Czech Republic and Romania, seem poised to follow. In a speech in 2014, one of the new populists, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, outlined his position on liberalism: "A democracy is not necessarily liberal. Just because something is not liberal, it still can be a democracy." To maintain global competitiveness, he went on to say, "we have to abandon liberal methods and principles of organizing a society." Although Orban governs a small country, the movement he represents is of global importance. In the West, where the will of the people remains the main source of political legitimacy, his style of illiberal democracy is likely to be the major alternative to liberalism in the coming decades.

**Subpoint B: Illiberal democracies degrade human rights**

Hegedüs (2015)

Hegedüs, Daniel. “Responding to Illiberal Democracies’ Shrinking Space for Human Rights in the EU.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 57–67.

Even though it is hardly disputable that the quality of individual human rights and freedoms in Hungary and Poland experienced a rather moderate decrease in recent years6, the institutional dimension of liberal constitutionalism – the functioning of constitutional checks and balances – has been fundamentally compromised. The Hungarian and Polish governments clash with the Constitutional Courts through legislative acts, [and] the undermin[e] of the Constitutional Courts’ independence through court-packing or removing sitting judges, are emblematic examples of the negative developments. Furthermore, as the “free but not fair” elections in 2014 in Hungary, as well as the related modifications of the campaign rules and the ongoing centralization and homogenization of the media landscape highlight, the electoral dimension of democracy is also affected. Both in Hungary and Poland, an ongoing and uninterrupted democratic backsliding process can be observed, a diminishing of democratic qualities, and the regimes’ downhill slide toward authoritarianism.

6The year 2017 might be a turning point in this regard, with authoritarian-style attacks against the civil society and academic freedom by Hungarian law on foreign funded NGOs and the discriminatory amendment of the Higher Education Act rendering the Central European University’s functioning in the country nearly impossible.

**Subpoint C: Degradation of human rights through illiberal democracies spreads globally through international institutions**

Puddington (2015)

Puddington, Arch. “Authoritarian Internationalism for the 21st Century.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 15–23.

In other UN bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, regimes have cobbled together coalitions with members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to ward off votes to condemn human rights violations or breaches of democratic standards. In cases where authoritarian states are in a clear minority, they have attempted with some success to cripple institutions whose mission includes the monitoring and enforcement of democratic norms. Thus Venezuela has worked assiduously to both undermine and create alternatives to the Organization of American States in which democracy and human rights standards were omitted as goals and the United States excluded from membership. Likewise, Russia and other Eurasian autocracies have severely weakened the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe after the ODIHR issued sharply-phrased reports that condemned elections in Russia and other Eurasia autocracies.

**C2: EU Economic Pressure Works**

**Subpoint A: Illiberal democracies rely on economic success**

Pogátsa (2017)

Pogátsa, Zoltán. “The Political Economy of Illiberal Democracy” Social Europe, 15 Nov. 2017, www.socialeurope.eu/the-political-economy-of-illiberal-democracy.

There is, however, [a] strong basis for Orbán’s durability: the economy. Hungary has enjoyed solid economic growth, increased employment and a steady rise in real wages in recent years. In the eyes of voters Orbán’s economic record – a fundamental yardstick for them – is unmistakably superb in comparison with the dismal record of his familiar and discredited opponents. In fact, many admirers of Orbán in neighboring countries have even taken to advocate the ‘successful economic model’ of his illiberal Hungary.

**Subpoint B: Illiberal democracies in the EU utilize a large amount of EU funding**

Schnyder/Sallai (2017)

Schnyder, Gerhard, and Dorottya Sallai. “Is the EU Subsidising Autocracies? Hungary and the Rise of the 'Illiberal' Model.” The Conversation, 12 Jan. 2018, theconversation.com/is-the-eu-subsidising-autocracies-hungary-and-the-rise-of-the-illiberal-model-89810.

Recent research by Dénes Bank found that these EU funds are now more important to these nations than[foreign-direct investment] FDI inflows. Between 2007 and 2013, EU funds for Hungary alone amounted to €35 billion whereas total FDI inflow was €28 billion. These structural funds may largely explain why Orbán and his clan can afford the luxury of boldly expanding their grip on the economy without fearing the consequences of an increasingly hostile investment climate. As such, EU structural funds may be much more central to the emerging illiberal model in Central and Eastern European countries than is commonly acknowledged. Indeed, it doesn’t seem too far-fetched to draw the troubling conclusion that they may be the very fuel that makes the illiberal motor turn. From this perspective, the idea, which is part of discussions about the next EU budget, of making some EU funding conditional on criteria such as respecting the rule of law should be very seriously considered. Removing the fuel may well be a necessary measure to make sure the illiberal fire does not spread any further.

**Subpoint C: Economic pressure through targeted reductions in EU financial aid would decrease illiberalism among EU members**

Euractive/Reuters (2018)

Euractive w/ Reuters. “Empire Strikes Back: EU to Combat Eastern Strongmen with Funding Threat.” Euractiv.com, 27 Apr. 2018, www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/empire-strikes-back-eu-to-combat-eastern-strongmen-with-funding-threat/.

EU officials expect Poland to back down enough next month on reforms of its judiciary to avoid the Commission having to follow through on a threat to try to suspend its EU voting rights — a compromise the EU executive believes will have been achieved through fear of penalties in the upcoming EU budget. Tensions with eastern states could also be defused by tough EU action to keep out irregular migrants, by a prospective compromise on sharing out the task of looking after refugees and by efforts to deal with complaints from former Soviet-bloc countries that they are treated as second-class citizens. “East to west: Europe must breathe with both lungs. Otherwise our continent will struggle for air,” Juncker said in September as he laid out policies for the rest of his mandate in what one aide described as “a love letter to eastern Europe”. “We will work hard to keep them hooked in to the system,” said another. “With the right carrots — and sticks.” The Commission faces a test of wills with Orbán. EU officials expect him to step up challenges to Brussels but say legal sanctions have forced him to back away from some actions and voice confidence that they can do so again. Orbán has backed down after losing cases to the Commission in the European Court of Justice, including on a move to remove senior judges and a data privacy supervisor. He also accepted an ECJ rejection of his attempts to overturn a Union policy that would oblige member states to take in a share of asylum-seekers. The executive expects to win cases, known as infringements, to block new Hungarian laws aimed at curbing funding from abroad, notably by Hungarian-American financier George Soros, of a university and of liberal non-government organisations.

**AFFIRMATIVE A2’S AND EXTENSIONS**

**EXT: Inaction exacerbates impacts and spreads illiberal democracy to other countries**

Zalan (2015)

Zalan, Eszter. “A Warning from Hungary: Building an Illiberal Zombie in the EU Threatens Political Rights and Democratic Freedoms.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 39–45.

The EU’s inability to roll back some of the restrictions on fundamental freedoms which Orbán has spearheaded over the years, could serve as an encouragement to other EU member states to go ahead with illiberal policies. No sanctions have been taken against the Orbán government for possibly infringing the Copenhagen criteria on rule of law that served as a precondition for accession. This undermines the EU’s credibility as a community of law and encourages Orbán to push further. Unless NGOs and citizens raise awareness about how the erosion of democracy in one member state, where the government no longer can be held accountable, might have a dangerous effect in their own countries, there will not be a critical mass among EU countries to tackle the situation.

**EXT: Illiberal democratic values are on the rise and spread fast**

Goksun/Polakow-Suransky (2015)

Goksun, Ela, and Sasha Polakow-Suransky. “Beyond Brussels: Why the EU Can’t Reverse the Populist Wave Alone.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 47–56.

The emergence of such populist parties with an illiberal and crudely majoritarian conception of democracy in core EU states poses a direct threat to liberal democratic norms in countries where those norms have long been taken for granted. According to Foa and Mounk (2016), the commitment to liberal democratic norms and institutions is especially in decline among millennials. More alarmingly, the number of Americans who believe that military rule would be a good thing has risen from 6 to 16 per cent since 1995; 35 per cent of those born after 1970 with a high income regard army rule as a “good thing”

**EXT: Illiberal democracies target and degrade minorities’ human rights**

Goksun/Polakow-Suransky (2015)

Goksun, Ela, and Sasha Polakow-Suransky. “Beyond Brussels: Why the EU Can’t Reverse the Populist Wave Alone.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 47–56.

This is because most populist far-right parties in the EU are critical of EU human rights legislation and of constitutional protections of minority rights and minorities’ religious freedoms. They argue it encroaches on the “people’s will” or the nation’s sovereign prerogative. This is consistent with their majoritarian approach to democracy. In their view, if the majority of the electorate wants to ban burkinis, halal meat, and mosque construction and if they support such measures in a referendum or by electing candidates like Geert Wilders or Marine Le Pen, then banning modest swimwear or mosques is an expression of the popular will. Because they do not believe in constitutional democracy, they argue that such laws are perfectly democratic. At the extreme, illiberal majoritarians would argue that ethnic cleansing has democratic legitimacy if a majority of voters supported violent removal of unpopular minorities. If these parties gain a greater share of the vote, their illiberal conception of democracy will present a major threat to human rights norms and legislation at the EU and member state level.

**A2: Illiberalism not strong enough/not growing in powerful EU states**

**Illiberalism on the rise in powerful EU states**

Goksun/Polakow-Suransky (2015)

Goksun, Ela, and Sasha Polakow-Suransky. “Beyond Brussels: Why the EU Can’t Reverse the Populist Wave Alone.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 47–56.

The rise of populist parties and their influence on mainstream politics has been at the center of three major European political campaigns this year: in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Anti-European sentiment drove the strong election performances of the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, the Front National (FN) in France, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany

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The appeal of populism lies in the false premise of appealing to such concerns and exploiting the cultural and social anxieties of voters who “feel that globalization threatens their way of life, even their very identity” (Huneke 2017). Therefore, even when these populist movements have not won elections, the issues they campaigned for have remained central to political debates. In ‘Europe’s Populist Surge’, Mudde (2017) writes that the “threat of terrorism and anxiety about a massive wave of immigrants from the Muslim world, coupled with the widespread belief that the EU hinders rather than helps when it comes to such problems, have created a perfect storm for populists”. These parties have managed to rally large and durable levels of support from the public in “some of the most economically secure and highly educated regions of Europe”.

**A2: Democratization fixes everything**

**Unconditional democratization leads to authoritarianism**

Zakaria (1997)

Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, 1997, pp. 22–43.

The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, democracy about its accumulation and use. For this reason, many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberals saw in democracy a force that could undermine liberty. James Madison explained in The Federalist that "the danger of oppression" in a democracy came from "the majority of the community." Tocqueville warned of the "tyranny of the majority," writing, "The very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority." The tendency for a democratic government to believe it has absolute sovereignty (that is, power) can result in the centralization of authority, often by extra-constitutional means and with grim results. Over the last decade, elected governments claiming to represent the people have steadily encroached on the powers and rights of other elements in society, a usurpation that is both horizontal (from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from regional and local authorities as well as private businesses and other non-governmental groups).

**NEGATIVE**

**Definitions**

**Ought**

Cambridge Dictionary

used to show when it is necessary or would be a good thing to perform the activity referred to by the following verb

**Economic Pressure**

Business Dictionary

A time period in the economy of a country or a nation when economic indicators are not in a favorable condition.

(in this instance, the resolution is asking the EU to impose this economic state upon illiberal democracies)

**Value**

**Sovereignty**

Merriam-Webster

The authority of a state to govern itself or another state.

**Criterion**

**Cost-benefit analysis**

A systematic approach to estimate the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives by determining which options provide the best approach to achieve benefits while preserving savings

**C1: EU Economic Pressure Fails**

**Subpoint A: Economic pressure doesn’t work**

Puddington (2015)

Puddington, Arch. “Authoritarian Internationalism for the 21st Century.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 15–23.

But authoritarian powers are willing to tolerate poverty, alienated university graduates, even mass hunger as long as reforms are seen as jeopardizing their political supremacy. Indeed, today’s autocrats understand that pluralism and dissenting ideas pose as serious a threat to their rule as they did to the one-party dictatorship of the previous century. They are also convinced that global politics is a zero-sum game, whereby the collapse of any member of the international authoritarian fraternity hands liberal democracy a victory and poses a threat to authoritarians everywhere. No matter how incompetent and unpopular a regime may be – take Venezuela, for example – or how brutal – Assad’s Syria junta – the loose-knit authoritarian international will take whatever steps are required, including direct intervention in some cases, to shore up a faltering and despised leadership. Today’s authoritarians see the world as hostile and are determined to prevail over the West.

**Subpoint B: Economic pressure undermines civil liberties and human rights**

de Regt (2015)

De Regt, Sabrina. “Don’t Ignore Citizens’ View on Democracy When Trying to Understand Illiberal Democracy.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 31–38.

As demonstrated above [by data from the World Values Survey], not everybody defines democracy in a liberal way. Variation exists in the extent to which citizens around the world believe that civil liberties and human rights are important in democracy. This raises the question why some people do not attach a lot of value to civil liberties and human rights in democracies. One explanation might be that citizens in many countries might simply be too occupied with achieving physical and financial security. Maslow’s (1943) famous Hierarchy of Needs predicts that people would need enough physical security, food, water, clothes, employment, and housing before they could value abstract elements of democracy such as freedom, equality, and human rights. In other words: first things first. This would explain why in many countries mentioned above, Iraq for example, citizens attach less value to abstract liberties in democracy. Iraqis, especially when living in areas which were controlled by Daesh, are simply too worried about their physical safety to be able to worry about other things. Living conditions are therefore important to take into account when trying to understand citizens’ view on democracy

**Subpoint C: Economic pressure exacerbates regional poverty, re-entrenches support for illiberalism**

Pogant (2018)

Pogany, Stephen I. “Europe's Illiberal States: Why Hungary and Poland Are Turning Away from Constitutional Democracy.” The Conversation, 7 Aug. 2018, theconversation.com/europes-illiberal-states-why-hungary-and-poland-are-turning-away-from-constitutional-democracy-89622

Economic factors, particularly the plight of many pensioners and of other economically vulnerable sections of central and eastern European societies, have also contributed to the current political climate. The establishment of market economies in the region created clear winners and losers in countries such as Poland. These societies are now far less egalitarian than under communism. While a new class of businessmen, lawyers and media personalities can indulge their taste for expensive foreign holidays and luxurious German automobiles, there is widespread poverty. In particular, residents of many rural areas and of towns and cities that have been ravaged by deindustrialisation are struggling. As Jacques Rupnik, a former adviser to Czech president Vaclav Havel, recently observed: “the ‘decoupling’ of liberalism and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe has a lot to do with the post-1989 confusion, and indeed collusion, between political and economic liberalism”. Rupnik poses the question: “Does this explain why Central Europe travelled from (economic) neo-liberalism to (political) illiberalism?”

**Subpoint D: Economic pressure strengthen illiberal actors**

Goksun/Polakow-Suransky (2015)

Goksun, Ela, and Sasha Polakow-Suransky. “Beyond Brussels: Why the EU Can’t Reverse the Populist Wave Alone.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 47–56.

In the case of Austria, Mouffe (2005) argues that the sanctions imposed on the country in 2000 as a reaction to the ÖVP and FPÖ coalition had the adverse effect of showing the EU’s inconsistent application (the equally troubling Italian Liga Norte and Alianza Nacional coalition was not targeted). It antagonized smaller nations that felt this treatment would not have been used in the case of a more important country, and it “did not have the intended effect of arresting the growth of right-wing populist parties” (Mouffe 2005: 67). Today, sanctions against populist leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński can backfire by “not only strengthening [the populist party] at home, but [and] also rightwing populists throughout the EU”

**C2: Economic interdependence and stability solves**

**Subpoint A: Economic interdependence and stability is key to preserving and advancing democratic institutions within illiberal democracies**

Snyder (2012)

Snyder, Jack. Power and Progress : International Politics in Transition, Routledge, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=958643.

The most effective scheme would gradually integrate reforming Soviet bloc states into the European Community. The EC is a strong, well-developed supranational institution with a proven record of successfully assimilating less developed European states into its economic system, with favorable effects on their political development. Germany, the nation that Soviet bloc states are most eager to trade with, is a member of the EC. With backing from Washington and a benign attitude from Moscow, the EC would surely have sufficient resources to play the leadership role that is helpful in setting up a strong international regime. There are economic incentives for the EC to play a more active role in the East, as well as ideological and security incentives. This is not a scheme that relies simply on the erroneous notion that economic interdependence breeds peace. The favorable political effect comes not just from interdependence, but also from the institutional structures and changes in domestic interests that may or may not accompany high levels of interdependence.

**Subpoint B: Strong democratic institutions key to liberalizing democracies**

Snyder (2012)

Snyder, Jack. Power and Progress : International Politics in Transition, Routledge, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=958643.

When institutions are strong, there is order; the effects of anarchy are mitigated. When institutions are weak, there is disorder; politics are marked by the perverse effects of anarchy. Thus, from this perspective, the problem of creating a new European security order to supplant that of the bipolar stalemate is above all a problem of building institutions. Institutionalist theories borrowed from the fields of comparative politics and international political economy may help illuminate the task ahead. The classic statement of the institutionalist understanding of political order is Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies . Huntington is concerned with the consequences for political order when intense political demands are advanced by a mobilized society, but governing institutions are too weak to reconcile those competing claims effectively. In particular, he examines the

disorder that emerges in a modernizing society when industrialization, urbanization, and expanding literacy lead to an expansion of political demands, which the traditional political institutions of the ancien régime cannot process efficiently and authoritatively. In such circumstances, politics becomes disordered. Groups and individuals cannot defend their interests by appealing to legitimate governing institutions and orderly procedures for resolving conflicts, because such channels are unavailable. As a result, narrow groups form to defend their parochial interests through self-help, including direct violent action, as in any anarchical environment. Social groups like students and organized labor may take to the streets or use other means of direct, coercive action, like political strikes, to advance their selfish parochial interests. Government institutions, unable to create order pursue the state’s interests on the basis of legitimate authority, also act as self-interested, coercive groups. The military, because the dominant means of violent coercion lie in its hands, tends to play a central role in this pattern of “praetorian” politics. As Huntington quotes Hobbes, “when nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps.”

**NEGATIVE A2’S AND EXTENSIONS**

**EXT: Centralized EU action will fail**

Goksun/Polakow-Suransky (2015)

Goksun, Ela, and Sasha Polakow-Suransky. “Beyond Brussels: Why the EU Can’t Reverse the Populist Wave Alone.” Strategic Studies, Oct. 2015, pp. 47–56.

What the academic literature overlooks by focusing on judicial and policy tools and what our article examines is the degree to which EU leverage depends on national level politics – a space where political debate is increasingly driven by animosity towards EU bureaucrats and resentment of supranational institutions.

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A major motivating factor is the idea of a democracy deficit. Populist parties are presenting themselves as defenders of the nation state against a federalist European utopia. They argue that bureaucrats in Brussels operate without adequate democratic oversight and control, which makes them indifferent to the people’s needs. The EU’s complex bureaucracy, as well as opaque appointment processes and low voter participation, have made it an easy target for angry voters “particularly when the body itself is endowed with the power of supranational law” (Sullivan 2017). At the member state level, the democracy deficit has been equally dangerous. Voters’ fears of eroding national sovereignty and the absence of robust democratic debates have led to what Chantal Mouffe (2002: 6) has called the “impasse of moralism” – when certain member states “claim the moral high ground [against populist right-wing ideology which] is always very tempting but does not provide a political strategy and it is unlikely to decrease the appeal of right-wing populist movements”

**EXT: Economic guarantees by the EU keep illiberal democracies from defecting**

Shattuck (2016)

Shattuck, John. “Eastern Europe Is Shunning Liberal Democracy – but It'll Come Back in the End.” The Conversation, 13 May 2016, theconversation.com/eastern-europe-is-shunning-liberal-democracy-but-itll-come-back-in-the-end-58329.

And despite their assault on the EU’s liberal values, Eastern European governments benefit substantially from the EU’s guarantee of employment mobility for their citizens. Without the EU, Hungary and its neighbours would be cast adrift in a chaotic world. They have few to no natural resources to speak of, and would likely become economic vassals of the two big illiberal states to the east, Russia and Turkey, whose economic and security situation is far more uncertain than the EU’s. This is why Hungary’s prime minister is trying to stop the EU from detaching Eastern Europe from the Schengen zone, and also why he is seeking to maintain social benefits for Hungarian workers in the UK. These may be losing battles, especially if Hungary continues to resist the EU quota rules on accepting refugees, but they show how much Orban and his neighbors need the EU.

**EXT: Illiberal democracies inevitably collapse from internal instability**

Shattuck (2016)

Shattuck, John. “Democracy and Its Discontents.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 40, no. 2, 2016, pp. 173–184., www.fletcherforum.org/s/FletcherForum\_Sum16\_40-2\_173-186\_SHATTUCK-azm7.pdf.

There are four key weaknesses in the system. First, the legacy of state control over the economy and its eventual collapse under communism show that it may be difficult for centralized illiberal regimes to deliver economically to their citizens without liberalizing their political institutions. This is particularly true for countries like Hungary and Poland that have been incorporated into a much larger interconnected market economy like the EU. Russia and China, the two main countries cited by Viktor Orban [right] as models of illiberal governance, are both faltering economically because of the way they are governed politically. Second, illiberal governance tends to lead to systemic corruption, which is a drag on economic growth and a source of instability, as the situation in Russia shows. Eastern European countries have unfavorable ratings compared to other EU member states on Transparency International’s European Corruption Index.

Third, illiberal governance is vulnerable to the digital revolution, which allows increased peer-to-peer flows of information and creates horizontal pressures for change. Traditional media may have fallen under the control of illiberal regimes, but digital media have not. In Hungary, over 100,000 people took to the streets in 2014 when the government threatened to tax the use of the internet, and the government had to back down. Fourth, as the internet tax controversy shows, illiberal regimes have few institutional safety valves for citizen discontent. When popular pressures build, the regime must either back down or resort to coercion. The Euromaidan protests in Ukraine demonstrated that the use of violence by an illiberal regime can lead to greater public discontent and pressure for more radical change.

**A2: Economic interdependence has historically not lead to an increase in liberal democratization**

**Past economic interdependence existed in a different international context**

Snyder (2012)

Snyder, Jack. Power and Progress : International Politics in Transition, Routledge, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=958643.

In previous eras of extensive foreign trade and loans, multilateral economic institutions were weaker, as were the effects of interdependence on domestic economic structure. Though trade may have been at high levels, the production process of individual firms was rarely internationalized, as it is now. Consequently, the political effects of a liberal order were not deeply rooted in international institutions and domestic interests. Thus, merely pointing out that high levels of trade preceded World War I is not an argument against a strategy of neo-liberal institution building in the former Soviet bloc.

**A2 Illiberal democracies weaken EU cohesion**

**Interdependence means economic pressure would trickle back and weaken all EU states even more**

Zalan (2017)

Zalan, Eszter. “Tying EU Funds to Politics Could Be Double-Edged.” EUobserver, 24 Oct. 2017, euobserver.com/political/139617.

Using EU funds to exert political pressure would be a double-edge sword, they argue. Poland's deputy minister for economic development Jerzy Kwiecinski recently told this website that according to studies, net contributors get most of their investment back as profits. "For every euro which is invested under the cohesion policy in our countries, 80 cents come back to the EU-15 in different forms - in the form of capital transfers but also in terms of exports and other transfers. So the whole EU benefits from that," he said. "A lot of the EU money goes towards infrastructure, where western companies benefit the most," Daniel Bartha, the director of the Budapest-based Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, told EUobserver. This was confirmed by the EU's budget commissioner. In an interview earlier this year Guenther Oettinger said: "The Poles use the money to place orders with the German construction industry, to buy German machines and German trucks. So net contributors such as Germany should be interested in the structural funds. From an economic perspective, Germany isn't a net contributor but a net recipient." "The cohesion sums are small compared to the benefits," the diplomat insisted, adding that it would be "absurd" to cut into the funds. "The cohesion policy is linked to the development of the single market and to compensate weaknesses in capital and infrastructure [in some countries]," he explained. That is why, the EU official pointed out, central and eastern countries "still need those funds to continue catching up." With less EU funds, convergence will be even slower and these funds are "one of the reasons why people in the region are so pro-EU," the official added.